Additional Recommendations for the U.S. Army of the Future*

Lajos F. Szaszdi

 

* The following additional recommendations up to and including the thirty-third were originally written between September and October 2010.

 

1)                  Establish independent heavy tank battalions as the German World War II schwere panzer abteilung (heavy tank battalion) of Tiger tanks or independent tank battalions as the U.S. Army’s 65 independent tank battalions during the Second World War.

 

2)                  Form independent combined arms battalions of tank/mechanized infantry battalions.

3)                  Constitute semi-independent companies (part of the independent tank battalions).

4)                  Form independent battalions capable of being deployed anywhere in the world in 48 hours. A semi-independent tank company could be deployed in 24 hours.

 

5)                  Combined arms battalions of Heavy Brigade Combat teams and infantry battalions of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (equipped with Stryker APC) should also be given independent capability in case they can be used autonomously from their brigade unit of action.

6)                  These independent battalions, either belonging to brigade units of action or being independent tank battalions in their own right, can be the core of composite fire brigades or battle groups, with other units and subunits attached to them, having a modular capability to form ad hoc operational units tasked to particular missions.

7)                  The independent tank battalions would have an organic Unmanned Aerial Vehicle reconnaissance platoon.

8)                  Combat or anti-mine robots (explosive charge robot, anti-mine MULE robot, infantry combat MULE variant, armed IED-reconnaissance robot) could be attached to the independent tank battalions, with each tank having the Command and Control capability to operate the robots.

9)                  Airborne glider assault stealthy flying wings with 10-11 man capacity with GPS navigation should be introduced.

10)              Paratroopers should air drop with GPS devices for pinpoint landing and post-landing orientation.

11)              Commander should operate accompanying their troops to the front, but without overexposing themselves thanks to modern command and control technology.

12)              Senior commanders in headquarters should not have the temptation of trying to micromanage the operations of units on the ground, due to the advanced command and control capabilities available today.

 

13)              Ground operations should make use of Special Forces and possibly of professional mercenaries (contractors) for raiding missions behind enemy lines, reconnaissance, destruction of supply convoys, attack of enemy logistical facilities, neutralization of enemy reconnaissance forces, to blind the enemy and deny it supplies and security in support of main ground combat operations. The role of these Special Forces would be like Trenck’s Frei Korps pandours, irregulars of the 18th century Austrian Army who playing the role of today’s special forces successfully harassed, destroyed supply convoys, and blinded the reconnaissance capabilities of the Prussian forces of King Frederick the Great.

 

14)              In addition to the principles of mobility, speed, surprise, there is that of tempo that should continue to be emphasized in conventional operations.

15)              The goal in a conventional conflict should be to be the first to arrive to the objective with all the means available.

16)              Commanding officers on the ground should be given broad independence and should have full faith in accomplishing their mission, to foster initiative in the face of the fog of war.

17)              Operations should be characterized by their fluidity instead of being dragged by being methodical, with the goal of finding and destroying the enemy forces, rather than holding territory. 

18)              Soldiers should be well trained at every level of command, so that if the officers have been put out of action, the non-commissioned officers can assume command of a mission, and that even a corporal could do so, if there are no NCOs available.

19)              Running Start1 type of operations should be adopted in a conventional conflict, as in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which units go to combat as soon as they arrive, not waiting for the complete ground force to be assembled in the theater first. This concept would justify the independent tank battalions alluded earlier, which could arrive in theater first to hold on a front against the earlier stages of an enemy offensive, like in Georgia in 2008, arriving to a threatened area 48 hours after the beginning of an invasion. The Russian operation lasted 5 days.

20)              Execute Effects Based Operations (EBO), understood as mass of effective firepower and mass of effect of speed,2 but instead of being strategic in magnitude as in Operation Iraqi Freedom, these EBO should be limited to reach operational and tactical objectives in support of the ground offensive.

21)              To gain the maximum firepower for EBO at an operational level, deploy ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) with force-multiplier type of firepower, like air-fuel thermobaric warheads against enemy troop concentrations caught in the open, smart anti-tank bomblets, anti-personnel and soft-skinned submunitions, EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) warheads against enemy command and control and computer centers, deeply buried bunker-busting unitary warheads, and anti-radar warheads against air control, air defense or battlefield ground radars. Also, GMLRS (guided multiple launch rocket system) artillery rocket launchers would be useful to launch smart bomblets, anti-tank mines or air-fuel warheads to maximize firepower in support of Effects Based Operations at an operational level in a land battlefield. Another weapon system that could provide superior firepower for Effects Based Operations is the microwave beam director that could be used against masses of enemy troops caught in the open.

22)              Deploy ATACMS and GMLRS as part of the strike, artillery, battalion of each brigade combat team.

23)              Assigned infantrymen should wear exoskeletons to carry and lift heavy loads that would otherwise require more than one man or wheeled equipment.

24)              Numbers matter in terms of men and equipment, and more robots in the field would become useful tools for the soldier as force multipliers. Robots, however, should not be seen yet as substitutes for men in major offensive combat operations, although combat robots armed with weapons should be used to support the troops during combat operations.

25)              Team up with aircraft manufacturer Antonov of Ukraine for the production of a modernized version of the An-225 heavy cargo plane, capable of carrying inside its cargo hold up to 200 tons of cargo or between 700 and 800 passengers that could be troops. One single An-225 could thus be able to transport a full battalion. An independent battalion could thus be airlifted faster to a conflict zone through a fleet of An-225 and An-124 aircraft. With the M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank having a combat weight of over 63 tons, an An-225 could carry three of the tanks ready for action. The goal would be for 6 An-225 to deploy a tank company or about 18 Abrams in 24 hours anywhere in the world.

 

26)              The U.S. should make use for the benefit of its forces and of NATO of the Antonov An-124 and An-225 heavy airlifters. The use of these aircraft, in combination with the U.S. Air Force C-17, C-130 and C-5M Super Galaxy would make possible – provided that there are adequate airfields to land and available air routes – the transport in 96 hours of a brigade combat team, of a division in 120 hours, of an independent tank battalion in 48 hours, and of a tank company in 24 hours, anywhere in the world. 

27)              The U.S. Army together with other U.S. forces should confront a conventional enemy with superior forces in terms of numbers and the quality of equipment and men, and through the superior use of the forces available. This does not mean the use of overwhelming ground forces and of massive numbers of tanks and infantry compared to the total enemy forces in the theater as predicated in the so-called Powell Doctrine. Rather, it implies: a) The use of superior forces in terms of numbers and quality of tanks and troops to those of the enemy at the schwerpunkt or selected breaking point of an enemy’s front. U.S. ground forces overall in theater might be inferior to the total number of ground forces of the enemy, but the number of U.S. forces concentrated at the schwerpunkt would be superior to those of the enemy they face; b) this concept is based on the principle of following if possible a strategy of indirect approach in operational plans, exploiting the element of surprise and the enemy’s weakest concentration of forces, thus avoiding a frontal attack against enemy strong and prepared positions; c) the use of overwhelming firepower as in Effects Based Operations; d) the use of superior speed and faster decision making in maneuver warfare to keep the enemy off-balance and prevent him from organizing its defenses once our forces have broken its front and penetrated deep into his rear areas; e) the concentration and/or convergence of forces and not their separation; f) the use of qualitatively superior forces (in terms of firepower), like tank formations instead of infantry units, to breach and crush the enemy defenses or to blunt and destroy the spearheads of an enemy offensive; g) the superior use by the U.S. Army of Special Forces and/or Airborne Forces to capture key strategic targets to disarticulate the enemy’s defenses, such as the German paratroopers’ capture of the Fort of Eben Emael in 1940, or to neutralize the enemy’s leadership/senior command with surgical commando-style operations as when Otto Skorzeny captured in 1944 Hungary’s seat of government in Budapest, preventing the country’s defection to the Allies.   

28)              The infantry brigade combat teams should be trained not just for combat in an open battlefield but particularly in an urban environment, where combat operations would more likely take place in the 21st century. Thus, assault infantry units should also be equipped with submachine guns in addition to assault rifles for fast combat actions inside buildings, in rooms and in house-to-house fighting. Storm troops armed with submachine guns for combat inside buildings would thus be armed like special forces for urban environments such as SWAT teams and the German KSK counter-terrorist units.

 

29)              In the U.S. Army emphasis should not be on the individual soldier but on the infantry squad, with its soldiers fighting as a team. All infantry brigade combat teams should be equipped with Stryker armored personnel carriers (APC), with one Stryker APC transporting one squad. The Stryker APC, with its command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities, mobility and protection should become the “mother ship” of an infantry squad. The infantry squad with its Stryker APC should become the cell in the Army’s network centric body, made of battalions, battle groups and brigades. Fighting as a team, unit modularity (allowing units and subunits to join up into kampfgruppen or battle groups and fire brigades), and jointness should be key words for the military. 

30)              The use of redundant GPS navigation satellites and the fast launching of replacement satellites so that the loss due to enemy action of part of the constellation of GPS satellites would not totally disrupt and paralyze the use of GPS satellite navigation available to the U.S. Army and our forces in general. With the Navstar constellation consisting of 24 satellites, four more GPS satellites should be put in orbit as cold spares for a total of 28 satellites in orbit, and an additional four satellites should be stored as ground spares to be launched quickly as replacements if the need arises. A minimum of four GPS satellites is needed for positioning, with three covering altitude and longitude, and a fourth satellite providing altitude. Emphasis should also be placed in having in addition redundant navigation systems to replace satellite navigation in case it has been disabled by enemy attack.

 

31)              Deploy a lethal microwave weapon based on the technology of the Sheriff vehicle-mounted microwave beam director Active Denial System. This weapon could be employed for non-lethal uses such as the dispersal of rioting crowds, but by graduating the power of the microwave beam it emits, it could be used to kill enemy soldiers charging in massed concentrations in the open, World War I-style. In case of a war with Iran, based on the past experience of the Iraq-Iran War, such a microwave weapon could be used to target and fry large concentrations of soldiers attacking en masse. In a war with China, this weapon could be used to likewise kill masses of Chinese troops attacking in the open without the need to use nuclear or chemical weapons, and probably reducing the need to deploy large numbers of our troops manning defensive machine gun positions, or supporting our troops in defensive positions to break up and defeat attacks in the open by waves of hundreds or even thousands of enemy soldiers. A directed microwave beam weapon could also be used to destroy the electronics of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), being employed for instance to shoot down swarms of micro UAVs used by an enemy for electronic intelligence or as platforms for a battlefield communications network. The microwave beam weapon would thus be useful in the future to destroy swarms of micro UAVs launched against our troops to sting them with lethal poison.  A powerful land-based microwave weapon could also be employed to fry the electronics of enemy aircraft in the same way as the radar of the F-35 stealth fighter is designed to burn the radar and avionics of enemy fighters.

 

32)              Mechanized infantry, the equivalent of the German panzer grenadiers, of the Heavy Brigade Combat Teams and the infantry of the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams should wear body armor in addition to the helmet. This body armor should be made of advanced ceramics and synthetic fibers including breastplate, shoulder and upper arm armor protection, abdominal armor protection, and greaves. The armor should be very light and the armored storm troops should have in their assault rifles 40 mm rocket launchers. They should also be capable of carrying individually several rocket-propelled grenades for anti-tank/bunker busting missions, in addition to a generous amount of hand grenades. Armored storm troops should be equipped to place explosively formed projectile (EFP) mines and to lay improvised explosive devices (IED) for defensive purposes.

33)              The level of discipline of our U.S. troops should be Prussian in style, strict and stern, and punishment for serious war crimes such as murder, attempted murder against our officers, rape or torture of prisoners leading to their deaths or to crippling injuries should be the death penalty by firing squad. This type of justice should not be an exemption but the rule in case of such serious violations of the laws of war. This is not going backwards to the 18th and 19th centuries, but a way to make the U.S. Army even more professional, to make sure any crimes such as “fragging” of our officers, and war crimes against enemy prisoners, including suspected insurgents, and against civilians, and the rape of women in the battlefield, either our own soldiers, prisoners of war or civilians, do not go unpunished. The murder of prisoners, of civilians, looting, rape, and torture in interrogations must be severely punished, including anyone in the chain of command who would willingly allow, consent or try to hide knowingly a war crime. Such actions as they have occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan irreparably damage the image of the U.S. military and of the country before the world and the population of an occupied country. Serious war crimes are a sign of a breakdown in discipline and a violation of the laws of the United States. Instead of winning the hearts and minds of the local population, such crimes and transgressions, committed also by mercenaries (security contractors), only help to fill the ranks of the insurgency and cause more casualties among our men. Those guilty of very serious crimes committed in the field, in a friendly country hosting one of our bases or at home should be severely punished without exception. To make it unequivocal, respect of the rules of war and international military law as ratified by Congress should be included as one of the rules in the U.S. Army code of conduct. It should also be remembered that if war criminals are not duly punished, they will eventually return to the U.S. and could become a potential threat to those living in the country. A court martial should be conducted with full consideration of the rights of the accused, yet the trials should be closed and conducted in the theater of operations, to prevent public opinion and politicians at home from interfering with the carrying out of justice.

 

34)              Train and deploy high-tech soldiers based on the Future Force Warrior concept. Conduct maneuver warfare updated to the concept of network-centric warfare with networked command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).     

35)              Use rapid reaction forces that would not be composed of light forces but would be equipped with fast main battle tanks (MBT), armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFV), and armored personnel carriers for defensive and offensive operations. For fast deployments the heavy rapid reaction forces would use heavy airlifters such as the Ukrainian An-124 and An-225 Mriya or take advantage in Europe, for example, of high-speed trains with freight wagons to transport main battle tanks and armored vehicles near the frontline, as the Germans panzer forces did in World War II, when they used the railway system to deploy rapidly their tank units to the sectors of the front where they were needed the most. The rapid reaction forces could be battalion or regiment-sized battle groups or kampfgruppen, or be formed by one or more brigades, by one or more divisions or by a corps.

36)              Make extensive use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in support of ground operations and ground troops, for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)/intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), communications relay, close air support (CAS), electronic warfare and cyber warfare, medical evacuation (medevac) or to transport ammunition and supplies to the troops in the frontline.   

37)              Deploy cyber warfare troops to conduct cyber warfare operations on the battlefield. Cyber warfare shall be treated as another dimension of warfare, along with electronic (in the electromagnetic spectrum), ground, naval, air and space warfare.

38)              Conduct electronic warfare and electronic attack operations together with cyber warfare against enemy battlefield radar and communication systems.

39)              Deploy mobile counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) defenses for ground troops, capable to perform as a close-in weapon system (CIWS) flak defensive operations against enemy low-flying aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), cruise missiles, air-to-ground missiles (AGM) including air-launched anti-tank missiles (ATGM), and air-launched precision-guided bombs. 

      

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1 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, with Malcolm McConnell (New York: Regan Books, 2004), 389.

2 Franks, 415-16; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2003-2004 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 98, 102.