Lajos F. Szaszdi
* The following additional recommendations up
to and including the thirty-third were originally written between September and
October 2010.
1)
Establish independent heavy
tank battalions as the German World War II schwere panzer abteilung (heavy tank
battalion) of Tiger tanks or independent tank battalions as the U.S. Army’s 65
independent tank battalions during the Second World War.
2)
Form independent combined arms
battalions of tank/mechanized infantry battalions.
3)
Constitute semi-independent
companies (part of the independent tank battalions).
4)
Form independent battalions
capable of being deployed anywhere in the world in 48 hours. A semi-independent
tank company could be deployed in 24 hours.
5)
Combined arms battalions of
Heavy Brigade Combat teams and infantry battalions of Stryker Brigade Combat
Teams and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (equipped with Stryker APC) should also
be given independent capability in case they can be used autonomously from
their brigade unit of action.
6)
These independent battalions,
either belonging to brigade units of action or being independent tank
battalions in their own right, can be the core of composite fire brigades or
battle groups, with other units and subunits attached to them, having a modular
capability to form ad hoc operational units tasked to particular missions.
7)
The independent tank battalions
would have an organic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle reconnaissance platoon.
8)
Combat or anti-mine robots
(explosive charge robot, anti-mine MULE robot, infantry combat MULE variant,
armed IED-reconnaissance robot) could be attached to the independent tank
battalions, with each tank having the Command and Control capability to operate
the robots.
9)
Airborne glider assault
stealthy flying wings with 10-11 man capacity with GPS navigation should be
introduced.
10)
Paratroopers should air drop
with GPS devices for pinpoint landing and post-landing orientation.
11)
Commander should operate
accompanying their troops to the front, but without overexposing themselves
thanks to modern command and control technology.
12)
Senior commanders in
headquarters should not have the temptation of trying to micromanage the operations
of units on the ground, due to the advanced command and control capabilities
available today.
13)
Ground operations should make
use of Special Forces and possibly of professional mercenaries (contractors)
for raiding missions behind enemy lines, reconnaissance, destruction of supply
convoys, attack of enemy logistical facilities, neutralization of enemy
reconnaissance forces, to blind the enemy and deny it supplies and security in
support of main ground combat operations. The role of these Special Forces
would be like Trenck’s Frei Korps pandours, irregulars of the 18th century
Austrian Army who playing the role of today’s special forces successfully
harassed, destroyed supply convoys, and blinded the reconnaissance capabilities
of the Prussian forces of King Frederick the Great.
14)
In addition to the principles
of mobility, speed, surprise, there is that of tempo that should continue to be
emphasized in conventional operations.
15)
The goal in a conventional
conflict should be to be the first to arrive to the objective with all the
means available.
16)
Commanding officers on the
ground should be given broad independence and should have full faith in
accomplishing their mission, to foster initiative in the face of the fog of
war.
17)
Operations should be characterized
by their fluidity instead of being dragged by being methodical, with the goal
of finding and destroying the enemy forces, rather than holding territory.
18)
Soldiers should be well trained
at every level of command, so that if the officers have been put out of action,
the non-commissioned officers can assume command of a mission, and that even a
corporal could do so, if there are no NCOs available.
19)
Running Start1 type of operations should be adopted in
a conventional conflict, as in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which units go to
combat as soon as they arrive, not waiting for the complete ground force to be
assembled in the theater first. This concept would justify the independent tank
battalions alluded earlier, which could arrive in theater first to hold on a
front against the earlier stages of an enemy offensive, like in Georgia in
2008, arriving to a threatened area 48 hours after the beginning of an
invasion. The Russian operation lasted 5 days.
20)
Execute Effects Based
Operations (EBO), understood as mass of effective firepower and mass of effect
of speed,2 but instead of being strategic in
magnitude as in Operation Iraqi Freedom, these EBO should be limited to reach
operational and tactical objectives in support of the ground offensive.
21)
To gain the maximum firepower
for EBO at an operational level, deploy ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System)
with force-multiplier type of firepower, like air-fuel thermobaric warheads
against enemy troop concentrations caught in the open, smart anti-tank bomblets,
anti-personnel and soft-skinned submunitions, EMP (electro-magnetic pulse)
warheads against enemy command and control and computer centers, deeply buried
bunker-busting unitary warheads, and anti-radar warheads against air control,
air defense or battlefield ground radars. Also, GMLRS (guided multiple launch
rocket system) artillery rocket launchers would be useful to launch smart
bomblets, anti-tank mines or air-fuel warheads to maximize firepower in support
of Effects Based Operations at an operational level in a land battlefield.
Another weapon system that could provide superior firepower for Effects Based
Operations is the microwave beam director that could be used against masses of
enemy troops caught in the open.
22)
Deploy ATACMS and GMLRS as part
of the strike, artillery, battalion of each brigade combat team.
23)
Assigned infantrymen should
wear exoskeletons to carry and lift heavy loads that would otherwise require
more than one man or wheeled equipment.
24)
Numbers matter in terms of men
and equipment, and more robots in the field would become useful tools for the
soldier as force multipliers. Robots, however, should not be seen yet as
substitutes for men in major offensive combat operations, although combat
robots armed with weapons should be used to support the troops during combat
operations.
25)
Team up with aircraft
manufacturer Antonov of Ukraine for the production of a modernized version of
the An-225 heavy cargo plane, capable of carrying inside its cargo hold up to
200 tons of cargo or between 700 and 800 passengers that could be troops. One
single An-225 could thus be able to transport a full battalion. An independent
battalion could thus be airlifted faster to a conflict zone through a fleet of
An-225 and An-124 aircraft. With the M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank having a
combat weight of over 63 tons, an An-225 could carry three of the tanks ready
for action. The goal would be for 6 An-225 to deploy a tank company or about 18
Abrams in 24 hours anywhere in the world.
26)
The U.S. should make use for
the benefit of its forces and of NATO of the Antonov An-124 and An-225 heavy
airlifters. The use of these aircraft, in combination with the U.S. Air Force
C-17, C-130 and C-5M Super Galaxy would make possible – provided that there are
adequate airfields to land and available air routes – the transport in 96 hours
of a brigade combat team, of a division in 120 hours, of an independent tank
battalion in 48 hours, and of a tank company in 24 hours, anywhere in the
world.
27)
The U.S. Army together with
other U.S. forces should confront a conventional enemy with superior forces in
terms of numbers and the quality of equipment and men, and through the superior
use of the forces available. This does not mean the use of overwhelming ground
forces and of massive numbers of tanks and infantry compared to the total enemy
forces in the theater as predicated in the so-called Powell Doctrine. Rather,
it implies: a) The use of superior forces in terms of numbers and quality of
tanks and troops to those of the enemy at the schwerpunkt or selected breaking
point of an enemy’s front. U.S. ground forces overall in theater might be
inferior to the total number of ground forces of the enemy, but the number of
U.S. forces concentrated at the schwerpunkt would be superior to those of the
enemy they face; b) this concept is based on the principle of following if
possible a strategy of indirect approach in operational plans, exploiting the
element of surprise and the enemy’s weakest concentration of forces, thus
avoiding a frontal attack against enemy strong and prepared positions; c) the
use of overwhelming firepower as in Effects Based Operations; d) the use of
superior speed and faster decision making in maneuver warfare to keep the enemy
off-balance and prevent him from organizing its defenses once our forces have
broken its front and penetrated deep into his rear areas; e) the concentration
and/or convergence of forces and not their separation; f) the use of
qualitatively superior forces (in terms of firepower), like tank formations instead
of infantry units, to breach and crush the enemy defenses or to blunt and
destroy the spearheads of an enemy offensive; g) the superior use by the U.S.
Army of Special Forces and/or Airborne Forces to capture key strategic targets
to disarticulate the enemy’s defenses, such as the German paratroopers’ capture
of the Fort of Eben Emael in 1940, or to neutralize the enemy’s
leadership/senior command with surgical commando-style operations as when Otto
Skorzeny captured in 1944 Hungary’s seat of government in Budapest, preventing
the country’s defection to the Allies.
28)
The infantry brigade combat
teams should be trained not just for combat in an open battlefield but
particularly in an urban environment, where combat operations would more likely
take place in the 21st century. Thus, assault infantry units should also be
equipped with submachine guns in addition to assault rifles for fast combat
actions inside buildings, in rooms and in house-to-house fighting. Storm troops
armed with submachine guns for combat inside buildings would thus be armed like
special forces for urban environments such as SWAT teams and the German KSK
counter-terrorist units.
29)
In the U.S. Army emphasis
should not be on the individual soldier but on the infantry squad, with its
soldiers fighting as a team. All infantry brigade combat teams should be
equipped with Stryker armored personnel carriers (APC), with one Stryker APC
transporting one squad. The Stryker APC, with its command, control,
communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
capabilities, mobility and protection should become the “mother ship” of an
infantry squad. The infantry squad with its Stryker APC should become the cell
in the Army’s network centric body, made of battalions, battle groups and
brigades. Fighting as a team, unit modularity (allowing units and subunits to
join up into kampfgruppen or battle groups and fire brigades), and jointness
should be key words for the military.
30)
The use of redundant GPS
navigation satellites and the fast launching of replacement satellites so that
the loss due to enemy action of part of the constellation of GPS satellites
would not totally disrupt and paralyze the use of GPS satellite navigation
available to the U.S. Army and our forces in general. With the Navstar
constellation consisting of 24 satellites, four more GPS satellites should be
put in orbit as cold spares for a total of 28 satellites in orbit, and an
additional four satellites should be stored as ground spares to be launched
quickly as replacements if the need arises. A minimum of four GPS satellites is
needed for positioning, with three covering altitude and longitude, and a
fourth satellite providing altitude. Emphasis should also be placed in having
in addition redundant navigation systems to replace satellite navigation in
case it has been disabled by enemy attack.
31)
Deploy a lethal microwave
weapon based on the technology of the Sheriff vehicle-mounted microwave beam
director Active Denial System. This weapon could be employed for non-lethal
uses such as the dispersal of rioting crowds, but by graduating the power of
the microwave beam it emits, it could be used to kill enemy soldiers charging
in massed concentrations in the open, World War I-style. In case of a war with
Iran, based on the past experience of the Iraq-Iran War, such a microwave
weapon could be used to target and fry large concentrations of soldiers
attacking en masse. In a war with China, this weapon could be used to likewise
kill masses of Chinese troops attacking in the open without the need to use
nuclear or chemical weapons, and probably reducing the need to deploy large
numbers of our troops manning defensive machine gun positions, or supporting
our troops in defensive positions to break up and defeat attacks in the open by
waves of hundreds or even thousands of enemy soldiers. A directed microwave
beam weapon could also be used to destroy the electronics of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV), being employed for instance to shoot down swarms of micro UAVs
used by an enemy for electronic intelligence or as platforms for a battlefield
communications network. The microwave beam weapon would thus be useful in the
future to destroy swarms of micro UAVs launched against our troops to sting
them with lethal poison. A powerful
land-based microwave weapon could also be employed to fry the electronics of
enemy aircraft in the same way as the radar of the F-35 stealth fighter is
designed to burn the radar and avionics of enemy fighters.
32)
Mechanized infantry, the
equivalent of the German panzer grenadiers, of the Heavy Brigade Combat Teams
and the infantry of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams should wear body armor in
addition to the helmet. This body armor should be made of advanced ceramics and
synthetic fibers including breastplate, shoulder and upper arm armor
protection, abdominal armor protection, and greaves. The armor should be very
light and the armored storm troops should have in their assault rifles 40 mm
rocket launchers. They should also be capable of carrying individually several
rocket-propelled grenades for anti-tank/bunker busting missions, in addition to
a generous amount of hand grenades. Armored storm troops should be equipped to
place explosively formed projectile (EFP) mines and to lay improvised explosive
devices (IED) for defensive purposes.
33)
The level of discipline of our U.S.
troops should be Prussian in style, strict and stern, and punishment for
serious war crimes such as murder, attempted murder against our officers, rape
or torture of prisoners leading to their deaths or to crippling injuries should
be the death penalty by firing squad. This type of justice should not be an
exemption but the rule in case of such serious violations of the laws of war.
This is not going backwards to the 18th and 19th centuries, but a way to make
the U.S. Army even more professional, to make sure any crimes such as
“fragging” of our officers, and war crimes against enemy prisoners, including
suspected insurgents, and against civilians, and the rape of women in the
battlefield, either our own soldiers, prisoners of war or civilians, do not go
unpunished. The murder of prisoners, of civilians, looting, rape, and torture
in interrogations must be severely punished, including anyone in the chain of
command who would willingly allow, consent or try to hide knowingly a war
crime. Such actions as they have occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan irreparably
damage the image of the U.S. military and of the country before the world and
the population of an occupied country. Serious war crimes are a sign of a
breakdown in discipline and a violation of the laws of the United States.
Instead of winning the hearts and minds of the local population, such crimes
and transgressions, committed also by mercenaries (security contractors), only
help to fill the ranks of the insurgency and cause more casualties among our
men. Those guilty of very serious crimes committed in the field, in a friendly
country hosting one of our bases or at home should be severely punished without
exception. To make it unequivocal, respect of the rules of war and
international military law as ratified by Congress should be included as one of
the rules in the U.S. Army code of conduct. It should also be remembered that
if war criminals are not duly punished, they will eventually return to the U.S.
and could become a potential threat to those living in the country. A court
martial should be conducted with full consideration of the rights of the
accused, yet the trials should be closed and conducted in the theater of
operations, to prevent public opinion and politicians at home from interfering
with the carrying out of justice.
34)
Train and deploy high-tech
soldiers based on the Future Force Warrior concept. Conduct maneuver warfare updated
to the concept of network-centric warfare with networked command, control, communications,
computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).
35)
Use rapid reaction forces that
would not be composed of light forces but would be equipped with fast main
battle tanks (MBT), armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV), and armored
personnel carriers for defensive and offensive operations. For fast deployments
the heavy rapid reaction forces would use heavy airlifters such as the
Ukrainian An-124 and An-225 Mriya or take advantage in Europe, for example, of
high-speed trains with freight wagons to transport main battle tanks and
armored vehicles near the frontline, as the Germans panzer forces did in World
War II, when they used the railway system to deploy rapidly their tank units to
the sectors of the front where they were needed the most. The rapid reaction
forces could be battalion or regiment-sized battle groups or kampfgruppen, or
be formed by one or more brigades, by one or more divisions or by a corps.
36)
Make extensive use of unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) in support of ground operations and ground troops, for intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)/intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition
and reconnaissance (ISTAR), communications relay, close air support (CAS), electronic
warfare and cyber warfare, medical evacuation (medevac) or to transport
ammunition and supplies to the troops in the frontline.
37)
Deploy cyber warfare troops to
conduct cyber warfare operations on the battlefield. Cyber warfare shall be
treated as another dimension of warfare, along with electronic (in the
electromagnetic spectrum), ground, naval, air and space warfare.
38)
Conduct electronic warfare and
electronic attack operations together with cyber warfare against enemy
battlefield radar and communication systems.
39)
Deploy mobile counter rocket,
artillery and mortar (C-RAM) defenses for ground troops, capable to perform as
a close-in weapon system (CIWS) flak defensive operations against enemy
low-flying aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), cruise
missiles, air-to-ground missiles (AGM) including air-launched anti-tank
missiles (ATGM), and air-launched precision-guided bombs.
