Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D.
It has come to our
attention that some believe at the U.S. Naval War College that Chinese space
satellites will be able to detect and track the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier
battle groups operating in the vicinity of Taiwan during a crisis over the
island-nation, thus negating our aircraft carriers the ability to sail
undetected from Chinese attacks. Indeed, that is not an isolated opinion and it
may be that the conventional wisdom both here and in China may regard our
aircraft carriers obsolete due to the presence of Chinese reconnaissance
satellites and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM).
The fact is that in the
history of warfare there is a constant and unending struggle between action and
reaction: one side comes up with a new weapon and the other side answers with a
counter weapon, and so the process continues. Chinese intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance satellites would pose a threat to our carrier
battle groups by locating their positions from space and thus helping
coordinate combined attacks with sea-skimming supersonic missiles and anti-ship
ballistic missiles. This notwithstanding, we do have the answer to these
threats.
Ticonderoga-class
guided-missile cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers can
be armed with Standard SM-3 surface-to-air missiles (SAM )
designed to shoot down ballistic missiles like the Chinese DF-21D ASBM,
intended to attack our warships at sea. In view of the Chinese ASBM threat and
the renewed Russian ballistic missile threat, funding should be allocated for
the development of the proposed Standard SM-3
Block IIB version of the SM-3 missile, also known as the Next Generation
Aegis Missile (NGAM),
which will be designed to intercept longer-range intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM). Last year U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck
Hagel announced the defunding and cancellation of the more capable Phase 4 of the SM-3
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) missile, the SM-3 Block IIB.
The SM-3 missile can be
employed to destroy low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites
like those designed to detect ships at sea with synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
and signals intelligence (SIGINT). A laser close-in weapon system (CIWS) has
been considered for the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which would be an
effective defense against multiple sea-skimming missiles attacking a battle
group.
Moreover, the future three
DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers can generate 78 megawatts (MW) of electrical
power (see Mackenzie Eaglen’s “Changing
Course on Navy Shipbuilding: Questions Congress Should Ask Before Funding”
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder), which would enable them to be armed with a
powerful solid state laser (SSL) weapon capable of hitting ballistic missiles,
LEO satellites, and sea-skimming cruise missiles at the speed of light. In
addition, the stealth
design of the Zumwalt-class may allow each one of the three vessels to
operate stealthily and undetected close to Taiwan, ready to hit with its laser
weapon Chinese naval reconnaissance satellites once hostilities would have
begun and before the Chinese could use the satellites to locate and target our
aircraft carriers. DDG-1000s deployed close to the Island of Formosa and
relying on their stealth to survive would use their laser weapon to intercept
anti-ship ballistic missiles aimed at our carrier battle groups and ballistic
missiles attacking Taiwan. These forward deployed Zumwalt-class destroyers
could also form a first line of defense to intercept early supersonic
sea-skimming cruise missiles and attack aircraft launched to strike our
aircraft carriers.
As mentioned by Ed Timperlake
in the Second
Line of Defense Forum, the new F-35 could detect ballistic missile
launches thanks to its Electro-Optical Sensor System (EOSS), as it did by
accident during a rocket launch in Florida at a distance of about 1,287 km (800
miles). Indeed, the USMC F-35B and the U.S. Navy F-35C would be able to serve
as early warning platforms to detect and locate ballistic missile launches from
mainland China. This would not only assist anti-ballistic missile defenses in
Taiwan and at sea on our guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, but also help
direct airborne strike formations of carrier-based F-35C and unmanned combat
air vehicles (UCAV), such as the X-47B or a much bigger X-47C, on attack
missions against mobile ballistic missile transporter erector launchers (TEL)
and their air defenses.
UCAV coordinating an
attack through network-centric warfare can conduct suppression of enemy air
defenses (SEAD) and destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) missions to
eliminate surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries and air defense radars
guarding anti-ship ballistic missiles, opening a way to air strikes against
mobile ASBM transporter erector launchers. Sea-launched cruise missiles from
guided-missile cruisers and destroyers and from submarines would also
strike priority targets. In addition, the Prompt
Global Strike (PGS) weapon, which may be designed as a hypersonic
glider missile/unmanned
aircraft system (UAS) armed with a conventional warhead, could be
employed to attack priority targets such as deeply buried command and control
centers, enemy aircraft carriers and mobile ASBM launchers.
A new dimension in war will
be added to deal with the anti-ship ballistic missile threat through cyber
warfare. The use offensively of computer virus such as the U.S. Air Force Suter
3 program and more advanced follow-on versions can allow an attacker to become
system administrator of enemy computers, thus taking control of the computers
of air defense radars, mobile air defense systems and ballistic missile
launchers. This capability can be achieved after the infection of enemy computers
with the Suter virus through platforms such as Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS),
which would beam the malicious algorithm to receiving antennas. Control of an
enemy’s computers can potentially allow the attacker to neutralize and disable
the opponent’s weapon systems without having to fire a conventional weapon,
opening the possibility of even allowing the use of the adversary’s weapons
against their owners.
We can conjure the combined
threat posed by Chinese naval surveillance satellites and anti-ship ballistic
missiles, but for that adequate resources should be invested for our naval
forces to retain the technological top edge. And this is no magic but research
and development and the supply of available military technology needed to stay
one step ahead in the ongoing evolution of warfare.
