By Dr. Lajos Szászdi León-Borja
The following
are some examples of actual or suspected senior members of the Russian
intelligence community occupying high positions in government and in boards of
state corporations:
A prominent example
is Igor Sechin, who was Deputy Prime Minister for energy and mineral extraction
in Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s government and at the same time Chairman of
the Board of Directors of Rosneft, Russia’s state oil company. Before the 2008 international
financial crisis Rosneft was the largest oil company in Russia in terms of
capitalization. Sechin, who was before the Kremlin’s Deputy Chief of the
Presidential Administration, was proposed to become the Chairman of the Board
of Inter RAO UES, Russia’s state monopoly for the export and import of
electricity. Originally from St. Petersburg and a close associate of Putin, it
is believed that he was an intelligence officer while working as a Portuguese
translator in Mozambique and Angola for Soviet trade representatives.46
Currently Sechin
is “President, Chairman of the Management Board, [and] Vice-chairman of Board
of directors of Rosneft.”47 He was
“Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation” from 2008 to 2012, and is
“Chairman of the Board of Directors at OJSC ROSNEFTEGAZ, LLC National Petroleum
Consortium, LLC RN-RDC, OJSC Inter-RAO, JSC FESRC, CJSC SPIMEX,….”48 SPIMEX is the St. Petersburg
International Mercantile Exchange, “Russia’s Largest Commodities Exchange.”49 The main activity of Rosneftegaz,
according to the Emerging Markets Information Service (EMIS), is the
exploitation of natural gas, but it is also “a Russian company which manages
state assets in the oil and gas industry.”50
In this regard, Rosneftegaz controls “75.16% shares of Rosneft, and 10.74%
shares of Gazprom. 100% of Rosneftegaz is state-owned.” Rosneftegaz controls
also “7% of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.”51
The National Petroleum Consortium or “National Oil Consortium owns and operates
oil projects in Venezuela and Cuba’s state-run oil company Cubapetroleo.” The
National Petroleum Consortium performs “as a subsidiary of OJSC OC Rosneft.”52 JSC FESRC is the Far Eastern
Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Center, which is a subsidiary of the state company
United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), part of Russian Technologies or
Rostekhnologii, the largest Russian state military-industrial corporate
conglomerate. The Far Eastern Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Center incorporates
“shipbuilding and ship repair yards located in the Far Eastern Federal District
including those in Kamchatka, Khabarovsky Krai and Primorsky Krai.”53
Another example
is Sergei Ivanov, who was Deputy Prime Minister in the Putin Cabinet and also was
Chairman of the Board of the United Aircraft Corporation, which incorporates
all the major aircraft manufacturers of Russia and is a part of the state-owned
mega-conglomerate Rostekhnologii. Ivanov, a native of St. Petersburg, is also a
friend of Putin from the days in the KGB, becoming in the 1990s a general of
the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).54
There is Sergei
Naryshkin, who became in May 2008 the Kremlin’s Chief of the Presidential
Administration, a position he held till 2011 when in December of that year he
became Speaker of the State Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament.55 He is also an associate of Putin and a
native of St. Petersburg. Naryshkin is suspected of having been a KGB agent
working covertly at the Soviet embassy in Belgium as an economic advisor and a
State Committee for Science and Technology (a technical intelligence body)
specialist. In addition to his Kremlin office, Naryshkin was Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation, which is
also part of Rostekhnologii. He was also Deputy Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Rosneft.56
Viktor Ivanov, a
career KGB officer who was Deputy Director of the FSB before becoming Deputy
Chief of the Presidential Administration. After that he became Aide to the
President during Putin’s presidency and before Dmitry Medvedev was elected Russian
president. Ivanov was Chairman of the Board of Directors of Aeroflot, the
Russian state airline, and was also Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Almaz-Antey, the company that produces state-of-the–art surface-to-air missile
systems. Almaz-Antey also belongs to Rostekhnologii. Ivanov advocated the
creation of a machine tool’s state conglomerate based on the state company
Stankoimport.57
Sergei Chemezov,
a KGB intelligence officer in East Germany who confessed in an interview of
having been Putin’s neighbor in Dresden. Chemezov is General Director of
Rostekhnologii, previously occupying the post of General Director of
Rosoboronexport State Corporation, which holds the monopoly of Russia’s arms
exports.58 Chemezov is now a Member
of the Board of Directors of Aeroflot, and he is also Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Almaz-Antey.59 The
General Director of Russian Technologies State Corporation is also the “Chairman
of the Board of Directors in JSC Rosoboronexport, JSC United Industrial
corporation Oboronprom,…JSC VSMPO-AVISMA Corporation, JSC AVTOVAZ, JSC KAMAZ,
JSCB NOVIKOMBANK, National information-computing systems LLC.”60 In addition, Chemezov is a “Member of
the Board of Directors in JSC United Aviation Corporation, JSC United
Shipbuilding Corporation, JSBC INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CLUB, JSC Rosnano, [and]
JSC Norilsk Nickel mining company.”61
He is also a “member of the High Council in United Russia,”62 the political party that backs
Vladimir Putin and the dominant force in the State Duma. VSMPO-AVISMA
Corporation is the world’s leading manufacturer of titanium,63 Rosnano or Rusnano Corporation is
tasked with developing in Russia nanotechnologies and “the nanoindustry,”64 and Norilsk Nickel is “the world’s
largest producer of nickel and palladium.”65
Another example
of a former member of Russian (Soviet) intelligence occupying a high position
in a state company is Anatoly Isaykin, the General Director of Rosoboronexport
and reportedly a former member of “KGB Special Forces.”66
Yevgeny Primakov,
who was the President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Russia and a
leading senior politician and foreign policy “wise man.” Before becoming Foreign
Minister and Prime Minister, Primakov was Director of the Foreign Intelligence
Service (SVR) from 1991 to 1996 under President Boris Yeltsin. Previously,
Primakov was chief of the Soviet KGB’s First Main Directorate (tasked with
intelligence operations abroad) and First Deputy Chairman of the KGB from
September to November 1991, and then Director of Gorbachev’s newly formed
Central Intelligence Service of the U.S.S.R. from November to December 1991. At
least from 1966 – if not from 1962 - to 1970 he is believed to have worked as a
covert KGB agent in Arab countries under cover as an “analyst, deputy editor,
[and] staff correspondent of the newspaper Pravda.”67
Alexander
Medvedev, who is Director General of Gazprom export and Deputy Chairman of
Gazprom’s Management Committee. He is suspected of having been an undercover
KGB operative while working at the Soviet Donaubank in Vienna, at the same time
as Andrei Akimov, who is suspected also of having been an undercover KGB agent,
worked at the Donaubank in Vienna. Akimov also worked at the Soviet
Vneshtorgbank in Switzerland, and he is Chairman of the Management Board of
Gazprombank, the Russian gas state monopoly’s bank.68
Petr Fradkov,
the elder son of former Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, now Director of the
SVR, was Deputy Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), the Russian state Foreign
Economic Affairs Bank. Mikhail Fradkov’s younger son graduated from the FSB
Academy.69
Vladimir
Yakunin, the President of the Russian Railways state company, it is believed he
was a covert KGB intelligence officer while working in the Soviet Committee for
Foreign Trade Relations, and during his six years at the Soviet Union’s mission
to the United Nations. Graduating from an institute in Leningrad, Yakunin probably
served in the Leningrad branch of the KGB during the ‘70s like Putin.70
Sergei S.
Ivanov, son of former Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, was from 2008-2009 the
First Vice-President of Gazprombank, from 2009 to 2011 Deputy Chairman of the Management
Board of Gazprombank, and since 2011 is the Chairman of the Management Board of
the Sogaz Insurance Group.71 In
this position Sergei S. Ivanov is also a Member of the Board of Gazprombank.72 In 2004 “Sogaz was wholly owned by the
Gazprom group,” which that year sold a majority of its shares in the insurance
group to companies belonging to Bank Rossiya.73
By 2014 Bank Rossiya’s subsidiary Abros owned a 51% stake of Sogaz, yet
recently Abros reduced the amount of shares in the insurance group it
controlled to below 50%. The reason for this was so that Sogaz would avoid
being targeted by U.S. sanctions imposed on Bank Rossiya to punish Russia for
its intervention in Ukraine.74 It
should be added that one of the founders of Bank Rossiya back in 1990 is
Vladimir Yakunin, an “associate of Putin” being targeted also by U.S.
sanctions. In this regard, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
“Bank Rossiya is the personal bank for senior officials of the Russian
Federation.”75
Andrei Patrushev
is the younger son of Army General of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary
of the Security Council and former Director of the FSB. Andrei belongs also to
the FSB and has served as an advisor of Chairman of the Board of Rosneft Igor
Sechin. Before this position Andrei Patrushev oversaw the oil industry from a
high-ranking position in the FSB, and it is said that as an advisor of Sechin
he was involved in the government’s seizure of Yukos. The older son of Nikolai
Patrushev, Dmitry Patrushev, was Vice-President of the state External Trading
Bank or Vneshtorgbank (VTB), where he oversaw the granting of credits to oil
companies.76
Yury
Zaostrovtsev, Colonel of the FSB who was Deputy Director of the Federal
Security Service and whose father, Yevgeny Zaostrovtsev, was a Major General of
the FSB. As a senior officer of the KGB Yevgeny Zaostrovtsev had under his
authority the former Director of the FSB Nikolai Patrushev.77 It has been reported that Yury
Zaostrovtsev received its intelligence service training in the KGB in St.
Petersburg (then Soviet Leningrad), having been suggested that he has ties to
Vladimir Putin due to this.78 Reportedly
he worked in the “department of economic counterintelligence” of the Russian
Ministry of Security (MB) – the post-Soviet successor of the KGB - up to 1993,
joining in 1998 the Russian Presidential Administration.79 It should be mentioned in this regard that
Putin in 1997 became Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration of
President Boris Yeltsin and his Chief of the President’s Main Control Directorate
in Moscow, being promoted in 1998 to First Deputy Chief of the Presidential
Administration before Yeltsin appointed him Director of the FSB later that
year.80 Zaostrovtsev’s reported appointment to
the Presidential Administration would have been part of a trend in Yeltsin’s
presidency, particularly in his later years, of having members of the Russian
intelligence community being appointed to positions in high-level bodies of the
Russian government.81
According to the
Moscow Times, it was reported by the newspaper Novaya Gazeta that Yury
Zaostrovtsev worked in various companies, one of which was Medoks, a subsidiary
of the company Siberian Aluminum, which in turn was “a major shareholder in
Russian Aluminum.”82 Russian
Aluminum or RUSAL was in 2011 the biggest aluminum company in the world.83 Presumably Zaostrovtsev would have
worked in the corporate sector between 1993 and 1998, having been claimed
publicly that he left the career as intelligence officer in 1993 only to return
in 1998 to work for the FSB.84 The reality
is that once a member of the KGB, always a member, whether the spy agency
changed names to MB, FSK, SVR or FSB.85
The notion that a career Russian intelligence officer would leave the
intelligence service during the period of President Yeltsin to work for the
Russian government or in the corporate sector would have been in reality a
subterfuge to hide the fact that still was working for Russian intelligence
undercover.
Yury
Zaostrovtsev was head of the FSB “Department of Economic Security” and later
became First Deputy Chairman of Vnesheconombank – “State Corporation ‘Bank for
Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank).’”86 Earlier and as Deputy Director of the
FSB Yury Zaostrovtsev became a member of the Board of Directors of the Russian
state airline Aeroflot.87 In
addition, FSB Deputy Director Zaostrovtsev became a member of the Board of
Directors of state-owned Sovcomflot,88
“the largest Russian shipping company” and also “one of the world’s leading
energy transporters” with one of the world’s top five tanker fleets.89 It should be added that the Director
of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, who previously replaced Yury Zaostrovtsev as
head of the FSB “Department of Economic Security,” was also a member of the
Board of Directors of Sovcomflot.90
There is also
Gennady Timchenko, considered to be an influential Russian businessman with
close ties to Vladimir Putin, and who is because of those connections to the
Russian President the target of Western sanctions in response to Russia’s intervention
in Ukraine.91 By 2014 Timchenko
controlled the Gunvor Group, an international crude oil trading company that is
the fourth in the world in terms of size, and had an estimated wealth of $15.3
billion dollars. According to Forbes magazine, Timchenko was “one of the most
powerful people in Russia.”92 It has
been reported that Timchenko was a member of the KGB’s 1st Chief Main
Directorate, responsible for foreign intelligence operations – the same KGB
Directorate in which Putin allegedly worked.93
It was claimed also that Timchenko knows Putin since the later part of the
decade of the 80s of the last century, meeting the future Russian President by
way of the KGB.94 Putin himself
reportedly acknowledged in 2011 that he met Timchenko while the future Russian
leader worked in the city administration of St. Petersburg in the decade of the
90s of the 20th century.95 It
should be mentioned that it was alleged that Putin worked for the reformist
Mayor Anatoly Sobchak of St. Petersburg not as a former member of the KGB that
already left its service, but actually as an undercover KGB agent tasked to
infiltrate the Russian city’s administration.96
President Vladimir Putin’s career in the KGB began in 1975, having attained the
rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the KGB by the time of the demise of the Soviet
Union in 1991. Despite the claim that he retired from the KGB, it is highly
probable that he remained an active undercover agent in order to infiltrate as
a “civilian” the St. Petersburg city administration and later the Russian
government of President Yeltsin. Having won the trust of Yeltsin, Putin was
appointed Director of the FSB in 1998.97
According to The
Guardian, the oil trading Gunvor Group, which is based in the Swiss canton of
Zug, “in 2007 posted profits of $8bn on a turnover of $43bn, an astronomic
figure, according to industry experts.”98
Russian political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky, founder of Moscow’s National
Strategy Institute and one who according to the Associated Press is “believed to
have close ties to Kremlin insiders,” claimed that Putin owned “at least 75%” of
Gunvor in claims made back in 2007.99
Belkovsky also claimed that Putin “effectively” controlled a 37% stake of
Surgutneftegaz with a value of $20 billion dollars back then, with the oil
company being the third in Russia in terms of oil production.100 Surgutneftegaz “accounts for almost
13% of the country’s crude output and 25% of gas produced by [Russian] domestic
oil companies.”101 Already back in 2004,
Surgutneftegaz was regarded “to have close ties to the Kremlin,”102 with Vladimir Putin having won that
year his reelection as Russian President. Belkovsky also claimed that Putin
controlled 4.5% of Gazprom shares.103
Gazprom is the biggest natural gas company in the world, owning the largest gas
reserves on the planet, and it is the world’s second largest oil and natural gas
company.104
Belkovsky
claimed in 2007 that Putin’s secret fortune based on the worth of assets he allegedly
controlled in Gunvor Group, Surgutneftegaz, and Gazprom was of “at least $40bn.
Maximum we cannot know. I suspect there are some businesses I know nothing
about….It may be more. It may be much more.” He also added that “Putin’s name
doesn’t appear on any shareholders’ register, of course. There is a non-transparent
scheme of successive ownership of offshore companies and funds. The final point
is in Zug…and Liechtenstein. Vladimir Putin should be the beneficiary owner.”105 Speaking again on the subject in
2012, Belkovsky said that “the figure of $40bn emerged in 2007. That figure could
now have changed, I believe at the level of $60-70bn.” These estimates were obtained
allegedly from informed sources knowledgeable of the three companies that Belkovsky
kept anonymous.106
In a secret U.S.
diplomatic cable of November 24, 2008 leaked by WikiLeaks, the then U.S. Ambassador
to Moscow John Beyrle reported to Washington that “oil exports from state-owned
or state-influenced oil companies have reportedly been funneled through favored
oil traders, potentially yielding billions of dollars of profits for these
companies. Of particular note in the Russian oil trading business is the Swiss
firm Gunvor. The company is rumored to be one of Putin’s sources of undisclosed
wealth, and is owned by Gennady Timchenko, who is rumored to be a former KGB
colleague of Putin’s.” The text of the leaked cable informed that according to
a source “Gunvor may control up to 50% of total Russian oil exports,” and that “Gunvor
claims in its glossy but uninformative brochure that it ‘handles a third of Russia’s
seaborne oil exports.’”107
The report
continues revealing that “Gunvor rose based on the ‘administrative support’ of
the GOR [Government of Russia], the government came to realize it could no
longer promote Gunvor at the expense of, for example, state-owned Rosneft and Gazpromneft.”
When referring to the issue of “greater transparency” in business activities,
the diplomatic cable mentioned “Surgutneftegaz (another reported source of
Putin’s illicit wealth) as a company that has not” moved “toward greater
transparency.” The cable informed that a source “also noted that oil exports to
Hungary, by Transneft decree, must go through ‘a certain intermediary’ (Gunvor),
which adds one dollar to each barrel. He said in a competitive market, by
contrast, an oil trader might add anywhere from five to 20 cents ‘maximum’ to
the price of a barrel of oil.” Ambassador Beyrle ended the cable pointing out
the following: “Greed, corruption, and geopolitical concerns still trump efficiency,
especially with regards to certain export routes to Europe and with regard to
certain connected oil traders, such as Gunvor.”108
Related to this, the U.S. Treasury Department stated when imposing its sanctions
in March of 2014 that “Timchenko’s activities in the energy sector have been
directly linked to Putin. Putin has investments in Gunvor and may have access
to Gunvor funds.”109
Greed indeed,
and also geopolitics as Ambassador Beyrle noted, in reference to Moscow’s use
of its energy exports as a political weapon to pressure Europe. Under the
heading of “Pipeline Exports to Europe Still a Problem,” the November 24, 2008
diplomatic cable from Ambassador Beyrle reported:
“All three
company representatives noted, however, that the trend toward greater
transparency stops with seaborne trade. They all said Russian oil exports to
Europe through pipelines, especially through the southern Druzhba pipeline, is
still a very opaque business.…said pipeline exports, in general, are inherently
more political than exports from ports, and that the trade through southern
Druzhba is so opaque that ‘no one knows who is getting what.’…said many in the
business ‘wonder what goes on between buyers and sellers’ along that route.”
“As an example,…specifically
cited the recent oil supply reductions from Russia to the Czech Republic (ref
A). He said that despite claims by officials that ‘middlemen’ were the problem,
he did not believe that to be the case. He said producers generally offer their
oil using formulas that include some premium on top of a base price, depending
on the export market. He explained that just prior to the supply reduction to
the Czech Republic (where Shell has a stake in a refinery), all producers
demanded the exact same premium, $1.25 per barrel, which he said was 4 to 5
times the previous figure for that route. He believed this price increase was
coordinated, and resulted in the re-routing of oil exports away from the Czech
Republic.”
“…said that in
the case of the Czech Republic, the refineries involved had access to other
supplies, but that there was indeed an additional cost associated with obtaining
alternate supplies. He said similar demands for higher premiums have occurred
with regard to deliveries to a German refinery partly owned by Shell, but that
the refinery had more limited access to alternatives. In such cases,… explained,
managers have to decide whether to run refineries at sub-optimal levels, or pay
the higher costs.”110
Back
in 2007 it was claimed that inside Putin’s Kremlin there were two factions
vying for power and influence. One was composed by the so-called “liberals,” including
Dmitry Medvedev, and the faction of the “siloviki” or men of power from the
security services and military.111 The
siloviki faction was known as the “Sechin group” that included Igor Sechin,
Nikolai Patrushev, Alexander Bortnikov and Viktor Ivanov,112 all mentioned in this study. Moreover,
among the Russian officials and businessmen sanctioned by the West, to punish
the Russian government for its military intervention in Ukraine, are Sergei
Ivanov, Sergei Naryshkin, Vladimir Yakunin, and Gennady Timchenko,113 all with reported ties to Soviet/Russian
intelligence.
Putin’s
alleged secret fortune, which if true would make him one of the richest men on Earth,
if not the wealthiest, would serve the additional purpose of providing a secret
fund for Russian intelligence, namely the FSB, to be able to fund free from any
oversight covert and clandestine operations, including those of such magnitude as
the destabilization of Ukraine by destabilizing Crimea and Eastern Ukraine
before the seizure of these regions by the Russian military, the intervention
in other sovereign and independent countries’ internal affairs, particularly
those that were part of the defunct Soviet Union or even of the extinct Warsaw Pact,
or to fund a comeback to power in Russia in the remote event that the Russian state
security-intelligence apparatus and the men belonging to it now in power – and mentioned
in this study - would lose it, for example, to a popular revolution or a military
coup d’état, at the moment seemingly highly unlikely eventualities. This fortune
would be independent from the Russian state budget, and due to its “nonexistence”
it would not be the subject of any oversight from political forces, state
institutions and civil society.
The examples covered
in this analysis show that the Russian government and its bureaucracy are led
by senior members of the Russian intelligence community. The examples also show
that the top leaders of the Russian intelligence apparatus are mindful of the
importance of also controlling the leading companies – and sectors – of the
Russian economy, by becoming top managers of some of the most powerful
companies of Russia. By making the state corporate sector the strongest of the
Russian economy, the leadership of the Russian intelligence community not only
make sure they control the economic reins of the country, thus guaranteeing the
flow of revenue to state coffers, but also that they can project its export
prowess and investment resources anywhere in the world. This in turn brings not
only hard currency to Russia but also expands the state’s geopolitical and
geoeconomic influence anywhere on Earth that there is an economic opportunity
ready to be exploited.
* This
paper was written in 2008, and it was originally intended as an appendix to The
Heritage Foundation’s Backgrounder "Russia's Drive for Global Economic
Power: A Challenge for the Obama Administration" which I co-authored. I
have made a few additions and modifications throughout the text to update it.
See Ariel Cohen and Lajos F. Szaszdi, "Russia's Drive for Global Economic
Power: A Challenge for the Obama Administration," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, no. 2235, January 30, 2009, at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2009/pdf/bg2235.pdf
(November 19, 2014).
**This paper was published first in
http://peiuprrp.blogspot.com/2014/11/members-of-russian-intelligence.html.
46 “Prime Minister Putin appoints new government – 2,” RIA Novosti, May 12, 2008, at
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080512/107180100.html
(October 6, 2008); “Board of Directors,” Rosneft,
at
http://www.rosneft.com/about/board/
(October 5, 2008); “Gazprom, LUKOIL Biggest in Russia,”
Kommersant, October 6, 2008, at http://www.kommersant.com/p-13340/r_529/Russias_largest_companies/
(October 6, 2008); “Sechin Gains
Power,” Kommersant, October 6,
2008, at http://www.kommersant.com/p1036445/r_529/Sechin_Inter_RAO_Rosneft/
(October 6, 2008);
“Russia’s top energy man Sechin may
join Inter RAO,” Reuters, at
http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssEnergyNews/idUSL324224420081003
(October 3, 2008); “Agents in
Power,” The St. Petersburg Times, February 12, 2008, at
http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=25000
(October 3, 2008); “Chekists in the
Corridors of Power;” “Russia Who’s
Who – Igor Sechin,” Entrepreneur.com,
September 8, 2008, at
http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/article/184650469.html
(October 8, 2008); “SECHIN, Igor
Ivanovich,” Russia Profile.org, June 20, 2008, at
http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/whoiswho/alphabet/s/sechin.wbp
(October 6, 2008); Arab Press
Service, “Russia Who’s Who – Igor
Sechin,” The Free Library, September
8, 2008, at
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Russia+Who's+Who+-+Igor+Sechin.-a0184650469
(November 19,
2014); Bill Powell, “How the KGB (and
friends) took over Russia’s economy,” Fortune.com,
September
10, 2008, at http://archive.fortune.com/2008/09/04/news/international/powell_KGB.fortune/index.htm
(November 19, 2014). The power of
Sechin in the energy sector grew further after Prime Minister Putin’s
decision to appoint him chief of the
government’s “commission for the development of power generation,”
to coordinate and oversee the
development of the electricity sector in Russia up till the year 2020. See
“Sechin to head govt commission for
power generation (Part 3),” Interfax,
September 22, 2008, at
http://www.interfax.com/3/430067/news.aspx
(September 23, 2008).
47 “Board of Directors,” Rosneft,
at http://www.rosneft.com/about/board/ (November 20, 2014);
48 “Igor Sechin,” Rosneft,
at http://www.rosneft.com/about/board/igor-sechin/ (November 20, 2014);
“Positions Occupied by Rosneft
Management Board Members in Other Legal Entities,” Rosneft, at
http://www.rosneft.com/attach/0/02/01/corpmanagement_inf_eng.pdf
(November 20, 2014).
49 SPIMEX, at http://spimex.com/en/ (November 20, 2014);
50 “Rosneftegaz OAO,” EMIS, at
http://www.securities.com/Public/company-
profile/RU/Rosneftegaz_OAO__%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%84%D1%82%D
0%B5%D0%B3%D0%B0%D0%B7_%D0%9E%D0%90%D0%9E__en_2491684.html
(November 20,
2014).
51 Ibid.
52 “Company Overview of OOO National Oil Consortium,” Bloomberg Businessweek, at
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=61166056
(November
20, 2014).
53 Far Eastern Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Center, at http://dcss.ru/en/index.html
(November 20, 2014).
54 “Prime Minister Putin appoints new government – 2;” “Meeting of the
Board of Directors of JSC ‘United
Aircraft Corporation,’” United Aircraft Corporation, August 29,
2008, at
http://www.uacrussia.ru/en/press/news/index.php?id4=158
(October 8, 2008); Reuben F. Johnson, “Russia
merges enterprises into industry
giant,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August
6, 2008, p. 20; “IVANOV, Sergei
Borisovich,” Russia Profile.org, July 15, 2008, at
http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/whoiswho/alphabet/i/Ivanovsb.wbp
(October 8, 2008).
55 “Naryshkin Sergei,” President
of Russia, at http://eng.state.kremlin.ru/persons/1 (November 19, 2014).
56 “Presidential Executive Office: Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin,” President of Russia, May 19, 2008, at
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/subj/97083.shtml
(October 6, 2008); “Naryshkin, Sergei Yevgenyevich,” Russia
Profile.org, February 16, 2007, at
http://www.russiaprofile.org/resources/whoiswho/alphabet/n/naryshkin.wbp
(October 2, 2008); Evgueni
Novikov, “The Rise of Sergei
Naryshkin,” Russia Profile.org,
August 6, 2007, at
2, 2008); “United Shipbuilding
Corporation,” www.InvestingInRussia.ru,
at
http://www.investinginrussia.ru/ppp/osk/
(October 9, 2008); “United Shipbuilding Corporation Has Been
Registered,” RZD-Partner, November 20, 2007, at
http://www.rzd-partner.com/news/2007/11/20/315098.html
(October 2, 2008); “Board of Directors,”
Rosneft, at http://www.rosneft.com/about/board/
(October 5, 2008).
57 “Presidential Executive Office: Viktor Petrovich Ivanov,” President of Russia, at
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/subj/22149.shtml
(October 9, 2008); “Companies Research: Aeroflot,”
Financial Times, October 4, 2008, at http://markets.ft.com/tearsheets/businessProfile.asp?s=ru%3AAFLT
(October 5, 2008); “Putin’s Aides
Expand Control of Companies,” FINROSFORUM, July 12, 2007, at
http://www.finrosforum.fi/?p=287
(October 5, 2008); “PRESS DIGEST – Russia – June 28: Kommersant,”
Reuters UK, June 28, 2007, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKL2861901920070628
(October 5, 2008);
“Stankoimport,” Abrasivesonline.net, at http://www.abrasivesonline.net/company/company.asp?id=587
(October 5, 2008).
58 “Sergey V. Chemezov,” Graduate
School of Management, St. Petersburg State University, at
http://www.gsom.pu.ru/en/about_som/board/chemezov
(October 14, 2008); “Agents in Power;” “Sergey
Chemezov Scores a Monopoly,” Kommersant, December 15, 2006, at
http://www.kommersant.com/p730496/r_1/Rosoboronoexport_Arms_Exporter/
(October 14, 2008).
59 “Board of Directors,” Aeroflot,
at https://www.aeroflot.ru/cms/en/about/committee_of_directors
(November 19, 2014); “Sergey chemezov
(sic) headed the Board of Directors of Almaz-antey,” Securities
market, information and analytics,
October 9, 2014, at http://www.fuuma.org/sergey-chemezov-headed-
the-board-of-directors-of-almaz-antey.html
(November 19, 2014); TASS, “Chemezov was (sic) headed by
the Board of Directors of OJSC
concern PVO ‘Almaz-Antey,’” NewsTwenty4Seven,
at
http://newstwenty4seven.com/en/news/chemezov-vozglavil-sovet-direktorov-kontserna-pvo-almaz-antej
(November 19, 2014); “Organi
upravlenia,” “Kontsern PVO Almaz-Antey,” at
http://www.almaz-
antey.ru/about/28/ (November 19,
2014).
60 “Board of Directors,” Aeroflot.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 “Corporation Today,” VSMPO-AVISMA
Corporation, at
http://www.vsmpo.ru/en/pages/Korporacija_segodnja
(November 20, 2014).
64 “Rusnano Corporation,” Rusnano, at http://en.rusnano.com/about
(November 20, 2014).
65 “General Information,” Norilsk
Nickel, at http://www.nornik.ru/en/about-norilsk-nickel/about-norilsk-
nickel1/general-information (November
20, 2014).
66 Vladislav Tyumenev, “Lessons from Rosoboronexport,” Expert Online 2.0, December 3, 2007, at
http://eng.expert.ru/printissues/expert/2007/45/goskorporacii/
(October 14, 2008); Pavel Felgenhauer,
“Chemizov to Head New Russian Arms
Conglomerate,” Eurasia Daily Monitor
4, No. 221, November 29,
2007, at http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372625
(October 14, 2008); Pavel
Felgenhauer, “Chemizov to Head New
Russian Arms Conglomerate,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor 4, No. 221,
November 29, 2007, at
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33201&tx_ttnews%5Bback
Pid%5D=171&no_cache=1#.VG0q8rt0zcc
(November 19, 2014).
67 “Biography of Evgenii Primakov, Minister for Foreign Affairs,” United Nations, at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/hlpanel/primakov-bio.htm
(October 16, 2008); “Yevgeniy Maksimovich
Primakov,” Centre for Russian Studies’ Database, October 16, 2008, at
http://www2.nupi.no/cgi-
win//Russland/personer.exe?79
(October 16, 2008); “Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
President Yevgeny Primakov: HAMAS
will eventually come to recognize Israel,” Interfax,
February 10, at
http://www.interfax.com/17/129410/Interview.aspx
(October 16, 2008).
68 “Agents in Power;” “Medvedev Alexander Ivanovich,” Gazprom, at
http://www.gazprom.com/eng/articles/article8873.shtml
(October 16, 2008); “Bank’s Management,”
Gazprombank, at http://www.gazprombank.ru/eng/about/management/
(October 3, 2008); “Board of
Directors,” Gazprombank, at http://www.gazprombank.ru/eng/about/sovet/
(November 19, 2014);
“Management Board,” Gazprombank, at http://www.gazprombank.ru/eng/about/board/
(November 19,
2014).
69 “Instead of Eltsin’s ‘Family’ the Country Is Being Plundered by
Putin’s ‘Team’ and the Matter
Is Being Done Much More Profoundly,” Forum.msk.ru, at
http://forum-msk.org/english/print.html?id=18238
(November 19, 2014).
70 “Agents in Power;” AFP, “Twelve Who have Putin’s Ear,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October
15, 2007, at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078952.html
(November 3, 2008).
71 “Instead of Eltsin’s ‘Family’ the Country Is Being Plundered by
Putin’s ‘Team’ and the Matter
Is Being Done Much More Profoundly;”
Andrew E. Kramer, “Former Russian Spies Are Now Prominent
in Business,” The New York Times, December 18, 2007, at
(November 3, 2008); “Bank’s
Management,” Gazprombank; “Top
Management,” Sogaz, at
http://en.sogaz.ru/management
(November 19, 2014); “Board of Directors,” Gazprombank.
72 Ibid.
73 “Gazprom shields Sogaz from sanctions,” Interfax, August 15, 2014, at
http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=528744
(November 19, 2014).
74 Ibid.
75 Boris Groendahl and Irina Reznik, “Bank Rossiya Is First Russian
Lender Under U.S. Sanctions,”
Bloomberg, March 20, 2014, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-20/bank-rossiya-becomes-first-
russian-lender-under-u-s-sanctions.html (November 19, 2014).
76 “Instead of Eltsin’s ‘Family’ the Country Is Being Plundered by
Putin’s ‘Team’ and the Matter
Is Being Done Much More Profoundly;”
AFP, “Twelve Who have Putin’s Ear;” Kramer, “Former Russian
Spies Are Now Prominent in Business.”
77 Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Corruption Scandal Could Shake Kremlin,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
September 26, 2006, at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071621.html
(November 19, 2014). For more
on Nikolai Patrushev see “PATRUSHEV,
Nikolai Platonovich,” Russia Profile.org,
at
http://russiaprofile.org/bg_people/resources_whoiswho_alphabet_p_patrushev.html
(November 19, 2014).
78 Lyuba Pronina, “FSB Man Tapped for Aeroflot Board,” The Moscow Times, August 9, 2001, at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2001/8/article/fsb-man-tapped-for-aeroflot-
board/252190.html (November 21,
2014).
79 Ibid.; Mark Galeotti, The
Kremlin’s Agenda: The New Russia and its Armed Forces, Jane’s Intelligence
Review (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s
Information Group, 1995), 96, 100;
80 Lajos F. Szászdi, Russian
Civil-Military Relations and the Origins of the Second Chechen War (Lanham,
Md.: University Press of America,
2008), 100, 102.
81 Ibid., 101-5.
82 Pronina, “FSB Man Tapped for Aeroflot Board.”
83 Agnieszka Troszkiewicz, “Top 10 Aluminum Companies in 2011 by
Production,” Bloomberg, February
27, 2012, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-27/top-10-aluminum-companies-in-2011-by-
production-table-.html (November 21,
2014). See also “Who we are,” RUSAL,
at
http://www.rusal.ru/en/about/facts.aspx
(November 21, 2014).
84 Pronina, “FSB Man Tapped for Aeroflot Board.”
85 Galeotti, 96-102.
86 “Alexander Bortnikov,” The
Moscow Times, April 1, 2011, at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/people/article/alexander_bortnikov/434244.html
(November 19, 2014);
“BORTNIKOV, Alexander Vasylievich,” Russia Profile.org, at
http://russiaprofile.org/bg_people/resources_whoiswho_alphabet_b_bortnikov.html
(November 19, 2014);
“ECGC signs MoU with Russian banks,” The Economic Times, November 18, 2004,
at
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/keyword/ecgc/featured/2
(November 19, 2014);
Vnesheconombank “Annual Report Year 2005,” at
(November 19, 2014); Vnesheconombank, at http://www.veb.ru/en/ (November 19,
2014).
87 Pronina, “FSB Man Tapped for Aeroflot Board;” Aeroflot, “Aeroflot
OKs board candidates,”
February 20, 2002, at
https://m.aeroflot.ru/cms/en/press_release/6288
(November 19, 2014); Aeroflot, “Aeroflot-Russian airlines
Annual Meeting of
Shareholders held today, May 27, 2002 in Moscow,” May 27, 2002, at
https://m.aeroflot.ru/cms/en/new/1198
(November 19, 2014).
88 Gary Dixon London, “Sovcomflot boosts first-quarter profit to
$459,000,” TradeWinds, July 31, 2003,
at
http://www.tradewindsnews.com/weekly/182871/sovcomflot-boosts-firstquarter-profit-to-459000
(November 19, 2014); Sovcomflot
Press-Centre, “Resolution no. 2869-p of the Ministry of Property
Relations of the Russian Federation,”
Sovcomflot, July 23, 2003, at
http://www.sovcomflot.ru/npage.aspx?ln=EN&did=2328&cid=113
(November 19, 2014).
89 SCF, at http://www.scf-group.com/default.aspx?anim=1&ln=EN
(November 19, 2014); “About Us,”
Sovcomflot, at http://www.scf-group.com/pages.aspx?ln=EN&anim=1&cid=2&cs=1
(November 19,
2014).
90 “BORTNIKOV, Alexander Vasylievich.”
91 Dan Roberts, Ian Traynor, and Alec Luhn, “Obama extends sanctions
against Russia to include wealthy
Putin allies,” Guardian, March 21, 2014, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/obama-
extends-sanctions-against-russia-ukraine
(November 21, 2014).
92 Ibid.
93 Luke Harding, “Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn
fortune,” Guardian, December 21,
2007, at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/21/russia.topstories3?guni=Article:in%20body%20link
(November 21, 2014); Szászdi, 99.
94 Roberts, Traynor, and Luhn, “Obama extends sanctions against Russia
to include wealthy
Putin allies.”
95 Alec Luhn, “Gennady Timchenko denies Putin links made him one of
Russia’s top oligarchs,” Guardian,
March 21, 2014, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/oligarch-timchenko-denies-putin-
inks-us-blacklist-sanctions (November
21, 2014).
96 Szászdi, 100.
97 Ibid., 99-101, 48.
98 Harding, “Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune.”
99 Ibid.; “Man sollte die aktive Rolle Putins nicht überschätzen,” Die Welt, December 11, 2007, at
http://www.welt.de/welt_print/article1354242/Man-sollte-die-aktive-Rolle-Putins-nicht-
ueberschaetzen.html (November 22, 2014); Associated Press, “Cyber
attacks engulf Kremlin’s critics on
left and right ahead of elections,” Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, July 1, 2007,
at
http://lubbockonline.com/stories/070107/wor_070107116.shtml
(November 22, 2014).
100 Harding, “Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune.”
101 “The company today,” Surgutneftegas,
at http://www.surgutneftegas.ru/en/about/today/ (November 22,
2014).
102 Peter Finn, “A Surprise Bidder Buys Yukos Unit,” Washington Post, December 20, 2004, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A11823-2004Dec19.html
(November 22, 2014).
103 Harding, “Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune.”
104 “The world’s biggest oil and gas companies,” hydrocarbons-technology.com, November 12, 2013, at
http://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/features/feature-the-10-biggest-oil-and-gas-companies-in-the-
world/ (November 22, 2014); “Gazprom
– The world’s largest gas company,” BBC
WorldService.com, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/specials/151_globalgiants/page4.shtml
(November 22, 2014); “About
Gazprom,” Gazprom, at http://www.gazprom.com/about/ (November 22, 2014).
105 Harding, “Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune.”
106 Maeve
McClenaghan, “Putin: The richest man on earth?,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, April
19, 2012, at http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/04/19/putin-the-richest-man-on-earth/
(November
22, 2014). For more on Putin’s alleged
secret wealth, see “US embassy cables: Revealed: President Putin’s
‘secret assets’ abroad,” Guardian, December 2, 2010, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-
cables-documents/133148?guni=Article:in%20body%20link
(November 23, 2014); V. Milov et al., “Putin.
Korruptsia. Nezavisimii ekspertnii doklad,”
Putin. Itogi., at http://www.putin-itogi.ru/putin-i-
korruptsiya/#4 (November 23, 2014); Leah
Goldman, “Putin’s Secret Billion Dollar Palace On The Black
Sea,” Business Insider, February 1, 2011, at http://www.businessinsider.com/putin-palace-black-sea-2011-
2?op=1 (November 23, 2014).
107 “US embassy cables: Putin’s links to Russia’s oil trade,” Guardian, December 1, 2010, at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-
documents/179661?guni=Article:in%20body%20link
(November 23, 2014); Luke Harding, “WikiLeaks
cables claim Vladimir Putin has
secret wealth hidden abroad,” Guardian,
December 1, 2010, at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/01/wikileaks-cables-vladimir-putin-claims
(November 23,
2014).
108 “US embassy cables: Putin’s links to Russia’s oil trade.”
109 Luhn, “Gennady Timchenko denies Putin links made him one of
Russia’s top oligarchs.”
110 “US embassy cables: Putin’s links to Russia’s oil trade.”
111 Harding, “Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune.”
112 Ibid.
113 Roberts, Traynor, and Luhn, “Obama extends sanctions against Russia
to include wealthy
Putin allies.”
