Hunter-Killer Battlegroups: A solution against the Taliban

 

Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D.

 

 

One possible solution to defeating militarily the Taliban insurgency could be the use of flexible tactical and operational formations centered on Hunter-Killer Battlegroups to search for elusive Taliban guerrilla groups in known areas of operation, surround them once located, and destroy them. The Hunter-Killer Battlegroups when in an area of reported Taliban activity would mainly operate in the countryside, with vehicles well-spaced in open formations, in search for reported Taliban hideouts and concentration of forces, trying to avoid main roads and traveling in convoy columns to avoid being attacked by car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IED), and mines purposely buried to hit their vehicles.

 

Once an enemy force is located with the assistance, for example, of airborne and space-based Intelligence, Surveillance, Target-Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) platforms, a Battlegroup or Battlegroups, operating always together with special forces and/or airborne troops, would surround the enemy with the use of the helicopter-born rapid reaction airborne troops and/or special forces to destroy the adversary. Like a white blood cell finding a germ, a Hunter-Killer Battlegroup would search for the enemy, find them, surround them, and obliterate them. Again, like several white blood cells close to each other but acting autonomously, various Hunter-Killer Battlegroups would operate simultaneously against separate bands of Taliban in an area or theater of operations, to prevent them from escaping or from supporting each other.  

 

Mobility, combined-arms firepower and flexibility are key for the success of the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup concept. The idea is to take the battle to the enemy instead of waiting to be attacked by them. This concept would involve air-land maneuver warfare. The concept has been inspired by the infantry tactics reportedly used by the Sinhalese army to defeat the Tamil Tigers guerrillas. Thus, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly: “Specially trained small infantry groups were the leading combat elements of army formations - division-sized battle groups of infantry and supporting arms…. The employment of these small groups along the entire front… resulted in simultaneity of operations that confused and overloaded the Tigers’ leadership, a [Sinhalese] formation commander said.”1 Since in Afghanistan there are not defined front lines, the small infantry groups – made up by airborne troops and/or special forces – would operate jointly with the Battlegroups to hunt down the enemy groups and destroy them. 

 

Other sources of inspiration have been the British Army’s concept of the Battlegroup,2 and the German use of Kampfgruppen (battlegroups) during the Second World War, in which case and on the battlefield a Kampfgruppe could flexibly be formed on the spot from available units, putting together in some cases a mixed force of tanks and assault guns, armored cars of reconnaissance units, armored personnel carriers (APC), self-propelled artillery and/or other supporting arms, Panzer Grenadiers (armored infantry), regular infantry or paratroopers.

 

Following the concept of the British Army’s Battlegroup, the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup would have a company of 14-16 Abrams M1A2 SEP (System Enhancement Package) Main Battle Tanks (MBT).3 The inclusion of MBT in the Battlegroup would provide firepower and the impressive presence of attacking Abrams may put the enemy to flight abandoning their positions, enabling other units like the special forces and airborne troops to catch the fleeing Taliban in the open. The heavy forces of a Hunter-Killer Battlegroup would be the anvil and the special infantry units the hammer and vice versa. Reportedly, “[t]he Abrams is mostly impervious to the RPG,” in reference to the RPG-7 (Rocket Propelled Grenade) and based on operational experience in Iraq.4 The Taliban fighters are armed with this type of weapon. Moreover, in reference to Canada’s use of MBT in Afghanistan, it was reported that “[w]herever Leopard 2A6M CAN MBTs have appeared, they have dominated the battlefield and the Taliban usually tries to avoid them altogether.”5 

 

Following the British model, the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup could have at least a company of Bradley armored infantry fighting vehicles and another company of Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers, together with supporting arms like artillery and mortars, and reconnaissance and engineer units. In the British concept, the “Battlegroup organization is very flexible and the units assigned can be quickly regrouped to cope with a change in the threat,” and the “Battlegroup is…structured according to task, with the correct mix of infantry, armour and supporting arms.”6 Four Battlegroups would form a Brigade and three Brigades will compose a Division, for a total of 12 Battlegroups - the “white blood cells” - per Division involved in the offensive operations.7

 

Additional recommendations are:

 

• Employ also in the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup, because of their mobility and flexibility, Stryker M1126 ICV versions such as the M1127 Reconnaissance, M1128 MGS (Motor Gun System) armed with a 105 mm gun, M1129 120 mm Mortar, M1130 Command equipped with C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), the M1132 engineer version with equipment for mine clearance, and the M1133 Medical Evacuation Vehicle.8
• Use the Sheriff Active Denial System (ADS), armed “with a roof-mounted, non-lethal, high-powered microwave system” with an approximate range of 1,000 meters. The system beams “millimetre wave electromagnetic energy” to force individuals to withdraw as they cannot stand the heat on the skin of the energy being directed at them.9 This system could be useful to force those inside a compound to flee, leaving them exposed to the open.  
• Employ as part of the support arms of the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup the Paladin M109A6 SIP (System Improvement Plan) self-propelled artillery system.10
• The special infantry units and infantry from the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup could use the “cross-country motorbike”11 for enhanced mobility. This would replicate the Taliban use of cross-country motorbikes for increased mobility. An idea  would be in some instances to fight the Taliban like the Taliban fight us.
• To support the special infantry units, i.e., the airborne troops and special forces, use the German-made Wiesel 1 and Wiesel 2 versions or any other equivalent airborne tracked armored vehicle. The Wiesel 1 Mk 20, which is armed with a 20 mm cannon, is in service with the paratroopers of the German Army. Its armor provides protection to the crew against 7.62 mm caliber arms and shell shrapnel. A single CH-53 helicopter or a CH-47 Chinook helicopter can carry 2 Wiesel 1 or 2 Wiesel 2 internally. There is also a Reconnaissance Wiesel 1 version.12 The Wiesel 2 family of vehicles include an armored personnel carrier, 120 mm mortar carrier, ambulance, the Wiesel 2 Engineer Reconnaissance Vehicle, the Wiesel 2 Mobile Command Post, an ammunition carrier, the PRIMUS (“Programme for Intelligent Mobile Unmanned Systems”) robot carrier, and the Wiesel 2 ARGUS, “Airtransportable Armoured Surveillance and Reconnaissance Vehicle” for “reconnaissance, scout missions, battlefield surveillance, artillery observation, command missions and security missions.”13 The Wiesel 2 is also in service with the German paratroopers. These vehicles can provide the special infantry units with mobility on the ground as well as increased firepower, greater reconnaissance reach, on site enhanced battlefield command and control capability, limited armored protection, and organic armor support.  
• As Taliban fighters equipped with RPG-7 launchers with additional grenades, the infantry of the Hunter-Killer Battlegroups and the special infantry units should be equipped with portable rocket launchers with 2-3 extra rounds, to give the individual infantryman enhanced firepower for “defeating bunkers and penetrating timber, brick, reinforced concrete, sandbag walls and other structures” and destroying vehicles including those with light armor protection.14 Such weapons are the U.S. MPIM (Multipurpose Individual Munition)/SRAW (Short Range Assault Weapon) and the SMAW (Shoulder-launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon).15 Another option may be the German Bunkerfaust, which was reportedly tested by the U.S. Equipped with a “computerised sight with an eye-safe laser range-finder,” the Bunkerfaust extends its effective range to 600 meters, having a minimum range of 11 meters, compared to the MPIM/SRAW and SMAW maximum effective range of 500 meters, and minimum effective range of the MPIM/SRAW of 17 meters.16 The SRAW is also credited with an effective maximum range of 600 meters against fixed targets.17    
• In addition to using UAV for ISR operations and to attack enemy targets, some UAVs could be used as decoys as they carry out their ISR missions to attract Taliban fire and thus discover their position.          
• Needless to say, the Hunter-Killer Battlegroups and the special infantry units would all be network-linked, coordinating their actions through Network Centric Warfare operations. 

 

Although it may be too late to introduce the type of units proposed in this study in Afghanistan, in light of President Obama’s announcement to withdraw U.S. combat troops, the concept of the Hunter-Killer Battlegroup may be useful for future counter-insurgency operations.

---

*This paper dates back to June 2011.

1 Rohan Gunasekera, “Infantry tactics ‘key to defeating Tamil Tigers,’” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 15, 2011, p. 25.

2 The British Army, “Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups,” armedforces.co.uk, at http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0014.html (June 23, 2011).

3 The British Army, “Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups;” Christopher F. Foss, ed., Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, 28th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2007), p. 171.

4 Gordon L. Rottman, Stryker Combat Vehicles, New Vanguard No. 121 (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2006), p. 42.

5 Carl Schulze, Canadian Leopard 2A6M CAN, International Special Nº 8002 (Erlangen, Germany: Tankograd Publishing, 2010), p. 6.

6 The British Army, “Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups.”

7 The British Army, “Formations: Battlegroups and Company Groups.”

8 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, p. 663.

9 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, p. 663.

10 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, p. 787.

11 Peter Blume, Panzertruppe ‘2010.’ German Panzer Forces in the 21^st Century, Militärfahrzeug Spezial Nº 5023 (Erlangen, Germany: Tankograd Publishing, 2009), p. 54.

12 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, pp. 239-40, 331.

13 Foss, Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2007-2008, pp. 331-33.

14 Richard D. Jones and Charles Q. Cutshaw, eds., Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2004-2005, 30th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), p. 163.

15 Jones and Cutshaw, Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2004-2005, pp. 178-79.

16 Jones and Cutshaw, Jane’s Infantry Weapons 2004-2005, pp. 163-64, 178-80.

17 GlobalSecurity.org, “Multipurpose Individual Munition (MPIM)/Predator Short Range Assault Weapon (SRAW),” at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/sraw.htm (June 23, 2011).