The Future of the U.S. Army: Some Considerations*

by

 

Lajos F. Szaszdi

 

* This paper dates back to August 2009.

In terms of the future of the U.S. Army and its involvement in any future war, three points must be taken always into consideration: 1) A clear knowledge and understanding of the war’s objectives and goals that the military aims to achieve; 2) The resources required to carry out the mission; 3) A clear idea of how to use those resources to achieve the war’s objectives.

The principles that shall inspire the Army’s modernization drive, principles that should also inspire its future conventional military operations are: mobility, speed, and surprise.

For the Army to fulfill its mission, the U.S. armed forces should achieve superiority and domination in at least four spaces of operation in a conventional conflict: 1) the land space; 2) the air space; 3) the outer space (navigation, communications and reconnaissance satellites); 4) cyber space.

The concept of rapid reaction forces and tank forces power projection can be further extended by airlifting one or several Heavy Brigade Combat Team(s) (HBCT) to a Landing Zone already secured by airborne forces, for the purpose of blocking the advance of invading enemy mobile spearheads. This conventional warfare scenario could take place in Ukraine or Central Asia. In addition to using the C-17B (ERFCS) airlifter, the U.S. should show interest in acquiring Ukraine’s Antonov An-124-300, equipped with U.S. engines and avionics. This cargo plane is capable of transporting from 120 metric tons to a maximum of 150 metric tons of cargo, compared to the 75-ton capacity of the C-17B. The Lockheed C-5M Galaxy RERP upgrade allows for a maximum payload increase to 122 metric tons of cargo. The concept of maneuver warfare and fast deployment is developed by the use of airborne forces landing in a forward area, securing a Landing Zone for the transport aircraft airlifting a Heavy Brigade Combat Team, which would oppose the advance of an enemy spearhead, and link up with friendly forces advancing to the Landing Zone. A HBCT could also be landed in the rear of the enemy, to widen an air-landing beachhead and take the enemy between two fires, by those of the air-landed HBCT attacking from behind and by the fire of the friendly forces facing the front of the enemy. The schwerpunkt of attack would not be only a point in the enemy line to be pierced by our forces opposing the enemy frontline, but the point of the air landing of the Heavy Brigade Combat Teams behind the enemy lines, for the purpose of helping break the enemy front by acting in concert and coordination with our main forces facing the enemy. The idea would be to catch the enemy between an anvil and a hammer. Air power projection of U.S. armored units of action will provide the mobility, speed and surprise for rapid reaction operations that transport by sea, rail or road would not provide.

Even though there is no jungle theater of operations in which our forces are involved, one way to adapt our forces to fight an insurgency operating in a jungle is to develop jungle brigades trained to live and fight in the jungle, like the enemy guerrillas. The jungle brigades would spend tours of 5-6 months at a time, seeking the enemy to destroy it. One example of such a force, trained to fight and live in the jungle, were the Chindits of the British army fighting the Japanese in the Burmese and Indian jungle during the Second World War.

Indeed, the composite unit recommendation can be adapted for the ground forces. For instance, the commander of a Heavy Brigade Combat Team could include elements of a Airborne Brigade Combat Team as part of an armored thrust task force or kampfgruppe consisting also of other elements like an attack helicopter battalion of Apache helicopters from a Combat Aviation Brigade, or a MLRS (Multiple-Launch Rocket System) battalion or company from an artillery brigade. A Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action (Heavy Brigade Combat Team, Infantry Brigade Combat Team – IBCT - or Stryker Brigade Combat Team – SBCT) could serve as the core for composite units having attached to it elements from other formations, such as attack helicopters, MLRS batteries, airborne troops or air assault troops with their transport helicopters. Such composite units – or indeed the Brigade Units of Action - would be modular, in that elements from other units could be attached to them depending on the particular mission – like attaching more sniper sections if there is a need for more than the two sections allotted to a Heavy Brigade Combat Team to fulfill a mission in an urban environment, or adding a cyber warfare company, a military intelligence company, a signals company, an anti-armor company, a Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadron or an air defense company.  

Composite units can be formed by combining, in accordance to the operational requirements, the tactical situation and the forces available, subunits from Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, from military aviation (helicopter) units, from artillery units, airborne forces, air assault, armored cavalry, armored infantry, air defense, special forces, combat engineers, mountain troops, Marine Corps, and even mercenaries (private security firm contractors). Put together through a concept of unit and subunit modularity, the ad hoc Task Force or kampfgruppe would function and be held together under a single Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system. The composite units should be a self-contained combined arms force, including infantry, armor, artillery, UAV, anti-RAM (rocket, artillery and mortar) air defense, cyber warfare, engineers, and military intelligence.  

Equipment:

The operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown the value of heavy armored vehicles in counter-insurgency operations, making of little value the light-armor concept for manned vehicles that was proposed with the Future Combat Systems (FCS).

China is apparently developing a Main Battle Tank (MBT) armed with a 152 mm gun, the CSU 152. There is reportedly a version of this tank that could be armed with an 88 mm liquid propellant or electro-thermal chemical gun. Russia is reportedly developing a Main Battle Tank with a 135 mm smoothbore gun, the T-95, and there seems to be another Russian MBT under development to be armed with a smoothbore 152 mm gun. The U.S. should consider upgrading its Abrams MBT with a 140 mm smoothbore gun in case Russia introduces a tank armed with a 135 mm gun. Germany and Switzerland have already tested a 140 mm smoothbore gun for their Leopard 2 MBT. It is recommended that in case the Russians and the Chinese introduce Main Battle Tanks with a 152 mm smoothbore gun, the U.S. should consider developing an Abrams MBT successor with a 155 mm gun, or with a liquid propellant or electro-thermal chemical gun with equivalent or greater range and penetrating power.

The successor to the Abrams Main Battle Tank should have a radar stealth design, anti-radar coatings, the latest generation of explosive reactive armor (ERA), an active defense systems, an electro-optical countermeasures system, and the fire-control system (FCS) should include a radar in addition to the laser range-finder. It is recommended that a fifth crewmember should be added to a future MBT as a dedicated operator of the vehicle’s Battlefield Management System and its Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) functions, in addition to the tank’s commander, gunner, loader and driver. Each Abrams and future MBT should be fitted with a C4ISR that would allow Command and Control of the tank in which it is fitted, Command and Control of other tanks up to a platoon and company, and to serve as a command post for the battalion commander. C4ISR systems should be provided to MBT, IFCV, APC

U.S. MBT and Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicles (AIFV) should be able to receive directly via datalink real-time targeting and intelligence video images collected by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). U.S. MBT and AIFV should be equipped when operational an active/adaptive camouflage system which is “a new form of active stealth… At the flick of a switch, objects can be made to virtually disappear by matching their background.” (Military Technology, July 2009, pp. 64-65).

U.S. military vehicles, including MBT, AIFV, Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) like the Stryker, and other utility vehicles should be able to use synthetic fuels (diesel and gasoline derived from coal and natural gas) and biodiesel from peanut oil, for example.

Artillery has been dubbed the “god of war,” showing its value more recently in Afghanistan. After the unfortunate cancellation of the Crusader self-propelled howitzer, and the recent cancellation of the Future Combat System’s Non-Line-of-Sight Cannon, there is not a replacement for the M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzer. It is recommended that planned upgrades for the Paladin should be implemented. The System Improvement Plan (SIP) proposes upgrades in 15 subsystems in the following areas: “computer growth, improved accuracy, increased rate of fire, survivability, reliability, availability and maintainability and crew/safety comfort.” Among the proposed improvements are: “advanced digital display allowing for future expansion to include items such as Interactive electronic technical manuals and situational awareness screens.… Improvements to the rate of fire are being studied including addition of a laser ignition system, a semi-automatic loader and an automatic fuze setter…. Other individual upgrades proposed by the SIP include an upgrade to the digital communications speed, laser range-finder, installation of a driver’s thermal viewer to replace the current image intensification device, hull vulnerability reduction and an upgrade to the Prognostic/Diagnostic Interface Unit (PDIU).” The improvements of the Enhanced Paladin Demonstrator, proposed as a private venture by BAE Systems, include a “155 mm 52 caliber barrel, additional armour, semi-automatic ammunition handling, upgraded suspension and additional ammunition capacity.” (Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, p. 787). These upgrades should also take place.   

It is proposed that the Stryker APC should be supplied, in addition to the 6 Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, to the 8 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT), to equip the 2 infantry battalions of each IBCT when deployed to combat zones. When deployed in non-combat zones the troops of an Infantry Brigade Combat Team would be transported in Military Tactical Vehicles (MTV) trucks. To ensure the protection of the infantrymen in a theater of operations where the enemy could ambush anywhere, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the deployed IBCT should thus be equipped with the Stryker APC.

By providing the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with Stryker armored personnel carriers, these Brigade Units of Action would become from light infantry units to medium combat units, upgrading their combat rating. Their structure would still be centered on 2 infantry battalions, 1 reconnaissance squadron, 1 field artillery battalion, 1 Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), and 1 Brigade Special Troops Battalion (BSTB). In an Infantry Brigade Combat Team, each Stryker APC would become for the infantry squad of 9 men it can carry like a “mother ship,” not only providing the soldiers it carries improved mobility, speed, protection and firepower when compared to a MTV truck, but also a command center for the squad unit, due to the Stryker’s own C4ISR system.

In addition, the 105 mm gun version of the Stryker, the Mobile Gun System (MGS), should be supplied as well to the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams to provide them with their own “tank” fire support against enemy combat vehicles, bunkers and strong points in urban areas.

The U.S. Army should supply to all its Brigade Units of Action, such as Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, as organic parts of each Brigade Unit of Action a laser gun defense system. This defense system, such as the Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser (MTHEL), the High Energy Laser for Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (HELARM), and the Solid State Heat Capacity Laser (SSHCL), should have a single 100 kW laser beam capable of intercepting and destroying artillery Rockets, Artillery shells and Mortar rounds (RAM). This laser defense system should be fully mobile and supplied to a specialized RAM defense platoon or company-size subunit in the Brigade Unit of Action. For instance, a RAM defense platoon can operate with the Target Acquisition platoon (in charge of counter-fire and counter-mortar radars) of a Heavy Brigade Combat Team. Another laser defense system, with a more powerful 200 kW beam and fully mobile like the proposed GARDIAN (sic), should defend the Brigade Unit of Action against cruise missiles, UAV, and air-to-surface missiles and bombs. A 200 kW mobile laser weapon might not need to be made an integral part of the Brigade Units of Action like the 100 kW mobile laser weapon should, and it could be attached to them in case of war against an enemy with air power.

A proposed system named Zeus and using the Solid State Heat Capacity Laser (SSHCL) to be mounted on a HMMWV to clear land mines on the surface and unexploded ordnance should be adopted.

From the Future Combat Systems program, the Army should preserve: the Class I (approved) and the Class IV (still pending a final decision) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) – (Class II and Class III have been cancelled); the unattended munitions Non-Line-Of-Sight Launch System (NLOS LS) missile launch system (approved); the Unattended Ground Sensors (approved); the Network and its operating principle (approved), in which the weapon systems and systems in the subunits of a Brigade Unit of Action are Networked Systems (Nodes) linked together by the (former FCS) Network following the concept of network-centric warfare; and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) such as the Small (Manpackable) UGV (approved), and the combat ARV-A (L), MULE: (Countermine) and MULE: (Transport) UGV (future fate uncertain). Support must be given for the development and deployment of robots and UGV after the cancellation of the FCS Armed Robotic Vehicle. For instance, the combat version of the MULE, the ARV-A (L), should be acquired if it is developed successfully to provide fire support to the soldier on foot as well as reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA). The future of warfare would see the increased use of autonomous robotic and unmanned vehicles, thus adequate investment should be spent in their development. This development would push forward the growth in the use of artificial intelligence and more advanced and versatile autonomous vehicles in combat. Moreover, workable robotic systems should be deployed operationally to place the U.S. Army in the cutting edge of 21st century warfare.

 

Hybrid Warfare:

The 2006 Lebanon War is by no means the first instance of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare is understood as a conflict in which conventional warfare, guerrilla war and counterinsurgency, and terrorism are mixed in the same war. For example, during the Napoleonic wars, Napoleon had to deploy 100,000 men and his cavalry in Spain to fight not only the Spanish, Portuguese and British armies under Wellington, but also the guerrillas that attacked its lines of communication and rear areas with hit and run tactics. After his defeat in Russia, Napoleon could not finish off the allied armies it defeated in Germany because his cavalry was in Spain fighting both conventional forces and the Spanish guerrillas. We saw in World War II the conventional war being accompanied by the insurgency warfare of the Soviet partisans in the Eastern Front, of Tito’s partisans in the former Yugoslavia, of the Maquis in France. We also saw in World War II before the Normandy landings the use by the French Maquis of terrorist acts against German forces, such as the bombing of German officers sitting in a café, the murder of those accused of collaborating with the Germans, etc., with some attacks not dissimilar to those committed later by the Spanish Basque terrorist organization E.T.A. in Spain. The Vietnam War is another instance in which conventional warfare, and insurgency warfare and terrorism by the Vietcong took place. Hybrid warfare is not a new phenomenon but actually a type of war that has seen before. The U.S. Army should therefore be prepared to fight both types of war, conventional and counterinsurgency/counter-terrorist, simultaneously for historical experience has demonstrated that these types of warfare are bound to happen and coexist more often than expected in one conflict.

Hunter-Killer Battlegroups: A solution against the Taliban

 

Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D.

 

 

One possible solution to defeating militarily the Taliban insurgency could be the use of flexible tactical and operational formations centered on Hunter-Killer Battlegroups to search for elusive Taliban guerrilla groups in known areas of operation, surround them once located, and destroy them. The Hunter-Killer Battlegroups when in an area of reported Taliban activity would mainly operate in the countryside, with vehicles well-spaced in open formations, in search for reported Taliban hideouts and concentration of forces, trying to avoid main roads and traveling in convoy columns to avoid being attacked by car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IED), and mines purposely buried to hit their vehicles.

 

Once an enemy force is located with the assistance, for example, of airborne and space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, Target-Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platforms, a Battlegroup or Battlegroups, operating always together with special forces and/or airborne troops, would surround the enemy with the use of the helicopter-born rapid reaction airborne troops and/or special forces to destroy the adversary. Like a white blood cell finding a germ, a Hunter-Killer Battlegroup would search for the enemy, find them, surround them, and obliterate them. Again, like several white blood cells close to each other but acting autonomously, various Hunter-Killer Battlegroups would operate simultaneously against separate bands of Taliban in an area or theater of operations, to prevent them from escaping or from supporting each other.  

 

Mobility, combined-arms firepower and flexibility are key for the success of the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup concept. The idea is to take the battle to the enemy instead of waiting to be attacked by them. This concept would involve air-land maneuver warfare. The concept has been inspired by the infantry tactics reportedly used by the Sinhalese army to defeat the Tamil Tigers guerrillas. Thus, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly: “Specially trained small infantry groups were the leading combat elements of army formations - division-sized battle groups of infantry and supporting arms…. The employment of these small groups along the entire front… resulted in simultaneity of operations that confused and overloaded the Tigers’ leadership, a [Sinhalese] formation commander said.”1 Since in Afghanistan there are not defined front lines, the small infantry groups – made up by airborne troops and/or special forces – would operate jointly with the Battlegroups to hunt down the enemy groups and destroy them. 

 

Other sources of inspiration have been the British Army’s concept of the Battlegroup,2 and the German use of Kampfgruppen (battlegroups) during the Second World War, in which case and on the battlefield a Kampfgruppe could flexibly be formed on the spot from available units, putting together in some cases a mixed force of tanks and assault guns, armored cars of reconnaissance units, armored personnel carriers (APC), self-propelled artillery and/or other supporting arms, Panzer Grenadiers (armored infantry), regular infantry or paratroopers.

 

Following the concept of the British Army’s Battlegroup, the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup would have a company of 14-16 Abrams M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Package) Main Battle Tanks (MBT).3 The inclusion of MBT in the Battlegroup would provide firepower and the impressive presence of attacking Abrams may put the enemy to flight abandoning their positions, enabling other units like the special forces and airborne troops to catch the fleeing Taliban in the open. The heavy forces of a Hunter-Killer Battlegroup would be the anvil and the special infantry units the hammer and vice versa. Reportedly, “[t]he Abrams is mostly impervious to the RPG,” in reference to the RPG-7 (Rocket Propelled Grenade) and based on operational experience in Iraq.4 The Taliban fighters are armed with this type of weapon. Moreover, in reference to Canada’s use of MBT in Afghanistan, it was reported that “[w]herever Leopard 2A6M CAN MBTs have appeared, they have dominated the battlefield and the Taliban usually tries to avoid them altogether.”5 

 

Following the British model, the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup could have at least a company of Bradley armored infantry fighting vehicles and another company of Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers, together with supporting arms like artillery and mortars, and reconnaissance and engineer units. In the British concept, the “Battlegroup organization is very flexible and the units assigned can be quickly regrouped to cope with a change in the threat,” and the “Battlegroup is…structured according to task, with the correct mix of infantry, armour and supporting arms.”6 Four Battlegroups would form a Brigade and three Brigades will compose a Division, for a total of 12 Battlegroups - the “white blood cells” - per Division involved in the offensive operations.7

 

Additional recommendations are:

 

• Employ also in the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup, because of their mobility and flexibility, Stryker M1126 ICV versions such as the M1127 Reconnaissance, M1128 MGS (Motor Gun System) armed with a 105 mm gun, M1129 120 mm Mortar, M1130 Command equipped with C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), the M1132 engineer version with equipment for mine clearance, and the M1133 Medical Evacuation Vehicle.8
• Use the Sheriff Active Denial System (ADS), armed “with a roof-mounted, non-lethal, high-powered microwave system” with an approximate range of 1,000 meters. The system beams “millimetre wave electromagnetic energy” to force individuals to withdraw as they cannot stand the heat on the skin of the energy being directed at them.9 This system could be useful to force those inside a compound to flee, leaving them exposed to the open.  
• Employ as part of the support arms of the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup the Paladin M109A6 SIP (System Improvement Plan) self-propelled artillery system.10
• The special infantry units and infantry from the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup could use the “cross-country motorbike”11 for enhanced mobility. This would replicate the Taliban use of cross-country motorbikes for increased mobility. An idea  would be in some instances to fight the Taliban like the Taliban fight us.
• To support the special infantry units, i.e., the airborne troops and special forces, use the German-made Wiesel 1 and Wiesel 2 versions or any other equivalent airborne tracked armored vehicle. The Wiesel 1 Mk 20, which is armed with a 20 mm cannon, is in service with the paratroopers of the German Army. Its armor provides protection to the crew against 7.62 mm caliber arms and shell shrapnel. A single CH-53 helicopter or a CH-47 Chinook helicopter can carry 2 Wiesel 1 or 2 Wiesel 2 internally. There is also a Reconnaissance Wiesel 1 version.12 The Wiesel 2 family of vehicles include an armored personnel carrier, 120 mm mortar carrier, ambulance, the Wiesel 2 Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle, the Wiesel 2 Mobile Command Post, an ammunition carrier, the PRIMUS (“Programme for Intelligent Mobile Unmanned Systems”) robot carrier, and the Wiesel 2 ARGUS, “Airtransportable Armoured Surveillance and Reconnaissance Vehicle” for “reconnaissance, scout missions, battlefield surveillance, artillery observation, command missions and security missions.”13 The Wiesel 2 is also in service with the German paratroopers. These vehicles can provide the special infantry units with mobility on the ground as well as increased firepower, greater reconnaissance reach, on site enhanced battlefield command and control capability, limited armored protection, and organic armor support.  
• As Taliban fighters equipped with RPG-7 launchers with additional grenades, the infantry of the Hunter-Killer Battlegroups and the special infantry units should be equipped with portable rocket launchers with 2-3 extra rounds, to give the individual infantryman enhanced firepower for “defeating bunkers and penetrating timber, brick, reinforced concrete, sandbag walls and other structures” and destroying vehicles including those with light armor protection.14 Such weapons are the U.S. MPIM (Multipurpose Individual Munition)/SRAW (Short Range Assault Weapon) and the SMAW (Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon).15 Another option may be the German Bunkerfaust, which was reportedly tested by the U.S. Equipped with a “computerised sight with an eye-safe laser range-finder,” the Bunkerfaust extends its effective range to 600 meters, having a minimum range of 11 meters, compared to the MPIM/SRAW and SMAW maximum effective range of 500 meters, and minimum effective range of the MPIM/SRAW of 17 meters.16 The SRAW is also credited with an effective maximum range of 600 meters against fixed targets.17    
• In addition to using UAV for ISR operations and to attack enemy targets, some UAVs could be used as decoys as they carry out their ISR missions to attract Taliban fire and thus discover their position.          
• Needless to say, the Hunter-Killer Battlegroups and the special infantry units would all be network-linked, coordinating their actions through Network Centric Warfare operations. 

 

Although it may be too late to introduce the type of units proposed in this study in Afghanistan, in light of President Obama’s announcement to withdraw U.S. combat troops, the concept of the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup may be useful for future counter-insurgency operations.

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*This paper dates back to June 2011.

1 Rohan Gunasekera, “Infantry tactics ‘key to defeating Tamil Tigers,’” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 15, 2011, p. 25.

2 The British Army, “Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups,” armedforces.co.uk, at http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0014.html (June 23, 2011).

3 The British Army, “Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups;” Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, 28th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2007), p. 171.

4 Gordon L. Rottman, Stryker Combat Vehicles, New Vanguard No. 121 (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2006), p. 42.

5 Carl Schulze, Canadian Leopard 2A6M CAN, International Special Nº 8002 (Erlangen, Germany: Tankograd Publishing, 2010), p. 6.

6 The British Army, “Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups.”

7 The British Army, “Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups.”

8 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, p. 663.

9 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, p. 663.

10 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, p. 787.

11 Peter Blume, Panzertruppe ‘2010.’ German Panzer Forces in the 21^st Century, Militärfahrzeug Spezial Nº 5023 (Erlangen, Germany: Tankograd Publishing, 2009), p. 54.

12 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, pp. 239-40, 331.

13 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, pp. 331-33.

14 Richard D. Jones and Charles Q. Cutshaw, eds., Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2004-2005, 30th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), p. 163.

15 Jones and Cutshaw, Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2004-2005, pp. 178-79.

16 Jones and Cutshaw, Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2004-2005, pp. 163-64, 178-80.

17 GlobalSecurity.org, “Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM)/Predator Short Range Assault Weapon (SRAW),” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/sraw.htm (June 23, 2011).