Friday, September 26, 2014

Air War over Libya: The Lessons for Future U.S. Military Acquisitions, Part II


 
Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D.                                  
 
This paper, written by using open sources intelligence research and analysis, has the purpose of revealing the major U.S. platforms, primarily airborne but also sea based, that took part in Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector in Libya. The first part of the study covered those military platforms that fulfilled the functions of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – Networks (C4ISR-N)1 and which were involved in the electromagnetic battlefield performing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and/or conducting attacks with non-kinetic weapons.2 This second part covers operational, under development or planned unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that are intended to complement or replace the platforms covered in the first part of this study. The third part of this study will cover combat platforms, kinetic weapon systems, and logistic support platforms.
 
In this study we have included those platforms that are under development or planned and which are intended to complement or replace the platforms that took part in the Libya operation because they would be essential to perform successfully similar military operations in the future. This work has also the purpose of revealing why the platforms and weapon systems here discussed are important to U.S. national security and for the successful prosecution of operations of the type of Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector.  
 
The air platforms covered in this study are the following: MQ-4C BAMS UAS, MQ-9B Reaper UAS, Predator C Avenger UAS, X-47B UCAS, Phantom Ray UCAS, RQ-170 Sentinel UAS, MQ-X UCAS, theater UAS (MQ-L/O [MQ-La]),3 High-speed ISR UCAS, Phantom Eye, Medium-Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System, and MALD-J and MALD-V air-launched electronic warfare decoys.
 
Future wars, whether conventional or involving mainly counter-insurgency operations, will be decided through control of the air and space, through the exercise of aerospace power.4 The emphasis in modern warfare is in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, to know precisely where the enemy is. It is as important as the ISR mission to exercise superiority over the electromagnetic battlefield by dominating the electromagnetic spectrum and thus “‘[m]aintaining the electro-magnetic spectrum as maneuver space’” for our airborne electronic attack (AEA) and electronic warfare (EW) operations.5
 
Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, former U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, has suggested that at the present time it is of primary importance to develop the tools to conduct information warfare by way, for example, of electronic warfare and cyber warfare through the penetration and control of enemy computer networks.6 To carry out information warfare a sufficient number of ISR platforms are needed. At least almost five years ago the problem was that the “‘Air Force has lots of strike capability, but not enough [ISR] collection.’”7 For this reason, more air platforms that were not originally designed for specialized ISR missions are conducting them equipped with the appropriate sensors in what has been termed nontraditional ISR. The goal of the U.S. armed forces, as stated by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert in reference to the Navy, is “treating EW and cyber environments as ‘maneuver spaces’ on par with surface, undersea, or air.”8 The electronic warfare (EW) environment is the electromagnetic spectrum, a “maneuver space” that will have to be dominated to prevail in warfare.
 
            Key to the prosecution of air operations in the future is the capability to conduct persistent “cooperative” airborne electronic attack and electronic warfare, to perform intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition (ISTAR), and to achieve “weapons systems integration” and thus integrate all platforms and systems involved through a network-centric warfare communications architecture based on a distributed “IP-based network.”9 The key to this network-centric connectivity is a secure “‘advanced data link and Internet protocol network to move information at a much higher speed.’”10 By sharing the intelligence and information collected through various sensors it would be possible to build a common picture of the electronic and/or conventional order of battle of our forces and of the enemy forces, enabling a very fast response against the enemy with non-kinetic and/or kinetic weapons.11 Information collected by “satellite, large intelligence aircraft and national agency data” will also be shared by the network.12 There will be a network linking airborne sensor, communications, and strike manned and unmanned platforms and weapon systems to space-based sensor and communications satellites, and ground, sea surface and underwater forces.
 
            Key to victory in modern warfare is the execution of airborne electronic attack (AEA), which includes “the offensive use of false targets, network attack, advanced jamming, algorithm-packed data streams” for the purpose of breeching and exploiting enemy communications and signals networks,” and “power surges” to destroy enemy electronics through the electromagnetic pulses (EMP) of “high-power microwaves.”13 There is also the use of directed energy weapons such as lasers14 and electromagnetic energy beamed from active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, in this case to burn the electronics of air defense radars and surface-to-air missile (SAM) command and control computers.15
 
In addition, cyber warfare is a new dimension of warfare integrated into information warfare and airborne electronic attack. Thus, “communications, cyber- and electronic activity are starting to resemble each other operationally” because “‘communications and data systems…have a lot in common… Some are the same system.’”16 Moreover, “the cyber realm…now has an extensive overlap with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)” which takes advantage of “[t]he rapid spread of computer and mobile communications.”17 One form of airborne cyber attack consists in “locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages algorithms that allow a number of activities including control.”18
 
The U.S. Air Force has offensive computer programs containing “algorithms designed to mine intelligence or enable unauthorized takeover as system administrator” of enemy computers.19 These computer viruses would be contained in “data streams” beamed to enemy emitters to penetrate and hack a foe’s computer networks. One of these programs is Suter, with Suter 2 allowing the intruder to an enemy air defense computer network to become it system administrator and thus take control of enemy radars, for example “steering them away from penetrating U.S. aircraft.”20 In addition, the Suter 3 program was designed to penetrate the networks linked to targets such as tactical mobile “ballistic missile launchers or mobile surface-to-air missile launchers.”21 Based on these developments, it is likely that there are now operational, under development or planned more advanced computer programs designed to control longer-range ballistic missile launchers, land-based cruise missile launchers, unmanned and manned enemy aircraft, sea-based targets, and perhaps even space satellites. Aircraft that have been linked to the offensive use of the Suter computer program are “the EC-130 Compass Call, RC-135 Rivet Joint and F-16CJ” suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) fighter. In addition, it has been reported that the Suter program was “integrated into U.S. unmanned aircraft by L-3 Communications.”22
 
ISR platforms, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and airborne electronic attack aircraft are not only key to prevail in air campaigns such as that conducted in Libya, but are at the center of the Pentagon’s “Air-Sea Battle concept.” In this regard, the U.S. military expects to face in a conflict with China an “Anti-Access and Area Denial threat (A2/AD)” that includes anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) such as the DF-21D intended to destroy aircraft carriers, anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, anti-ship cruise missiles, stealth fighters such as the J-20, unmanned aircraft systems, submarines, and cyber warfare operations.23  New extreme low observable (ELO) UAS will be introduced to perform intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) and airborne electronic attack (AEA) operations against the anti-access and area denial threat.24 In this regard, Admiral Greenert wrote: “Electronic warfare (EW) and cyber operations are increasingly essential to defeating the sensors and command and control (C2) that underpin an opponent’s A2/AD capabilities. If the adversary is blinded or unable to communicate, he cannot aim long-range ballistic and cruise missiles or cue submarines and aircraft.”25
 
Funding should be provided for these future unmanned aircraft systems that will constitute essential nodal points in the distributed and integrated network-centric warfare architecture needed to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum to thus prevail over the air, ground and sea.  
 
This study will proceed to identify the types of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) performing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Strike, Airborne Electronic Attack, Communications and Cyber Warfare that are intended to complement or replace the airborne platforms and systems in the U.S. military inventory that have been employed in the Libyan Crisis and which are essential for the successful prosecution of a modern war. Some of the UAS are being referred as Unmanned Combat Air Systems (UCAS) due to their design capability to perform, in addition to ISR, strike missions with kinetic weapons and non-kinetic weapons, in the latter case for airborne electronic attack (AEA) and airborne cyber attack (ACA). Superior ISR is a necessary capability to achieve information superiority and information dominance,26 essential in modern warfare to know where the enemy is and our forces are in relation to each other, so that our combat assets can proceed quickly to defeat the enemy before he can attack us.
 
ISR UAS:
 
MQ-4C BAMS Unmanned Aircraft System:  The MQ-4C Broad Area Maritime Surveillance is the U.S. Navy’s version of the USAF RQ-4 Global Hawk intended for maritime surveillance. The high altitude long endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft system can perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations over a wide area and at a mission radius of 3,704 km (2,000 nm), covering large ocean expanses as well as littoral regions. The MQ-4C can operate 24 hours, seven days a week, it has a maximum endurance of 28 hours, and it can operate autonomously or in conjunction with naval units in support of fleet operations.27
 
The MQ-4C is equipped with the Multi-Function Active Sensor Active Electronically Scanned Array (MFAS AESA) with 360º coverage, capable of detection of radar contacts at long-ranges and of their classification, operating over sea and land. The UAS also has electro-optic and infrared sensors, and Electronic Support Measures (ESM) to identify, for example, electromagnetic signals. Operated from ground stations, the MQ-4C has an integrated sensor Command and Control.28   
 
First flight for the MQ-4C is planned for Fiscal Year 2012, and its initial operational capability (IOC) is expected in Fiscal Year 2016, with the projected 68 aircraft delivered by Fiscal Year 2019.29 The UAS is intended to complement the new P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) and the legacy P-3/EP-3 in the maritime surveillance mission and “to support strike, signals intelligence, and communications relay.”30 Thus, according to Northrop Grumman the operations that the MQ-4C can perform include the following: “maritime surveillance, collection of enemy order of battle information, battle damage assessment, port surveillance, communication relay, and support of the following missions – maritime interdiction, surface warfare, battlespace management, and targeting for maritime and littoral strike missions.”31 The MQ-4C is capable of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and its tested Electronic Support Measure system reportedly can “‘identify, jam (sic), intercept or encrypt (sic) electronic traffic.’”32 Moreover, MQ-4C could be equipped with the Navy’s Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), which has been “designed to attack enemy electronics with jamming, pulses of high-powered microwaves and packets of algorithms to infiltrate enemy networks.”33 Thus, the MQ-4C appears capable of conducting cyber warfare attacks with computer programs like Suter.
 
In addition, the U.S. Coast Guard had expressed its interest in acquiring 7 MQ-4C.34 The proposed MQ-4C fleet could perform necessary missions like protecting our maritime borders and our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and to detect and locate drug-trafficking semi-submersibles and submarines in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean.35 The need for adequate numbers of unmanned MQ-4C is highlighted by the aggressiveness displayed by Chinese fighter pilots against our manned reconnaissance planes – and the risk to our crews that such acts entail - like the April 2001 incident against a Navy EP-3E Aries II intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft or the recent event of late June 2011 against an Air Force U-2 reconnaissance plane.36 Also, the proliferation of new classes of diesel-electric submarines (SS), including the latest types fitted with air-independent propulsion (AIP), which can allow a boat to remain submerged for two weeks or more without the need to surface often with a snorkel to recharge its batteries, requires long-endurance unmanned aircraft like the MQ-4C to detect the submarine when it does. Moreover, the high-altitude flight of the MQ-4C would place the aircraft out of harms way against submarine-launched subsurface-to-air missiles designed to hit maritime patrol aircraft flying at low altitude or at low speed, in addition to intercepting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters.37
MQ-9B Reaper: The Reaper UAS is the successor of the MQ-1B Predator and it is in use by the U.S. Air Force. It was designed as an improved “Hunter-Killer,” multirole successor capable of persistent intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) operations, and strike missions. When compared with the Predator, the Reaper has over twice the speed of its predecessor, twice the maximum altitude in which it can operate at 15,240 meters, over eight times the payload capacity, which for the Predator is 204 kg and for the Reaper 1,746 kg, and 10 times the external payload capacity, which is of 136 kg for the Predator and 1,361 kg for the Reaper. Also, the turboprop MQ-9B has a maximum endurance of over 30 hours.38 In the words of the U.S. Air Force, the Reaper is “larger and more powerful than the MQ-1 Predator and is designed to go after time-sensitive targets with persistence and precision, and destroy or disable those targets.”39
 
To fulfill its missions, the Reaper is equipped with the electro-optic Multi-spectral Targeting System MTS-B system, with the Lynx I Multi-mode Radar, and a version of the ASIP signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic support measures (ESM) system.40 The aircraft’s modular design allows for different payload configurations depending on the mission.41 For example, it has been suggested that an UAS the size of Reaper may be able to carry the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ).42 The MQ-9B has seven hard points for external payloads, and it can be armed with up to 16 AGM-114P Hellfire II missiles, and it can carry at least 2 GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bombs, 2 GBU-38 500 lb JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) inertial navigation system (INS) and satellite-guided bombs or 2 GBU-49 (EGBU-12) Enhanced Paveway II, Dual-Mode Laser Guided Bombs, which use both laser guidance and INS with satellite guidance.43 The Reaper can be armed with new weapons such as the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), and it can carry air-to-air missiles like the Stinger and the AIM-9 Sidewinder.44
 
According to its manufacturer, the MQ-9B chief military missions are: “Persistent ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance], precision strike on time-sensitive targets, close air support, laser designation and illumination, SIGINT [signals intelligence], convoy protection, IED [improvised explosive device] detection.”45 The Reaper demonstrated its worth fulfilling these missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, where it began to operate since 2007 conducting ISR missions day and night, at a range and altitude it could not be detected by the insurgents.46 The Reaper would likely be used by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency to field the Airborne Infrared System (ABIR), using the electro-optical system of the MQ-9 to provide early detection and remote fire-control data against ballistic missiles. ABIR would be based on the new Multi-spectral Targeting System MTS-C system, which would allow ‘launch-on-remote’ of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) missiles based on tracking and fire-control data collected by the infrared sensors of the Reaper’s MTS-C system, and then relayed by the aircraft to the missile defense launch platforms.47 In addition, the Reaper can perform non-military missions such as “border security, maritime surveillance, disaster relief, firefighting, scientific research.”48 
 
Each MQ-9B system comprises up to 4 Reaper unmanned aircraft, and like the Predator UAS, it has a ground control station (GCS), and the Predator Primary Satellite Link (PPSL). The satellite link of the Reaper UAS allows Remote Split Operations, in which the operators of the ground control station are responsible of taking off and landing the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, with operators in Creech Air Force Base in Nevada in charge of flying the aircraft for the duration of the mission.49 The USAF had in August 2010 48 Reapers, and it has been reported that the service’s total inventory of MQ-9B by the end of Fiscal Year 2011 would be 76 aircraft.50 Last year it was reported that the Air Force had plans to eventually acquire 329 MQ-9B Reaper remotely piloted aircraft.51   
 
Predator C Avenger: It is a new UAS, a successor of the Reaper that has a stealthy design and a jet engine. It was designed to fly faster and at a higher altitude, and it has a weapons bay to carry bombs internally. The Avenger is being offered to the U.S. Air Force and Navy. It is a long-endurance unmanned aircraft system intended to perform intelligence, reconnaissance, target acquisition and surveillance (ISTAR), and to conduct precision air strikes from higher altitudes, using higher transit and operational speeds and its stealth design for greater survivability.52
 
The service ceiling of the Avenger is being advertised as more than 16,154 meters (53,000 feet), and it has been reported that its maximum “operational altitude” can be 18,288 meters (60,000 feet), attaining a maximum speed of over 740 km per hour as marketed and probably “speeds ‘considerably greater’ than that.”53 These altitudes will place the Avenger beyond the reach of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAM) or MANPADS (man portable air defense system), and outside the range of modern short-range mobile SAM systems such as the Russian Tor (SA-15 “Gauntlet” according to NATO) and the Pantsyr-S1 (SA-22 “Greyhound”).54 The Predator C has an endurance of 20 hours.55
 
The Avenger’s survivability would depend largely on its stealth design and technologies. Its design follows the principle of planform alignment with canted vertical tails to scatter radar waves and to mask the engine exhaust to reduce its heat emissions. The Avenger has an “S” shaped exhaust duct to help cool it to limit its infrared signature and to shield the engine from being scanned by radar. The UAS also has a weapons bay to carry precision bombs internally instead of only in the wings, thus greatly reducing its radar cross-section. It is to be expected that the Avenger will have radar absorbent materials (RAM) and radar absorbent structures (RAS), as it has been reported that “General Atomics Aeronautical’s parent company includes a division that produces materials for controlling radar, optical and infrared signatures.”56   
 
    To perform intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) operations, the Avenger is equipped with a Lynx radar system featuring a synthetic aperture radar and ground moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI). It will also have the highly-sensitive Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) of the F-35, which has a low-observable external design of “faceted sapphire windows.” The version of the EOTS for unmanned aircraft systems is called the Advanced Low-observable Embedded Reconnaissance Targeting system (ALERT).57 In addition, there are apparently plans to develop a dedicated surveillance and reconnaissance version of the Avenger fitted with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar using steerable radar beams for “wide-area surveillance” in all weather conditions. The AESA radar, which is to be supplied by the USAF, would be installed on the “long, featureless underside” of the aircraft.58 It is to be expected that the Avenger will have also a signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic support measures (ESM) system, and that it will be capable of cyber warfare operations. Avenger may be capable of carrying the Navy’s Next Generation Jammer (NGJ) system.59
 
The Predator C’s weapons bay can carry internally 3,000 lb of bombs and payloads, which could include sensors or additional fuel tanks. Flying in a non-stealthy mode the Avenger can also carry missiles, bombs and payloads under the wings in six hard points. The Avenger can carry internally Hellfire II missiles and precision bombs such as: the GBU-12 500 lb and the GBU-16 1,000 lb Paveway II laser-guided bombs (LGB), the GBU-48 1,000 lb and the GBU-49 500 lb Enhanced Paveway II Dual-Mode inertial navigation system/satellite and LGB, the GBU-31 Mk 84 2,000 lb Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the GBU-32 1,000 lb JDAM and the GBU-38 500 lb JDAM, and the GBU-39 250 lb Small Diameter Bomb (SDB).60 Moreover, a promotional video of the Avenger showed it armed by 2017 with a retractable laser weapon in the lower part of the fuselage due to its “flexible mission payload.”61
 
The Avenger would exploit the concept of airborne network-centric warfare, with an Unmanned Aircraft System that could comprise 12 remotely piloted aircraft and which by 2017 could be manned by four operators, with three Predator C operated simultaneously by a single operator. A “swarm” of Avengers will operate in an “airborne network” in which the unmanned aircraft will have the capability of “automated repositioning,” of “autonomous target prioritization,” “dynamic re-tasking” during the mission with “precise geo-location,” thus ensuring a “persistent integrated presence” while providing its operator with “fused sensor video” for a clear picture of the battlefield.62 
 
X-47B:  The X-47B is the prototype of an unmanned combat air system (UCAS) with ISR capabilities. Northrop Grumman’s two X-47B aircraft are technology demonstrators for the U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) program, aiming to fulfill the requirement for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system.63
 
Even though the X-47B UCAS did not take part in the Libya Crisis, it will perform roles conducted by platforms that participated in Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector. The X-47B is planned to perform for the first time autonomous launching, recovery (landing), and handling on the flight deck of an aircraft carrier, tests that are scheduled for 2013. The X-47B will also be tested to fly autonomously “operations in the carrier control area (out to 50 nautical miles).” It will also conduct in 2014 autonomous in-flight refueling with the Navy’s ‘probe and drogue’ and the USAF ‘boom-receptacle’ systems, which Northrop Grumman’s UCAS-D was designed to use. The X-47B uses “3.4 million lines of software code” to perform its autonomous flight functions in a “preprogrammed mission.” Instead of being remotely piloted, the operator – who would not need to be a trained pilot – would monitor the operational performance of the X-47B, simply using a computer mouse to click on functions such as starting the engines, taxiing or taking off.64 If successful, the X-47B’s ability to perform its flight operations autonomously would represent a milestone towards unmanned aircraft capable of performing their missions fully autonomously from human control. The X-47B could be considered to be a successor to the Navy’s A-6 Intruder all-weather strike aircraft, which was capable of conducting bombing missions “under zero-visibility conditions.”65 According to Admiral Greenert, in reference to the UCLASS, “the unmanned combat air system will be operating by 2025 as an integral element of some carrier air wings, providing surveillance and some strike capability at vastly increased ranges compared with today’s strike fighters.”66 
 
            The X-47B has a stealthy extreme low observable (ELO) design, including planform alignment, and an operational aircraft of its kind would use radar absorbent materials (RAM) and radar absorbent structures (RAS). Based on its design, it will be low observable (LO) to radar and infrared sensors. The X.-47B, whose size is 87 percent of that of the F/A-18C fighter, is designed to carry out “persistent, penetrating surveillance, and penetrating strike…in high threat areas.”67 The X-47B has a maximum range of over 3,889 km (2,100 nautical miles), a “high subsonic” maximum speed, and a maximum endurance of more than 6 hours without refueling, and two internal weapons bays with a payload capacity of 2,041 kg (4,500 lb), including 6 GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs per weapons bay or additional fuel tanks.68
 
To perform its missions the X-47B would be equipped with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems such as electro-optic sensors including an infrared system, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) – which provides a high resolution that enables visual identification of a moving target at sea, ground moving target indicator (GMTI), maritime moving target indicator (MMTI), and electronic support measures (ESM).69     
 
            The X-47B could also be a candidate for the adjunct UCAS – which may be the Air Force’s proposed MQ-Ma - intended to accompany and support the planned U.S. Air Force future strategic bomber, the unmanned/manned Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP). A formation of multiple adjunct UCAS would perform in a distributed fashion ISR and target acquisition (ISTAR) for the bomber, airborne electronic attack, electronic warfare to defend the LRSP against surface-to-air missiles, cyber warfare operations against the enemy’s air defense computer network, and strike with kinetic weapons.70 The future bomber is at the center of the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle concept, having the future operational objective of defeating the military threat posed by anti access/area denial (A2/AD) weapon systems.71
 
The X-47B in the role of LRSP unmanned combat aircraft system adjunct would perform the “‘enabling’” missions of “‘penetrating stand-in airborne electronic attack’ (P-AEA) and penetrating ISR.” Both missions would be carried out deep inside enemy “heavily defended” airspace, with penetrating stand-in airborne electronic attack describing the jamming of a strong enemy radar emitter near this target, which would require less radiated power to jam the radar. These UCAS supporting the bomber would follow the principle of “‘first in, last out.’”72
 
The extreme low observable (ELO) flying wing design of the X-47B could be scaled up to become a candidate for the theater UAS, based on the X-47C, an enlarged version of the X-47B with a wingspan of 52.43 meters (172 feet) similar to the wingspan of the B-2A stealth strategic bomber, also with a flying wing design. The larger X-47C could also serve the basis for the future strategic bomber, the Long-Range Strike Platform.73
 
To achieve visual stealth that would enable it to conduct daytime surveillance and strike missions like suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) over enemy territory, an operational follow-on to the X-47B prototypes could be equipped with “electronic camouflage” or “e-camouflage,” a technology in which “micro-cameras covering the surface of the aircraft would capture real-time images of the fighter’s environment.”74 This e-camouflage technology could cover “other parts of the electro-magnetic spectrum,” including infrared camouflage through the use of metamaterials “that can change temperature very rapidly, allowing the vehicle to blend in with its surroundings. …in the infrared spectrum.”75  
 
In addition, the X-47B could also be equipped with active stealth technology against radar such as a stealthogenic system consisting of a cold plasma cloud that would absorb enemy radar waves or allow them to pass by the aircraft without reflecting them.76 The X-47B could instead be fitted with an active cancellation system to reduce the aircraft’s radar cross-section. In the active cancellation system “the incoming…radar wave is sampled by a receiving antenna. Having predicted the aircraft’s reflectivity at this frequency and angle, the avionics create and transmit a false echo (mauve), a signal designed to cancel out the genuine reflection…from the aircraft’s skin.”77
 
Phantom Ray:  Boeing’s Phantom Ray UAS is a technology demonstrator the size of a fighter aircraft designed to test advanced systems for a future operational unmanned combat air system (UCAS) with ISR capabilities. Like the X-47B, Phantom Ray would be equipped to perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), air strikes including “hunter/killer” missions (like loitering over an area until a target of opportunity appears), suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), “electronic attack” and electronic warfare, and “autonomous aerial refueling (AAR).”78 It has an extreme low observable (ELO) flying wing design with a discrete engine exhaust for reduced radar and infrared signatures, and it would probably incorporate radar absorbent materials (RAM) and radar absorbent structures (RAS). The Phantom Ray is derived from Boeing’s earlier X-45C experimental UCAV, with the U.S. Air Force seemingly interested in the new UCAV.79
 
Among its sensors it would have an active electronically scanned array (AESA) synthetic aperture radar (SAR), electronic support measures (ESM) as well as electro-optic systems. This would allow Phantom Ray to collect real time video images and target detection from its own sensors and from external sources “to detect, identify and locate fixed, relocatable and mobile targets quickly.”80 As the X-47B, the Predator, Reaper, Avenger, and manned aircraft equipped with sophisticated reconnaissance and targeting pods, the Phantom Ray would perform with its sensors non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NT-ISR). For example, the Phantom Ray’s AESA synthetic aperture radar would be used to conduct battle damage assessment (BDA), convoy escort or to carry out real time target acquisition with its ISR sensors to deliver an air strike, thus performing combat intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (combat ISTAR) and hunter/killer strike operations with its sensor and weapons payloads.81    
 
            Phantom Ray will fly its missions autonomously, controlled by an operator through “fly-by-mouse” technology, by the click of a computer mouse.82 It can operate “[f]ully autonomously, including taxi, take-off and landing.” An example of Phantom Ray’s capacity to fly autonomously could be appreciated in the test flight of Boeing’s X-45A, a predecessor of Phantom Ray, which in 2005 “autonomously created its own flight plan to remain out of lethal range of simulated SAM emitters; attacked a simulated priority ground target; demonstrated ability to suppress ‘enemy’ air defences; and conducted a simulated BDA.”83
 
Like Boeing’s earlier X-45B UCAS, Phantom Ray may have two internal weapon bays with the same length like those in the F-35 Lightening II stealth fighter and the capacity to carry internally at least 2,000 lb of weapons, including 8 GBU-39 Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) or 2 GBU-32 JDAM 1,000 lb precision bombs. Phantom Ray may be armed also with a laser weapon.84 The UCAS may be able to reach a speed of Mach 0.85 and it may have an operational range of 4,815 km (2,600 nautical miles).85
 
Phantom Ray would be a candidate for the adjunct UCAS intended to accompany and support the U.S. Air Force future unmanned/manned Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP). It can also be a candidate for the Navy’s unmanned carrier-launched surveillance and strike (UCLASS) system, and due to its scalable design, an enlarged version of Phantom Ray could serve as the theater UAS and also as the Long-Range Strike Platform. In this regard, according a to the president of Boeing’s “Phantom Works for the Boeing Defense, Space & Security (BDS) business unit,” “‘[a] lot of Phantom Ray’s software is directly applicable to…next-generation bomber….’”86     
 
            Unmanned combat air systems (UCAS) such as Phantom Ray and X-47B would be network-enabled, being communications nodes capable also of transmitting and sharing tactical information with other UCAS and manned aircraft during flight missions. The UCAS would be equipped with a powerful computer system capable of autonomous flight and operations and of tactical decision making like an “electronic pilot.”87 It would be an Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platform capable of ISR operations and of delivering precision bombs and air-to-surface missiles. The UCAS may also be capable of conducting electronic attack and electronic warfare, and, like the F-35, they may also be able with their AESA radar to burn the electronic systems of enemy radar and the command-and-control computers of a surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery.88 The UCAS may also perform cyber warfare and information warfare operations.89 It could also perform air-to-air operations, engaging enemy aircraft with beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles as a stand-off air-to-air missile launch platform. The UCAS could also launch short-range air-to-air missiles for self-defense, but it may still lack the capability of outperforming in a dogfight an enemy pilot sitting in the cockpit of a fighter.
 
A great advantage that could be derived from UCAS is the numerical superiority that could be achieved through their mass-production, to overwhelm enemy forces and to replace combat loses in case of a conventional war against a major industrial and military power such as China. Lack of a cockpit and flight systems for a pilot may ease series production of the UCAS, and its autonomous flight together with the simplicity to control it through “fly-by-mouse” would allow mass deployment into combat without the need of trained pilots. Moreover, one operator may be able to control three UCAS simultaneously. Potentially, spare naval UCAS could be stored in racks inside the hangar bay of an aircraft carrier, ready to replace attrition loses if the need arises or to add more aircraft to the carrier’s combat plane inventory than what is possible now with manned aircraft. UCAS could either be used to operate in counter insurgency operations like in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Somalia, or in conventional air military operations such as Libya.  At least, conventional conflicts will be decided in favor of whoever detects, locates, identifies, acquires as target, and fires successfully at the enemy first. Conventional wars would thus be won by whoever deploys the most sophisticated, effective, and versatile C4ISR-N systems in the greatest number of platforms possible.                
 
RQ-170 Sentinel:  Developed by Lockheed Martin, the RQ-170 Sentinel unmanned aircraft system (UAS) has an extreme low observable (ELO) flying wing design. Dubbed the “Beast of Kandahar” because it was first photographed at the air base in the Afghan city, it performed ISR operations over Pakistan utilizing its “full-motion video” capability to maintain Osama bin Laden’s hideout under surveillance. The Sentinel carried out this mission unnoticed and continuously for an extended period of time.90 Indeed, the RQ-170 participated in Operation Neptune Spear on May 1 that led to the killing of bin Laden by “providing overhead imagery.”91
 
With a wingspan estimated to be similar to that of the MQ-9B Reaper, the RQ-170 has been considered to be a tactical UAS instead of an aircraft meant to perform strategic ISR missions. It has been speculated that Sentinel could have also been used for ISR operations aimed at Iran and China, conducting “signals and multi-spectral intelligence.”92 It is believed that the electro-optic sensor system of the Sentinel may be related to the Alert system, developed by Lockheed Martin for UAS and possessing elements of the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) developed for the F-35 fifth-generation fighter.93 Thus, in the course of a test one of the electro-optic systems of the F-35 was able to detect a space rocket that was launched at a distance of more than 1,287 km from Florida.94 If the Sentinel’s electro-optical system possesses such a capability, flying from Afghanistan it could have been used as it has been suggested to monitor ballistic missile test launches from Iran, Pakistan, China and India.95 This capability to detect long-range missile launches would be also of value for the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle concept, particularly to sense the launch of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM).
 
If the Sentinel operated against the bin Laden complex during broad daylight, presumably at a medium altitude, this raises the question of whether the ELO UAS was equipped with “e-camouflage” technology, enabling it to remain invisible to the naked eye. Due to its recent operational experience inside Pakistan, it is therefore not improbable that Sentinel would have been used over Libya.
 
The RQ-170 may be developed to fulfill the Air Force’s requirement for the adjunct UCAS - probably the Air Force’s MQ-Ma UAS requirement96 - intended to accompany and support the planned U.S. Air Force future strategic bomber, the unmanned/manned Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP). Sentinel may also be developed as an alternative for the Navy’s unmanned carrier-launched surveillance and strike (UCLASS) system. Sentinel’s flying wing design might be scalable, enabling it to be expanded into larger platforms that could perform the roles of theater UAS and the LRSP. The RQ-170 may have the capability of performing airborne electronic attack (AEA) and airborne cyber attack (ACA).          
 
MQ-X:  The MQ-X UCAS is the U.S. Air Force’s replacement for the Predator and Reaper UAS. The MQ-X will display improvements in performance over the MQ-1B and MQ-9B in terms of speed, range, endurance and payload capacity, with the capability of allowing the operation of several aircraft at the same time through “semi-autonomous” flight.97 The Air Force envisages an evolution of the MQ-X system up to the year 2047, starting with the MQ-Ma, followed by the MQ-Mb and then by the MQ-Mc, with the latter expected to perform air-to-air operations probably thanks to an expanded ability to operate autonomously due to a higher level of “artificial intelligence.”98
 
The MQ-Ma will carry out ISR and strike operations, being thus an unmanned combat air system, and it would share common systems and components - if not being the same platform – with the UCLASS system of the Navy.99 The MQ-Ma would perform the role of adjunct UCAS intended to accompany and support the U.S. Air Force future unmanned/manned Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP). As mentioned above, candidates for the MQ-X and its first version, the MQ-Ma, are Boeing’s Phantom Ray, Lockheed Martin’s RQ-170 Sentinel or even the Navy’s Northrop Grumman X-47B.100 The MQ-Ma would display “‘survivability in contested airspace’” and it may have an endurance of 24 hours. Back in 2009 the Air Force planned to deploy at least 200 or up to 250 MQ-X, in addition to more aircraft to replace losses of Predator and Reaper UAS.101
 
The MQ-Ma could be the basis for the “close air support” UCAS that DARPA is interested in developing, probably, according to Norman Friedman, to “replace a segment of the manned Air Force.” This UCAS would have a payload capacity of between 2,000 pounds and 5,000 pounds, and like the future air–to-air capable MQ-Mc, it may display “greater autonomy linked to artificial intelligence.”102 The aircraft the close air support UCAS may replace would be the A-10 and the F-16 fighter in the close air support mission.
 
Theater UAS (MQ-L/O [MQ-La]): The theater UAS, also referred as a “regional UAV,” will have an all-aspect stealth flying wing with an extreme low observable (ELO) design. It will be a high altitude long endurance (HALE) ISR platform that may have a 48 hour endurance.103 One candidate for the theater UAS, which the Air Force labels the MQ-L/O or the MQ-La, may be based on Northrop Grumman’s X-47C, a “substantially larger” version of the X-47B.104 Like the X-47C, with a wingspan of 52.43 meters (172 feet), the MQ-L/O would have a greater payload capacity than the X-47B in terms of weapons, sensors, active stealth systems, and fuel, which would translate into more range and endurance.105
 
            Potentially, the MQ-L/O could be adapted as a stealthy air tanker to provide in-flight refueling for the adjunct UCAS and the future Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP) strategic bomber, and also for the manned F-22 and F-35 fifth-generation fighters. In addition, the MQ-L/O could serve as the basis for the LRSP. The MQ-L/O is intended to “complement the Global Hawk,” and it will be equipped with ISR sensors including a radar system featuring “synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and ground moving target indication (GMTI).”106 As mentioned above, the MQ-L/O may perform the role of AWACS Bistatic UAV Adjunct, a similar role of bistatic UAV adjunct to operate in tandem with space-based radar to detect ground targets, or as a communications relay platform in a combat zone, potentially replacing satellite communications knocked out in a war.107 
            The MQ-L/O as mentioned above will have an all-aspect, extreme low observable (ELO) flying wing design like the MQ-X and the Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP). It will be stealthier than the F-22 and the F-35 fifth-generation fighters, probably with a radar cross section (RCS) of -70 dB (Decibel) per square meter, equivalent to 0.0000001 square meter.108 In comparison, the F-22 has a RCS of -40 dB per square meter, equivalent to 0.0001 square meter, reportedly having the RCS of a metal ‘marble.’ The less stealthy F-35 has a RCS of -30 dB per square meter, equivalent to 0.001 per square meter, the RCS of a golf ball.109 The MQ-L/O may also have active stealth systems such as e-camouflage and an active cancellation system or a cold plasma cloaking device for greater stealth in the visible, infrared and radar spectrums. Its ELO design would allow the MQ-L/O to operate undetected inside enemy heavily defended airspace, as opposed to the more conventional RQ-4 Global Hawk UAS.
 
            With a higher degree of stealth, the MQ-L/O, together with a fleet of multiple adjunct UCAS – the MQ-Ma – accompanying the future strategic bomber, will support the Long-Range Strike Platform (LRSP) to penetrate a heavily defended air space by performing the ‘enabling’ missions of “‘penetrating stand-in airborne electronic attack’ (P-AEA) and penetrating ISR.”110 The P-AEA mission will entail getting close to an enemy radar to jam it with less electromagnetic energy than if the airborne electronic attack (AEA) would have been done at a longer, stand-off distance. Thus, MQ-L/O will follow the principle of ‘first in, last out’111
 
            MQ-L/O should be able to conduct “wide-area, standoff EW” (electronic warfare) jamming, airborne cyber attack and information warfare operations, including “breeching and exploiting enemy communications and signals networks.”112 The greater endurance of the MQ-L/O would make it an ideal platform to operate in the Western Pacific as part of the Pentagon’s Air-Sea Battle concept to help neutralize the menace posed by “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)” weapons.113  There are indications that a prototype made by Northrop Grumman may have been built by or after 2009.114   
                                                                                                                                 
High-speed ISR UCAS:  This secret project by Lockheed Martin is a stealthy high speed ISR unmanned combat air system (UCAS) that would be an “adjunct aircraft” to the future strategic bomber, the LRSP.115 The high-speed ISR UCAS may perform in addition to intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, airborne electronic attack (AEA) including cyber warfare operations with non-kinetic weapons, as well as suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) with kinetic weapons such as anti-radiation missiles (ARM). In this regard, Lockheed Martin’s high-speed UCAS may complement and eventually replace the F-16C/D Block 50D/52D (F-16CJ/ DJ) in the SEAD mission for the U.S. Air Force.
            The high-speed ISR UCAS can operate for 8 hours and carry out its mission inside a hostile air space protected by strong air defenses, at a distance from its air base of 1,852 km. Reportedly, the Air Force has two aircraft and a land-based control station, and the high-speed UCAS incorporates lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan.116 It may be that the maximum speed of the UCAS is between, Mach 1.5 and Mach 1.8, the reported supercruise speeds of the F-22 fighter,117 a sustained supersonic speed that would be utilized when penetrating an enemy defended air space en route towards the target. With a radius of action of 1,852 km, equivalent to 1,000 nautical miles, the high-speed ISR UCAS would have longer range than the F-16C Block 50, with a combat radius of 1,759 km or 950 nautical miles.118 Lockheed Martin’s high-speed UCAS may be equipped with an active stealth system such as e-camouflage and an active cancellation system or a cold plasma cloaking device for added stealth.
                                                                                      
Phantom Eye:  Made by Boeing, Phantom Eye is a propelled-driven high altitude long endurance (HALE) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) UAS that is powered by a liquid hydrogen propulsion system.119 Phantom Eye recently tested its hydrogen engines on the ground, with its first test flight to take place soon.120
 
            The first prototype has two propeller engines, a wingspan of about 46 meters, and it is expected to operate at an altitude of 19,812 meters and to have an endurance of 100 hours or at least four days. The operational version of the Phantom Eye will have a wingspan of 76 meters, a payload of 1,000 pounds to 2,000 pounds, a 10-day endurance that could be doubled to 20 days with a less heavier payload, and the capability to operate for four days 18,520 km distant from its air base. Such endurance is due to the fact that the energy content of the liquid hydrogen fuel is three times more than that in liquid fossil fuels. Boeing plans a bigger version of Phantom Eye that will be a four-engine UAS with wingspan of about 107 meters, and a payload capacity of 8,000 pounds to 10,000 pounds.121 
           
            The non-stealthy Phantom Eye will perform its ISR mission at a safe distance from hostile airspace, where it can conduct long-endurance patrols to detect distant ballistic missile launches in support of missile defense. Phantom Eye could also serve as a communications node and relay platform to link UCAS and manned stealth fighters operating inside defended enemy airspace with other platforms, air- and sea-based, and with ground command and control centers.122
    
The future of warfare and of air power in particular will be increasingly defined by the use of unmanned aircraft systems, which will evolve into fully autonomous platforms. The U.S. is at the forefront of this technology and is setting the pace of development of unmanned aerial technologies along with the ways to use them operationally. Thus, this advantage should not be lost and adequate funding should be dedicated to the continued development of unmanned aircraft systems.
 
Medium-Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System:  The MRMUS is planned to enter service in Fiscal Year 2018 for the purpose of offering a “long-term capability for beyond line-of-sight SOF [special operations forces] and Navy missions.”123  According to a Naval Air Systems Command document, “[t]he Medium-Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System (MRMUS) will be a Multi-Intelligence (MultiINT), reconfigurable platform capable of operating from air-capable ships.” The purpose is to fulfill the Navy’s “maritime and Littoral Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission requirements.”124
 
A candidate for the MRMUS might be based on Boeing’s A160T Hummingbird, named also the YMQ-18A, Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) system. The Hummingbird is fitted with rigid rotor blades instead of articulated rotor blades as in regular helicopters. A rigid rotor would allow “greater range, endurance, and altitude,” and it can operate at a greater speed than what a conventional rotor would allow.125
 
A key sensor technology that is being fitted to the Hummingbird is the Foliage Penetration Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Tracking and Engagement Radar (FORESTER) Ultra High Frequency (UHF) synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system. It would allow for detection of targets hiding under the cover of trees and foliage, and future plans are for the radar emitters to be placed in conformal arrays on the Hummingbird’s fuselage and the receivers to be embedded in its rotor blades.126 Currently the long FORESTER radar antenna is carried under the fuselage of Hummingbird, where it can rotate to get the best angle for detection of troops and military vehicles hiding under dense foliage, being capable of covering an area of 250 km.127
 
            Another sensor planned for the Hummingbird is the Autonomous Realtime Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System (ARGUS-IS), a “wide-area visual surveillance sensor” that can operate only in daylight and which could be installed under the fuselage of the VTUAV.128 Hummingbird may also be fitted with the future ARGUS-IF, a wide-area infrared sensor system for both day and night operations.129 In addition to the electro-optic visual and infrared sensors, and the “foliage penetration (fopen)” synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and moving target indicator (MTI) radar system, Hummingbird is designed to carry a laser designator, an electronic intelligence (ELINT) system, electronic countermeasures (ECM), satellite communications (SATCOM), and a communications datalink. It can fly and perform missions autonomously, being monitored by an operator with “manual override.”130           
 
            Hummingbird’s endurance is of 20 hours with a radius of 926 km (500 nautical miles). The VTUAV has a maximum range of more than 4,167 km (2,250 nautical miles), and a maximum endurance of over 20 hours. A more capable later version of the Hummingbird may have a maximum range of 4,625 km and an endurance of over 24 hours.131  In addition to the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps has shown interest in the Hummingbird to carry payloads to forward operating bases, and “the U.S. Army and the Special Forces have been very interested” in the VTUAV for additional functions such as evacuation of a combat casualty from inside enemy –held territory or carrying a ground robot or unmanned ground vehicle (UGV).132  
 
Air-launched Electronic Warfare Decoys:
 
MALD-J and MALD-V: Raytheon’s Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD) entered operational service early in 2010 to be launched from the Air Force’s B-52 strategic bombers and F-16 multirole fighters.133 MALD would fool an enemy’s air defense by appearing in radar screens as actual attacking aircraft. Enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) fire-control radars would then illuminate the MALD, revealing their positions and radar frequencies. Surface-to-air missiles would then be spent on the decoys, while our suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft in a strike force would fire HARM anti-radiation missiles (ARM) at the enemy SAM radars. In addition, the U.S. Navy has shown interest in MALD to equip the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet.134 Other aircraft that could carry MALD are the B-1B and B-2 strategic bombers, the F-15 fighter, the A-10 close support aircraft, the F-22 and F-35 fifth-generation fighters, and unmanned combat air systems (UCAS).135 MALD has an orbiting endurance of over two hours and a range of approximately 805 km (500 miles).136
 
Under development is the MALD-J (MALD-Jammer) version, intended to perform electronic jamming and which is planned to become operational in the USAF at the end of 2012.137 Also planned is the MALD-V version for modular payloads, which can “include jamming devices, seekers, data links, communications relays or surveillance equipment” up to 50 pounds. For example, MALD-V could carry “high-power microwave or radio-frequency burst devices”, electromagnetic pulse weapons (EMP), to short-circuit and disrupt enemy electronics and communication systems.138    
 
Recommendations:  
 
  • Fund development and acquisition of UAS and UCAS for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Unmanned aircraft systems are an essential element of 21st century air power, one in which currently the U.S. armed forces enjoy an advantage. America’s technological and numerical advantage in UAS should not be lost. Unmanned aircraft systems represent the future of U.S. air power, as many of the current manned airborne platforms will be first complemented by and then eventually replaced by UAS. Addressing Congress desire, reportedly reflected in the defense authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2011, for “an independent, non-profit organization” to conduct a study to determine the right proportion “between manned and remotely piloted aircraft of the Armed Forces,”139 we propose for the Navy the proportion for unmanned combat air systems (UCAS) of 20 extreme low observable (ELO) unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS) like the X-47B embarked in an aircraft carrier,140 which would be deployed at sea together with 24 F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, 20 F-35C Lighting II, 5 EF-18G Growler, 4 E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, 6 H-60 helicopters, and 2 C-2A Greyhound “carrier onboard-delivery aircraft.”141 The carrier-based UCAS would replace the 20 A-6E Intruder that used to be deployed aboard the Navy’s aircraft carriers.142 In the future the Navy could acquire an estimated fleet of about 200 operational subsonic carrier-based UCAS, to operate in parallel with the F/A-18E/F and the F-35C. The U.S. Air Force, on the other hand, could acquire a fleet of 200-250 stealthy subsonic UCAS like the Phantom Ray, to operate in support of the future strategic bomber, the LRSP, and alongside legacy fighters such as modernized F-15 and F-16 and the F-22A Raptor and F-35A Lightning II fifth-generation fighters.
 
  • Do not acquire UCAS at the expense of manned fifth-generation fighters. While the Air Force has plans to procure 1,763 F-35A, the Navy reportedly is considering reducing its planned purchase of carrier-based F-35C and Marine Corps F-35B and buy instead UCAS.143 The Navy believes that it will be “unaffordable” to try to make manned aircraft stealthier than what they are, probably in terms of achieving extreme low observable (ELO) manned aircraft in the -70 dB per square meter range. In this regard, it is believed that it will be “more affordable,” and in terms of achieving greater stealth “technically possible” to develop unmanned aircraft systems than manned aircraft.144 In this regard, it is advised to the services that will acquire the F-35 not to make further cuts in the number of Joint Strike Fighters they intend to procure, because the manned fifth-generation fighter will still determine who achieves air superiority and air supremacy over a battlefield. This, however, could only be achieved among other things by having large numbers of stealth fighters in light of the fact that Russia will introduce into service the PAK FA and China the J-20 fifth-generation fighters by the second half of this decade. Russia is poised to export in large numbers the PAK FA, and the U.S. must be prepared to fight a war against a regional power backed by one or two major world powers deploying fifth-generation fighters. The alleged shooting down of the extreme low observable (ELO) RQ-170 Sentinel ISR UAS by the Iranians, a claim rejected by the U.S., would nonetheless demonstrate if accurate that one of our stealthiest aircraft was detected and brought down on foreign soil while conducting a covert operation for the CIA.145 Iran will give Russia’s GRU military intelligence service and Chinese military intelligence access to the ELO technologies of the downed Sentinel, technologies which would probably be incorporated into the PAK FA and the J-20 fighter programs. Thus, the argument that more UCAS should be procured instead of manned fifth-generation fighters because they are more affordable runs the risk of supplying future enemy stealth fighters targets to shoot down, because their ELO technology could be detected. ELO ISR UAS and UCAS are necessary 21st century additions to our air arsenal, but these should not be regarded as a “silver bullet” that can replace manned stealth fighters. UAS and UCAS will have to work together with the fifth-generation fighters: the unmanned aircraft will collect ISR and conduct airborne electronic attack and strike missions with kinetic weapons while or after our stealth fighters engage successfully or have defeated the enemy’s fifth-generation fighter force.
 
  • Fund development and deployment of state-of-the-art low observable technologies. The genie is out of the bottle. Major world powers with divergent national interests to those of the U.S. and its allies are developing aerospace stealth technologies to defeat our sensors. Russia and China are likely to acquire the extreme low observable technologies of the RQ-170 Sentinel UAS downed over Iran. The U.S. must continue funding of more advanced stealth technologies to try to maintain America’s qualitative advantage in this area. Technologies such as e-camouflage, active cancellation systems, and cold plasma cloaking devices should be further developed in addition to research and development of advanced designs, materials and coatings for extreme low observable effects.   
 
  • Fund development and deployment of advanced ISR and non-kinetic weapons technologies. The development of UAS as the future of air power should proceed alongside the development of state-of-the-art intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communications, artificial intelligence, airborne electronic attack, airborne cyber attack and information warfare systems that will equip them. As Admiral Greenert wrote, “the weapons, sensors,…and electronic-warfare systems that a platform deploys will increasingly become more important than the platform itself.”146 At the same time, electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) and cyber warfare countermeasures systems s protective measures to deny an enemy the ability to disrupt our use of UAS and UCAS by way of electronic and cyber attacks. Even if the Iranian claim that their military used electronic warfare to bring down the RQ-170 Sentinel – a claim denied by the U.S. – is not true,147 it is likely that Russia, China and other powers have the capability to use electronic attack (EA) and cyber attack to disrupt our use of UAS. Therefore the latest countermeasures to these threats should be adopted, and new countermeasures should continue to be developed, to match the latest non-kinetic weapons developed by potential opponents.
 
Conclusion:
 
      The agreed cuts of $465 billion in defense spending planned for the next ten years148 should take into consideration the damage to U.S. national security and to our ability to successfully wage air wars against ground military objectives, such as in Libya, if such reductions in spending target unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) as those covered in this study. These UAS are fundamental elements of the networked force of the 21st century necessary to prevail in the future air-land and air-sea battle; their ISR, airborne electronic attack, airborne cyber attack, airborne information attack, communications, artificial intelligence, and their greater range and endurance are a technological breakthrough that is shaping the way modern warfare is and will be waged. In this regard, UAS and UCAS are essential and at the heart of the Air-Sea Battle concept and the neutralization of the Anti-Access and Area Denial threat. For these reasons, the additional $585 billion in defense spending cuts due to sequestration will in all likelihood, if not prevented, lead to the cancellation or freezing of these programs.149 This would be “catastrophic”150 to our national defense and to our national security commitments abroad, as the United States will be left behind technologically in its ability to wage war in the 21st century, thus losing its military technical edge to rival world powers. America’s ability to defend itself, its allies, and freedom and democracy will be compromised, to our own and the free world’s peril.


1 Networks refer to Network Centric Warfare.
2 David A. Fulghum, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 56; David A. Fulghum, “UAS Combat,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 73.
3 Bill Sweetman, “Big Wing,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, pp. 46-48.
4 Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, The Aerospace Revolution. Role Revision & Technology: An Overview, Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology Series (London: Brassey’s, 1998), p. 1.  
5 David A. Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, pp. 70-71.
6 David A. Fulghum and Bill Sweetman, “Future ISR,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, pp. 45-46.
7 David A. Fulghum, “Technology Will Be Key to Iraq Buildup,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14, 2007, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/aw011507p2.xml (November 11, 2011).
8 Jonathan Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” Proceedings, December 2011, p. 23.
9 Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 71; idem, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” p. 57.
10 Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 71.
11 Fulghum, “Technology Will Be Key to Iraq Buildup;” idem, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” p. 56; Alon Ben-David, “Fast Response,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 63.
12 Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 71.
13 David A. Fulghum, “F-35 To Become Electronic Attack Aircraft,” November 30, 2008, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw120108p2.xml (November 8, 2011); idem, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 70.
14 Fulghum, “UAS Combat,” p. 73
15 The History Channel, Dogfights of the Future, A&E Television Networks AAE-131240, 2007, DVD. 
16 Fulghum, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” pp. 56-57.
17 Ben-David, “Fast Response,” p. 63. 
18 David A. Fulghum, “Why Syria’s Air Defenses Failed to Detect Israelis,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, in Aviation Week.com, October 3, 2007, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogscript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A2710d024-5eda-416c-b117-ae6d649146cd (November 11, 2011).
19 Fulghum, “UAS Combat,” p. 73.
20 David A. Fulghum, Michael A. Dornheim, and William B. Scott, “Pictures Give Insight Into Stealth Projects,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 12, 2005, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/02145p04.xml&headline=Pictures%20Give%20Insights%20Into%20Stealth%20Projects (November 11, 2011); Fulghum, “Technology Will Be Key to Iraq Buildup.”
21 Fulghum, Dornheim, and Scott, “Pictures Give Insight Into Stealth Projects.”
22 Fulghum, Dornheim, and Scott, “Pictures Give Insight Into Stealth Projects;” Fulghum, “Why Syria’s Air Defenses Failed to Detect Israelis.”                                      
23 Bill Gertz, “Pentagon battle concept has Cold War posture on China,” The Washington Times, November 9, 2011, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/9/pentagon-battle-concept-signals-cold-war-posture-o/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS (November 11, 2011); Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: Air Sea Battle Fight,” The Washington Times, October 13, 2011, p. A10; Bill Sweetman, “Big Wing,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, pp. 46-47; Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, No. 48 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2008), pp. 25-26.
24 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” pp. 46-48; Gertz, “Pentagon battle concept has Cold War posture on China.”
25 Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” p. 23.                     
26 The Information Warfare Site, “Information Dominance vs. Information Superiority,” Issue Paper, April 1, 1997, at http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/info-dominance/issue-paper.htm (July 27, 2011).
27 Northrop Grumman, “MQ-4C BAMS UAS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/bams/assets/bams_uas_data_sheet.pdf (August 8, 2011); Martin Streetly, ed., Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, No. 21 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2008), p. 198; Gary Mortimer, “Northrop Grumman test Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS),” sUAS News, April 25, 2011, at http://www.suasnews.com/2011/04/5284/northrop-grumman-test-multi-function-active-sensor-mfas/ (July 18, 2011).
28 Northrop Grumman, “MQ-4C BAMS UAS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aircraft System.”
29 Marcel van Leeuwen, “BAMS given MQ-4C designation,” AviationNews.eu, September 13, 2010, at http://www.aviationnews.eu/2010/09/13/bams-given-mq-4c-designation/ (July 18, 2011); Norman Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010), p. 208.
30 van Leeuwen, “BAMS given MQ-4C designation;” Northrop Grumman, “MQ-4C BAMS UAS,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/bams/index.html (July 18, 2011); Mark Daly, Martin Streetly, and Kenneth Munson, eds., Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, No. 29 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2007), p. 307. 
31 Northrop Grumman, “MQ-4C BAMS UAS.”
32 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 198. 
33 Fulghum, “F-35 To Become Electronic Attack Aircraft;” idem, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 70.
34 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 307. 
35 See for instance BBC News, “Honduras finds 2.5 tonnes cocaine in submarine,” July 29, 2011, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14351061 (August 8, 2011).
36 Bill Gertz, “Chinese jets chase U.S. surveillance jet over Taiwan Strait,” Washington Times, July 25, 2011, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/25/chinese-jets-chase-us-surveillance-jet-over-taiwan/ (August 8, 2011); Jamie Hunter, ed., Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, 14th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2006), p. 504.
37 See for example the entry for the now cancelled Polyphem missile in Eric Wertheim, ed., The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, 15th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), p. 242. On the IDAS (Interactive Defense and Attack System for Submarines) missile see Joris Janssen Lok, “Updated with New Photos: Submerged IDAS Missile Firing,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, in Aviation Week.com, June 5, 2008, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogscript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3Ad680d51a-98dd-4bca-bc02-b635e7457fe1 (August 8, 2011); Jane’s Information Group, “IDAS (Germany), Underwater weapons,” Jane’s Naval Weapon Systems, June 13, 2011, at http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Naval-Weapon-Systems/IDAS-Germany.html (August 8, 2011); Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, 5th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pp. 575-76.
38 General Atomics Aeronautical, “MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B,” at http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/pdf/Predator_B.pdf (August 8, 2011); General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator B UAS,” at http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php (August 8, 2011); General Atomics Aeronautical, “GA-ASI and CAE Partner to Meet Canadian ISTAR and Strike Needs With Offer of Predator B UAS,” May 25, 2011, at http://www.ga-asi.com/news_events/index.php?read=1&id=347&date=2011 (August 8, 2011); General Atomics Aeronautical, “MQ-1 Predator/Predator,” at http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/pdf/MQ-1_Predator.pdf (August 8, 2011); Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 123.
39 U.S. Air Force, “MQ-9 Reaper,” August 18, 2010, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=6405 (August 8, 2011).
40 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 122-23; General Atomics Aeronautical, “MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B;” idem, “Predator B UAS;” U.S. Air Force, “MQ-9 Reaper.”
41 General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator B UAS.
42 Fulghum, “F-35 To Become Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
43 General Atomics Aeronautical, “MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B;” Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, pp. 268-69; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 122-23, 125; Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, No. 56 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, September 2010), pp. 371-72, 379, 390-91.
44 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 268; Hewson, Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, p. 385; Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 214.
45 Brackets are mine. General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator B UAS.”
46 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 213; Royal Air Force, “RAF Reapers hit 20,000 hours over Afghanistan,” Shephard Group, April 8, 2011, at http://www.shephard.co.uk/news/uvonline/raf-reapers-hit-20-000-hours-over-afghanistan/8764/ (August 8, 2011).
47 Amy Buttler, “Reaping the Benefits,” Aviation Week &v Space Technology, August 15, 2011, pp. 48-50.
48 General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator B UAS.”
49 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 268; U.S. Air Force, “MQ-9 Reaper;” Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, pp. 212-13.
50 U.S. Air Force, “MQ-9 Reaper;” Military Technology, The World Defence Almanac 2011 (Bonn, Germany: Mönch Publishing Group, May 2011), p. 52.
51 John A. Tirpak, “The RPA Boom,” airforce-magazine.com, August 2010, at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810RPA.aspx (August 24, 2011).
52 General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator C Avenger,” at http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/pdf/Predator_C.pdf (August 8, 2011); General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator C Avenger UAS,” at http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_c.php (August 8, 2011); Stephen Trimble, “VIDEO: Avenger billed as ‘attrition tolerant’ alternative to F-22,” The Dew Line in Flightglobal/Blogs, June 23, 2011, at http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2011/06/video-avenger-billed-as-attrit.html (August 31, 2011).
53 General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator C Avenger UAS;” David Fulghum and Bill Sweetman, “Predator C Avenger Makes First Flights,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 17, 2009, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/AVENGER041709.xml&headline=Predator%20C%20Avenger%20Makes%20First%20Flights&channel=defense (August 8, 2011); Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 203.
54 James C. O’Halloran and Christopher F. Foss, eds., Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence 2005-2006, No. 18 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2005), pp. 168, 175; RIA Novosti, “The Pantsyr-S1,” March 19, 2010, at http://en.rian.ru/infographics/20100319/158254598.html (August 31, 2011).
55 General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator C Avenger UAS;” Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 203; Fulghum and Sweetman, “Predator C Avenger Makes First Flights.” 
56 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Predator C Avenger Makes First Flights;” General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator C Avenger;” idem, “Predator C Avenger UAS;” Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 203.
57 Graham Warwick, “Stealthy F-35 Sensor To Fly On Avenger UAV,” Aerospace Daily And Defense Report, September 18, 2009, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/AVENGER091809.xml&headline=Stealthy%20F-35%20Sensor%20To%20Fly%20On%20Avenger%20UAV (August 31, 2011); Trimble, “VIDEO: Avenger billed as ‘attrition tolerant’ alternative to F-22.”
58 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Predator C Avenger Makes First Flights.” On the way an AESA radar scans and also to see how the F-35’s optronic EOTS system scans, see F35JSFVideos, “F-35 Lightning II EOTS Videos 1,” YouTube, December 1, 2009, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=igoV7W7la_0&feature=related (August 31, 2011). 
59 See Fulghum, “F-35 To Become Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
60 General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator C Avenger;” idem, “Predator C Avenger UAS;” General Atomics Aeronautical, “Avenger Ready For Deployment,” July 19, 2010, at http://www.ga-asi.com/news_events/index.php?read=1&id=300 (August 8, 2011); Fulghum and Sweetman, “Predator C Avenger Makes First Flights;” Hewson, Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, pp. 371-74, 390-92, 379, 384, 385-86, 388; thedewline, “Avenger vs F-22,” YouTube, June 23, 2011, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3jQUP_IVZks&feature=player_embedded (August 31, 2011).
61 thedewline, “Avenger vs F-22.”
62 thedewline, “Avenger vs F-22;” General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator C Avenger UAS.”
63 Northrop Grumman, “X-47B UCAS Data Sheet,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/nucasx47b/assets/UCAS-D_DataSheet_final.pdf (September 8, 2011); David A. Fulghum and Bill Sweetman, “Phantom Wings,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 51.
64 Northrop Grumman, “X-47B UCAS Data Sheet;” Northrop Grumman, “X-47B UCAS Fact Sheet,” July 28, 2011, at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/nucasx47b/assets/X-47B_Navy_UCAS_FactSheet.pdf (September 8, 2011); Popular Science, “The Navy’s X-47B Will Be So Autonomous, You Can Steer It With Mouse Clicks,” FOX News.com, April 13, 2011, at http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/04/12/navys-x-47b-autonomous-steer-mouse-clicks/ (September 8, 2011); Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 220.
65 Department of the Navy, “A-6E Intruder,” Naval Historical Center, March 31, 1997, at http://www.history.navy.mil/planes/a6.htm (September 11, 2011).
66 Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” p. 22.
67 Northrop Grumman, “X-47B UCAS Data Sheet;” Sweetman, “Big Wing,” pp. 46, 48; William Marks, “X-47B Unmanned Air Combat Air System Taking Shape On Board Lincoln,” Navy.mil, February 13, 2010, at http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=51239 (September 8, 2011).
68 Northrop Grumman, “X-47B UCAS Fact Sheet;” Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 220.
69 Northrop Grumman, “X-47B UCAS Fact Sheet;” idem, “X-47B UCAS Data Sheet.”
70 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Future ISR,” pp. 44-46; Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 48; Fulghum and Sweetman, “Phantom Wings,” p. 51.
71 Gertz, “Pentagon battle concept has Cold War posture on China;” Fulghum and Sweetman, “Future ISR,” pp. 44-45.
72 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 47.
73 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 48; Fulghum and Sweetman, “In and Out of Sight,” p. 49; Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 309; Jamie Hunter, ed., Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2009-2010, 17th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2009), p. 484.
74 Mackenzie Eaglen and Lajos F. Szaszdi, “Russia Debuts Stealth Fighter—with Implications for the U.S.,” The Foundry, August 18, 2011, at http://blog.heritage.org/2011/08/18/russia-debuts-stealth-fighter%e2%80%94with-implications-for-the-u-s/ (September 10, 2011); A&E Home Videos, That’s Impossible: Invisibility Cloaks, DVD, 2009; Sean Rayment, “Invisible tanks could be on battlefield within five years,” The Telegraph, January 9, 2011, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8247967/Invisible-tanks-could-be-on-battlefield-within-five-years.html (September 10, 2011); Virginia Wheeler, “Boffins invent invisible tank,” The Sun, October 30, 2007, at http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article403250.ece (September 10, 2011).
75 Christopher F. Foss, “Stealthy, upgunned CV90 breaks cover at DSEi,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 14, 2011, p. 6.
76 See Mackenzie Eaglen and Lajos F. Szaszdi, “What Russia’s Stealth Fighter Developments Mean for America,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2494, December 1, 2010, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/12/What-Russias-Stealth-Fighter-Developments-Mean-for-America.
77 Doug Richardson, Stealth Warplanes: Deception, Evasion, and Concealment in the Air (Osceola, Wis.: MBI Publishing Company, 2001), pp. 48-49.
78 Boeing, “Phantom Ray,” February 2010, at http://www.boeing.com/bds/mediakit/2010/afa/pdf/bkgd_phantomray_0210.pdf (September 19, 2011); Boeing, “Boeing Phantom Ray Completes 1st Flight,” May 3, 2011, at http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1732 (September 11, 2011); Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 247.
79 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, pp. 236-37, 196; Chris Haddox, “Phantom Ray makes first flight,” Boeing, May 9, 2011, at http://www.boeing.com/Features/2011/05/bds_phantom_ray_first_flight_05_04_11.html (September 11, 2011).
80 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 246; Martin Streetly, “Sensory Evolution,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 14, 2011, p. 62.
81 Streetly, “Sensory Evolution,” p. 62.                                                                                             
82 Fox News, “Boeing’s Next-Gen Drone ‘Phantom Ray’ Takes Maiden Flight,” May 5, 2011, at http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/05/05/boeings-gen-drone-phantom-ray-takes-maiden-flight/ (September 11, 2011).
83 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 246.
84 Ibid.
85 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, pp. 236-37.
86 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Phantom Wings,” p. 51; Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 48; Boeing, “Executive Biographies: Darryl W. Davis,” September 2011, at http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/aboutus/execprofiles/davis.html (December 1, 2011).
87 See for example Eaglen and Szaszdi, “What Russia’s Stealth Fighter Developments Mean for America.”
88 See Eaglen and Szaszdi, “What Russia’s Stealth Fighter Developments Mean for America.”
89 See David A. Fulghum, “Libyan Leaders, Soldiers Face Cyber and Information Attacks,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, in Aviation Week.com, March 25, 2011, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3Ac3f95ee8-3fce-41ee-aedc-b69053fbbd1a (September 5, 2011).
90 David Fulghum and Bill Sweetman, “U.S. Air Force Reveals Operational Stealth UAV,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, in Aviation Week.com, December 4, 2009, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&newspaperUserId=27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:649e3cf4-8c07-4739-82cf-322c6c56ccd5&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest (December 2, 2011); Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, pp. 205-6; Fulghum and Sweetman, “Future ISR,” p. 45.
91 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 48.
92 Fulghum and Sweetman, “U.S. Air Force Reveals Operational Stealth UAV;” Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 206.
93 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 48. On the EOTS see Michael J. Gething, ed., Jane’s Electro-Optic Systems 2009-2010 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2009), pp. 522-23.
94 Ed Timperlake, “Navy ‘Thinkers’ Versus The Fighting Navy,” Second Line of Defense Forum, July 14, 2011, at http://www.sldforum.com/2011/07/navy-%E2%80%9Cthinkers%E2%80%9D-versus-the-fighting-navy/ (July 15, 2011).
95 Fulghum and Sweetman, “U.S. Air Force Reveals Operational Stealth UAV.”
96 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 48.
97 Gayle Putrich, “USAF still contemplating MQ-X requirements,” Flightglobal, February 3, 2011, at http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-still-contemplating-mq-x-requirements-352716/ (December 3, 2011); Boeing, “MQ-X,” ImageShack, at http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/12/boeingmqxslide.jpg/ (December 3, 2011).
98 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 199.
99 Putrich, “USAF still contemplating MQ-X requirements.”
100 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Future ISR,” p. 46; Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 48; Fulghum and Sweetman, “Phantom Wings,” p. 51.
101 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, pp. 220-21.
102 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 199.
103 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” pp. 46-48.
104 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 220.
105 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” pp. 46, 48.
106 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 46.
107 On the vulnerability of space satellites, see Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: STRATCOM on Space Defense,” The Washington Times, November 30, 2011, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/30/inside-the-ring-49499116/?page=all (December 2, 2011).
108 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 48; William D. O’Neil, “Stealth: Radar stealth,” Analysis William D. O’Neil, 2001, at http://www.analysis.williamdoneil.com/Stealth.pdf (December 4, 2011).
109 David A. Fulghum, “F-22 Design Shows More Than Expected,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 8, 2009, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw020909p2.xml (December 2, 2011).
110 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 47.
111 Ibid.
112 Fulghum, “F-35 To Become Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
113 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” pp. 46-47.
114 Ibid., p. 48.
115 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Future ISR,” pp. 44, 47; Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 206.
116 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 206.
117 See Eaglen and Szaszdi, “What Russia’s Stealth Fighter Developments Mean for America.”
118 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 206; Paul Jackson, ed., Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, 97th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2006), p. 817.
119 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Phantom Wings,” p. 51.
120 Hakan Abrahamson, “Boeing testar vätgasmotor I nytt spionplan” (“Boeing tests hydrogen engine in the new spy plane”), NyTeknik, November 17, 2011, at http://www.nyteknik.se/nyheter/fordon_motor/flygplan/article3346848.ece (December 4, 2011).
121 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Phantom Wings,” p. 52.
122 Fulghum and Sweetman, “Phantom Wings,” pp. 52-53.
123 Graham Warwick, “U.S. Navy Wants Larger Fire Scout Airframe,” Aviation Week.com, February 17, 2011, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/02/17/02.xml&headline=U.S.%20Navy%20Wants%20Larger%20Fire%20Scout%20Airframe (September 5, 2011).
124 Naval Air Systems Command, “Industry Day for the Medium Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System (MRMUAS),” August 18, 2011, at https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=33cfa1295869cbc35d05a0f7a1002135&tab=core&_cview=1 (September 5, 2011).
125 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, pp. 218-19.
126 Ibid., p. 219.
127 Clarence A. Robinson Jr., “Radar Counters Camouflage,” SRC, at http://srcinc.com/common/downloads/whats_new/FORESTER_SIGNAL%20June%202007_pg39.pdf (September 26, 2011).
128 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 219; Graham Warwick, “ARGUS – DARPA’s All-Seeing Eye,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, in Aviation Week.com, February 10, 2010, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A881370e5-a10f-46be-bab0-bf60fa08b425 (September 26, 2011).
129 Warwick, “ARGUS – DARPA’s All-Seeing Eye.”
130 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, pp. 240-41.
131 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 220; Boeing, “A1670T Hummingbird Overview,” June 2011, at http://www.boeing.com/bds/phantom_works/hummingbird/docs/hummingbird_overview.pdf (September 26, 2011).
132 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 219; Boeing, “A160 Hummingbird,” at http://www.boeing.com/bds/phantom_works/hummingbird.html (September 26, 2011); Guy Norris, “Boeing Rotary UAV Aims To Set Records,” Aviation Week And Space Technology, March 30, 2008, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/aw033108p1.xml (September 26, 2011).
133 David A. Fulghum, “Killing Electronics,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 59; Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 318. 
134 Fulghum, “Killing Electronics,” p. 59.
135 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 319.
136 Fulghum, “Killing Electronics,” p. 60.
137 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, pp. 318-19; Fulghum, “Killing Electronics,” p. 60. 
138 Fulghum, “Killing Electronics,” p. 60.
139 Walter Pincus, “Military services should consider common course in chase for updated unmanned aircraft,” Washington Post, January 11, 2011, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/10/AR2011011006252.html (August 5, 2011).
140 James Dunnigan, “USN Wants To Replace F-35s With UAVs,” Strategy Page, September 26, 2011, at http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/USN-Wants-To-Replace-F-35s-With-UAVs-9-26-2011.asp (October 7, 2011).
141 Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, pp. 882, 892.
142 Jean Labayle Couhat, ed., Combat Fleets of the World 1986/87: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1986), pp. 599-601. This book’s “English language edition [was] prepared by A.D. Baker III.” This book was published in Great Britain “under the auspices of the U.S. Naval Institute.” See book’s dust jacket and p. ii. In addition, by 1990 the estimated U.S. Navy fleet of A-6 Intruder was of 390 aircraft, and its inventory of operational A-7E Corsair II attack aircraft was 114, for a total of 504 aircraft. See The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990-1991 (Oxford: Brassey’s, 1990), p. 21.  
143 Joseph G. Cote, “Lockheed Martin showcases new fighter jet,” nashuatelegraph.com, September 30, 2011, at http://www.nashuatelegraph.com/news/934310-196/lockheed-martin-showcases-new-fighter-jet.html (October 7, 2011); GlobalSecurity.org, “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II: Specifications,” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35-specs.htm (October 7, 2011).
144 Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” p. 21.
 
145 Luis Martinez, “U.S. Drone on CIA Mission Before Crashing Into Iran: Officials,” ABC News, December 6, 2011, at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/stealth-drone-cia-op-falling-iran-officials/story?id=15096214 (December 6, 2011).
146 Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” p. 21.
147 Martinez, “U.S. Drone on CIA Mission Before Crashing Into Iran: Officials.”
148 Rowan Scarborough, “Service chiefs warn $1T cut would be ‘catastrophic,’” The Washington Times, November 2, 2011, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/2/service-chiefs-warn-1t-cut-would-be-catastrophic/?page=all (December 7, 2011).
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.