Friday, September 26, 2014

Air War over Libya: The Lessons for Future U.S. Military Acquisitions, Part I


 
 
Lajos F. Szaszdi, Ph.D.
 
NATO air operations began last March against Libyan government forces, under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 passed on March 17 and which allowed the taking of ‘all necessary measures’ to defend Libya’s civilian population from deliberate attacks by Muammar Gaddafi’s military and security units.1 Offensive operations against Gaddafi’s air defenses began in earnest on March 19 under U.S. leadership with Operation Odyssey Dawn, during which U.S. air strike assets outweighed those of other members of the international coalition, including the United Kingdom and France in the suppression of enemy air defenses, including surface-to-air missile (SAM), radar sites, and command and control centers.2 Twelve days later on March 31, NATO took command of Operation Unified Protector to enforce a no-fly zone and arms embargo against Libya.3 The scale of U.S. involvement in Libya by August 22 was seen in the number of air sorties conducted by U.S. aircraft until then, with 5,316 sorties out of a NATO total of 19,877 flights. Hence, the U.S. participation represented 26.7 percent of the total of NATO air sorties, of which 1,210 strike sorties were flown by U.S. aircraft.4      
 
This paper, written by using open sources intelligence research and analysis, has the purpose of revealing the major U.S. platforms, primarily airborne but also sea based, that took part in Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector. This first part will cover those military platforms that fulfilled the functions of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – Networks (C4ISR-N)5 and which were involved in the electromagnetic battlefield performing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and/or conducting attacks with non-kinetic weapons.6 The second part covers operational, under development or planned unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) that are intended to complement or replace the platforms covered in the first part of this study. The third part of this study will cover combat platforms, kinetic weapon systems, and logistic support platforms. In this study we have included those platforms that are under development or planned and which are intended to complement or replace the platforms that took part in the Libya operation because they would be essential to perform successfully similar military operations in the future. This work has also the purpose of revealing why the platforms and weapon systems here discussed are important to U.S. national security and for the successful prosecution of operations of the type of Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector.   
 
The air and sea platforms covered in this study are the following: E-3 Sentry AWACS, E-8C Joint STARS, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, RC-135U Combat Sent, RQ-4 Global Hawk UAS, MQ-1B Predator UAS, MQ-8B Fire Scout VTUAV, EP-3E ARIES II, EC-130H Compass Call, EC-130J Commando Solo III, USS Mount Whitney, EA-18G Growler, and F-16C/D Block 50D/52D (F-16CJ/DJ).
 
Future wars, whether conventional or involving mainly counter-insurgency operations, will be decided through control of the air and space, through the exercise of aerospace power.7 The emphasis in modern warfare is in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, to know precisely where the enemy is. It is as important as the ISR mission to exercise superiority over the electromagnetic battlefield by dominating the electromagnetic spectrum and thus “‘[m]aintaining the electro-magnetic spectrum as maneuver space’” for our airborne electronic attack (AEA) and electronic warfare (EW) operations.8
 
Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, former U.S. Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, has suggested that at the present time it is of primary importance to develop the tools to conduct information warfare by way, for example, of electronic warfare and cyber warfare through the penetration and control of enemy computer networks.9 To carry out information warfare a sufficient number of ISR platforms are needed. At least almost five years ago the problem was that the “‘Air Force has lots of strike capability, but not enough [ISR] collection.’”10 For this reason, more air platforms that were not originally designed for specialized ISR missions are conducting them equipped with the appropriate sensors in what has been termed nontraditional ISR. The goal of the U.S. armed forces, as stated by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert in reference to the Navy, is “treating EW and cyber environments as ‘maneuver spaces’ on par with surface, undersea, or air.”11 The electronic warfare (EW) environment is the electromagnetic spectrum, a “maneuver space” that will have to be dominated to prevail in warfare.
 
            Key to the prosecution of air operations in the future is the capability to conduct persistent “cooperative” airborne electronic attack and electronic warfare, to perform intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and target acquisition (ISTAR), and to achieve “weapons systems integration” and thus integrate all platforms and systems involved through a network-centric warfare communications architecture based on a distributed “IP-based network.”12 The key to this network-centric connectivity is a secure “‘advanced data link and Internet protocol network to move information at a much higher speed.’”13 By sharing the intelligence and information collected through various sensors it would be possible to build a common picture of the electronic and/or conventional order of battle of our forces and of the enemy forces, enabling a very fast response against the enemy with non-kinetic and/or kinetic weapons.14 Information collected by “satellite, large intelligence aircraft and national agency data” will also be shared by the network.15 There will be a network linking airborne sensor, communications, and strike manned and unmanned platforms and weapon systems to space-based sensor and communications satellites, and ground, sea surface and underwater forces.
 
            Key to victory in modern warfare is the execution of airborne electronic attack (AEA), which includes “the offensive use of false targets, network attack, advanced jamming, algorithm-packed data streams” for the purpose of breeching and exploiting enemy communications and signals networks,” and “power surges” to destroy enemy electronics through the electromagnetic pulses (EMP) of “high-power microwaves.”16 There is also the use of directed energy weapons such as lasers17 and electromagnetic energy beamed from active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, in this case to burn the electronics of air defense radars and surface-to-air missile (SAM) command and control computers.18
 
In addition, cyber warfare is a new dimension of warfare integrated into information warfare and airborne electronic attack. Thus, “communications, cyber- and electronic activity are starting to resemble each other operationally” because “‘communications and data systems…have a lot in common… Some are the same system.’”19 Moreover, “the cyber realm…now has an extensive overlap with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)” which takes advantage of “[t]he rapid spread of computer and mobile communications.”20 One form of airborne cyber attack consists in “locating enemy emitters with great precision and then directing data streams into them that can include false targets and misleading messages algorithms that allow a number of activities including control.”21
 
The U.S. Air Force has offensive computer programs containing “algorithms designed to mine intelligence or enable unauthorized takeover as system administrator” of enemy computers.22 These computer viruses would be contained in “data streams” beamed to enemy emitters to penetrate and hack a foe’s computer networks. One of these programs is Suter, with Suter 2 allowing the intruder to an enemy air defense computer network to become it system administrator and thus take control of enemy radars, for example “steering them away from penetrating U.S. aircraft.”23 In addition, the Suter 3 program was designed to penetrate the networks linked to targets such as tactical mobile “ballistic missile launchers or mobile surface-to-air missile launchers.”24 Based on these developments, it is likely that there are now operational, under development or planned more advanced computer programs designed to control longer-range ballistic missile launchers, land-based cruise missile launchers, unmanned and manned enemy aircraft, sea-based targets, and perhaps even space satellites. Aircraft that have been linked to the offensive use of the Suter computer program are “the EC-130 Compass Call, RC-135 Rivet Joint and F-16CJ” suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) fighter. In addition, it has been reported that the Suter program was “integrated into U.S. unmanned aircraft by L-3 Communications.”25
 
ISR platforms, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and airborne electronic attack aircraft are not only key to prevail in air campaigns such as that conducted in Libya, but are at the center of the Pentagon’s “Air-Sea Battle concept.” In this regard, the U.S. military expects to face in a conflict with China an “Anti-Access and Area Denial threat (A2/AD)” that includes anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) such as the DF-21D intended to destroy aircraft carriers, anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons, anti-ship cruise missiles, stealth fighters such as the J-20, unmanned aircraft systems, submarines, and cyber warfare operations.26  New extreme low observable (ELO) UAS will be introduced to perform intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) and airborne electronic attack (AEA) operations against the anti-access and area denial threat.27 In this regard, Admiral Greenert wrote: “Electronic warfare (EW) and cyber operations are increasingly essential to defeating the sensors and command and control (C2) that underpin an opponent’s A2/AD capabilities. If the adversary is blinded or unable to communicate, he cannot aim long-range ballistic and cruise missiles or cue submarines and aircraft.”28
                                                                                 
Funding should be provided for these future platforms as well as for the following manned and unmanned aircraft, which constitute essential nodal points in the distributed and integrated network-centric warfare architecture needed to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum to thus prevail over the air, ground and sea.   
 
            This study will proceed to identify the types of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – Networks, Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA), Cyber Warfare, Information Warfare, and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) platforms and systems in the U.S. military inventory that have been employed in the Libyan Crisis and which are essential for the successful prosecution of a modern war. These platforms and systems enable our forces to achieve information superiority and information dominance,29 essential in modern warfare to know where the enemy is and our forces are in relation to each other, so that our combat assets can proceed quickly to defeat the enemy before he can attack us.        
 
Airborne C4ISR-N:
 
Airborne Early Warning and Control systems:
 
E-3 Sentry AWACS: The U.S. Air Force holds the largest fleet of Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) platforms, deploying 32 Boeing E-3B and E-3C Sentry AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft in seven squadrons.30 The value of the AWACS cannot be overstated. It performs airborne radar surveillance over hundreds of kilometers with 360º coverage, its radar having a detection range of 400 km against aircraft flying at low altitude and of 520 km when “operating at ‘medium’ altitude.”31 The AWACS also carries out tasks like “airborne Command & Control (C2), air and maritime surveillance and battlespace management….”32 It can provide a picture of an air and sea battle space, displaying the location of all aircraft and ships under its radar, both friends and foes, relying the information to our command and control on land and on ships, providing air traffic control to our air assets, and directing them to engage enemy air and naval targets. Thus, according to the USAF, “AWACS provides situational awareness of friendly, neutral and hostile activity, command and control of an area of responsibility, battle management of theater forces, all-altitude and all-weather surveillance of the battle space, and early warning of enemy actions during joint, allied, and coalition operations.”33      
 
The U.S. advantage in numbers with regard to AEW&C aircraft became clear when NATO voiced its decision on March 10 of this year to increase air surveillance operations with AWACS planes in the vicinity of Libya. Then NATO had forward-based 4 E-3 AWACS in Sicily and the RAF had 2 E-3 Sentry deployed in Cyprus, but it would seem that these aircraft were not sufficient to implement a no-fly zone to the full extent.34 NATO agreed that no AWACS aircraft operating in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan – the Alliance’s most important operation - should be redeployed to the Mediterranean to back the Libya operation. Thus, in reference to the additional E-3 Sentry needed to carry out fully a no-fly zone over Libya, a NATO official said: “These would have to come from elsewhere, such as the US.”35
 
Quality also matters in the battle space of the 21st century. Of the USAF E-3B/C fleet of 32 aircraft, all are expected to be upgraded to the latest E-3G version, known before as the Block 40/45 upgrade, by 2020.36 According to the USAF head of “AWACS 40/45 Production,” the latest modernization of the Sentry “replaces a mission computer system originally installed in the 1970s,” adding that “[t]he new system will have an open, network-based architecture, enabling future net-centric modifications.”37 Still, the USAF received the original 34 baseline E-3A Sentry by 1984, with the first AWACS delivered in 1977.38 The legacy E-3, based on the venerable Boeing 707 aircraft,39 is no longer being manufactured.
 
There are plans for the USAF to deploy after 2015 a new airborne early warning system known as the AWACS Bistatic UAV Adjunct, in which an E-3 Sentry would play the role of radar transmitter while a High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) would be the receiver of the radar returns. The HALE UAV with bistatic radar receivers could be the Global Hawk or have a stealth design like the cancelled Dark Star, which would allow the Bistatic UAV to operate inside enemy airspace, thus increasing the radar detection range of an E-3. Also, the Bistatic UAV would have a better performance in detecting stealth aircraft. The use of the Bistatic UAV Adjunct would help reduce the number of Sentry aircraft in operation in two regional wars fought at the same time.40 In addition, the U.S. Navy’s E-2D Advanced Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft would also be able to operate in combination with the Bistatic UAV.41
 
A candidate for the Bistatic UAV Adjunct would be based on Northrop Grumman’s X-47C unmanned aircraft system (UAS), an extreme low observable (ELO) subsonic aircraft with a wingspan of about 52.43 meters, high altitude long endurance (HALE) flight, and with wings fitted with wide radar antenna apertures. The Bistatic UAV Adjunct may be essentially the same baseline aircraft, of modular design, as the one the U.S. Air Force plans for its theater UAS, identified by the USAF as either the MQ-L/O or MQ-La and which has been designed for ISR and airborne electronic attack (AEA) operations deep inside defended enemy airspace.42
 
The USAF eventually plans to replace the E-3 Sentry in the Airborne Early Warning mission with radar-equipped satellites that would operate as space-based emitters of radar pulses while the Bistatic UAV would receive the radar returns from air or sea contacts.43 While recognizing the value of an advanced space–based early warning system, it would be advisable to have also manned airborne early warning platforms as a backup in case that in a major war an enemy would disable our radar early warning satellites and Bistatic UAV using GPS satellites for navigation and which would be controlled through satellite communications. As a Boeing official said: “How can you operate a fleet of … unmanned platforms that are dependent on satellites? Because there’s this thing called satellite denial. We’ve already seen countries around the world that have demonstrated a capability to take our satellites,” adding that “…we’re seeing GPS denial, videos being hacked. Cyberwar is the buzzword….”44 
 
Also, the command and control and “battle management” functions now performed by the E-3 AWACS system would be transferred to ground centers that would be part of the Ground Theater Air Control System (GTACS), since neither the radar satellites nor the Bistatic UAV Adjunct would be able to carry out those tasks due to obvious weight and volume constraints.45 Thus, a future lack of an alternative and more survivable airborne platform like the E-3 or the cancelled replacement of the Sentry, theE-10, capable of conducting command and control of an airspace, would make our forces too reliant on ground command and control centers that could be targeted with ballistic missiles and cruise missiles armed with highly accurate conventional, nuclear or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads. There is also the added threat of disruptive cyber attack against our command, control, communications and computers (C4). Indeed, as Lt. General Deptula said: “We need to look at designing command and control architectures and institutions to become much, much more survivable.”46   
 
            An example of the worth of the AWACS in counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare in Afghanistan was seen in 2007 when it supported air operations aimed at the recapture of Musah Qalah, a town in the province of Helmand that fell to the hands of the Taliban. In this instance one E-3C Sentry was used to coordinate the use of B-1B strategic bombers, Predator unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and RAF Nimrod MR. Mk 2 maritime patrol aircraft used to perform Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) in support of the land forces that reconquered the Afghan town.47
 
E-8C Joint STARS: The USAF deploys 17 E-8C Joint STARS (Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) aircraft, the largest fleet of its kind among all U.S allies. The Joint STARS performs battlefield radar surveillance of ground targets, having a radar range of “more than 250 kilometers.” Also, it “is an airborne battle management, command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platform.”48 The E-8C radar can “detect, track, and classify” deep inside enemy territory moving land targets like main battle tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery, road-mobile ballistic missile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles, trucks, and other utility vehicles. The radar can also detect low flying, slow moving aircraft, helicopters, and radar antennas in rotation.49 With its radar and computer processing power, the aircraft can generate a picture of the battlefield with the location of enemy forces in relation to our forces, and transmit it near real-time to our forces on the ground and in the air.50
 
The Joint STARS is a joint program between the USAF and the U.S. Army. In the words of the Air Force, “[i]ts primary mission is to provide theater ground and air commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting that contributes to the delay, disruption and destruction of enemy forces.” In addition, the E-8C is considered the only operational aircraft that can conduct battlefield radar surveillance in real-time of a land area of the size where an army corps would operate.51    
 
            The aircraft used for the Joint STARS system is again the legacy Boeing 707, which is no longer being manufactured. Before the program was removed from Fiscal Year 2007, the USAF planned to introduce the next generation Northrop Grumman E-10A, which would have replaced the E-8C Joint STARS.52 The E-10A would have provided in a new Boeing 767-400ER airframe a “next-generation multisensor command and control aircraft,” equipped with the Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP), a J-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar.53 In addition of having an improved capacity for detecting and tracking vehicles moving on the ground, the MP-RTIP would have been able to detect cruise missiles. The E-10A would also have included a sensor-fusion capability “of all-source sensor data,” and the ability of “directing activities of manned and unmanned air and space sensor systems used for surveillance and reconnaissance.”54
 
            A successor to the E-8C being promoted by Boeing for the USAF is the P-8 AGS (Airborne Ground Surveillance), based on the P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.55 Even though Boeing has claimed that its proposed P-8 AGS “would…be equipped with the same multi-mode radar as the P-8A, the AN/APY-10,” which is a non AESA radar, reports state that the P-8 AGS will be fitted with the Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS), a new radar derived from the Navy’s AESA AN/APS-149 Littoral Surveillance Radar System (LSRS).56 The LSRS was successfully used onboard modified Navy P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it was able to track individuals in addition to vehicles.57 The U.S. Navy has plans to acquire 117 P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, a number of which would have the Advanced Airborne Sensor, which is capable of tracking targets on land and sea.58 One option in order to have more platforms that would complement the Joint-STARS fleet in conducting air surveillance of ground moving targets is to use when needed some of the Navy’s P-8A Poseidon equipped with the Advanced Airborne Sensor. If advisable, eventually the Navy could have all of its planned Poseidon fleet refitted with the AAS radar.
 
Another option is to upgrade the E-8C with the new MP-RTIP radar system originally intended for the shelved E-10A. Even though the Boeing 707 airframe of the Joint STARS is that of a legacy aircraft, the fact that it was rebuilt makes the E-8C on average only about 10.5 years of age. In addition, there are plans to fit the Joint STARS fleet with new engines.59 If the option of the MP-RTIP radar is pursued, there would be commonality in terms of using the same radar system with the Block 40 version of the RQ-4B Global Hawk High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft system (UAS).60 An upgraded E-8C may be able to control the RQ-4B Block 40 Global Hawk equipped with the same MP-RTIP radar.61 This radar, made by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, may have the ability of detecting individuals like the LSRS radar made by Raytheon.62 The E-8C Joint STARS, whose last rebuilt aircraft was handed over to the Air Force in 2005, does have the added capability of serving as a command and control and battlefield management platform.63 Another advantage that an MP-RTIP-equipped E-8 may have over the P-8 AGS is the MP-RTIP system’s capability of detecting and tracking air targets, including a tri-dimensional Moving Target Indication (MTI) of cruise missiles.64        
 
            A probable future replacement of the E-8C might be the planned theater UAS, the MQ-L/O (MQ-La), operating together with the Global Hawk UAS. According to the USAF, the theater UAS is intended to “‘complement the Global Hawk’” and it will be equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and ground moving target indication (GMTI).65 A key value of the extreme low observable MQ-L/O (MQ-La) would be its ability to operate inside a defended enemy airspace due to its stealthy design, as opposed to the Global Hawk.
 
            It may be that in the future the Joint STARS mission – like in the case of the planned future AWACS Bistatic UAV Adjunct – would involve a bistatic radar system in which the radar transmitter would be based in space in a satellite equipped with a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), while the bistatic radar receiver would be an airborne platform with a SAR.66 Thus, the bistatic radar receiver could be the Joint STARS and eventually a bistatic UAV, which could be based on the RQ-4B Block 40 Global Hawk and the theater UAS, the MQ-L/O. Like the abandoned E-10A, the E-8 upgraded with the MP-RTIP system may be capable of controlling space satellites equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar or other sensors “for surveillance and reconnaissance.”67 Such a modernized Joint STARS could thus control SAR satellites and serve as the bistatic receiver of radar waves emitted from space, or manage bistatic UAS such as the RQ-4B Global Hawk and the MQ-L/O to receive the radar returns from Synthetic Aperture Radar satellites. This latter function of controlling bistatic UAS would also be performed from the ground. In the future, bistatic UAS like Global Hawk and the MQ-L/O may control space satellites with SAR for bistatic radar surveillance operations.  
 
E-2D Advanced Hawkeye:  This advanced version of the E-2C Hawkeye will continue to provide airborne radar early warning and command and control capabilities to an aircraft carrier battle group. In addition, the Navy’s new E-2D Advanced Hawkeye will feature a new “communications suite and net-centric architecture,” for the fast transfer of data and information to other platforms, and “multiple sensor fusion capabilities.”68 The Advanced Hawkeye’s new capabilities will make the E-2D a “FORCEnet enabler” which will further network centric operations and improve command and control of naval operations.69 The aircraft’s advanced sensor, communications and command and control systems will enable a marked reduction in the reaction time from the moment a target is detected and identified to the instant when our closest combat platform is ready to fire at it.70 Capable of operating over oceanic, littoral and inland environments, the Advanced Hawkeye will support “theater air and missile defense” of the aircraft carrier battle group, including when “interceptor missiles” - understood to be launched from escort cruisers and destroyers – will use their maximum range to engage a target.71 In this regard, the range of the naval Standard SM-3 Block 1 surface-to-air missile designed for missile defense is estimated to be 1,200 km approximately.72 As mentioned above, the E-2D would be able also to operate with a bistatic UAV to extend the range of its radar coverage.73
 
 
Airborne Electronic Intelligence (ELINT):
 
RC-135V/W Rivet Joint: According to an expert, the RC-135 aircraft would have been operating in Libya to collect the signals emitted from Libyan air defense radar emplacements.74 The RC-135V/W Rivet Joint (RJ) is a reconnaissance aircraft that can collect strategic and tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT), communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT).75 The sensor system of the Rivet Joint can “detect, identify and geolocate (sic) signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum.”76 The USAF Rivet Joint fleet consists of 17 aircraft, and the relevance of this aircraft can also be seen in the recent British purchase of 3 new RC-135W for the RAF.77 The key role played by the RC-135V/W is above all demonstrated by the fact that it has been operating in the Middle East since the 1990 Operation Desert Shield, being also employed over Afghanistan.78 For example, Rivet Joint aircraft listened to radio communications from the Taliban, and based on the intelligence obtained from these operations Predator Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) were sent to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) of possible enemy bases of operation, after being directed where to look for the Taliban.79 It has been commented that in Libya Rivet Joint aircraft have intercepted the communications of Gaddafi’s Libyan government troops, acquiring information that put together with the location of those forces obtained by the radar of RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aircraft system (UAS), has helped direct air strikes against them.80    
 
One important task performed by the aircraft is to collect the electromagnetic waves emitted by air search radars and by surface-to-air missile (SAM) fire-control radars to use the data and information collected to defeat an opponent’s air defense system. The RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 30 High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAV would be used to complement the Rivet Joint fleet in carrying out SIGINT operations.81 Rivet Joint has been identified as one of the aircraft conducting cyber warfare operations with the Suter computer program.82   
 
RC-135U Combat Sent: The Air Force’s two RC-135U Combat Sent aircraft perform “strategic electronic reconnaissance” operations for the national civilian and military leadership. The Combat Sent carry out technical intelligence (TECHINT) “of emitters and/or weapon systems of interest” by “[l]ocating and identifying foreign military land, naval and airborne radar signals” for the purpose of “providing strategic analysis” to be used by our forces.83 Thus, in the words of the U.S. Air Force: “The Combat Sent records these signals for future references or for extensive analysis by electronic systems theorists. Any information garnered from the data will help determine detailed operating characteristics and capabilities of foreign systems. Evasion techniques and equipment are then developed from this knowledge that will detect, warn of, or defeat these electronic systems.”84 Even though the RC-135U Combat Sent and the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint have been modernized thoroughly, the 19 aircraft that make up their combined fleet are based on converted legacy C-135 transport aircraft, built for the Air Force between 1956 and 1965.85
 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems:
 
RQ-4 Global Hawk Unmanned Aircraft System: Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk is a High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft system (UAS) that performs intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) for the purpose of supporting ground, air and sea operations.86 The RQ-4 has been designed to give “near-continuous all-weather, day/night, wide area surveillance.”87 The Global Hawk’s long endurance enables it to sustain flights without refueling for more than two days over intercontinental distances.88 In the words of Norman Friedman, “Global Hawk remains in the air for much longer than a manned reconnaissance airplane, so each of its sorties is equivalent to several manned ones.”89 Thus, to show its capabilities, in 2001 a Global Hawk carried out a flight of 13,890 km (7,500 nautical miles) to Australia. The maximum endurance of the RQ-4 Block 10 is 35 hours in flight, while that of the RQ-4B is 36 hours of non-stop flight. The range of the RQ-4 could be extended further through by adding an in-flight refueling capability.90
 
Displaying a high degree of automation, according to the Air Force: “Once mission parameters are programmed into a Global Hawk, the UAS can autonomously taxi, take off, fly, remain on station capturing imagery, return and land. Ground-based operators monitor the UAS’s status, and can change navigation and sensor plans during flight.”91 The RQ-4 can be operated from the continental United States via space satellite link.92
 
Currently, the USAF plans to deploy a fleet of 55 Global Hawks, of which 7 are the earlier RQ-4 Block 10, and 6 are RQ-4B Block 20. The mainstay of the Global Hawk fleet is the RQ-4B Block 30, of which there would be 31. The latest version is the RQ-4B Block 40, with a planned current total of 11 UAS.93 Earlier, the Air Force intended to acquire a total of 78 Global Hawk UAS, but budgetary considerations led to procurement cuts, like the decision to order only half the number of planned RQ-4B Block 40 from 22 to 11.94 
 
The Global Hawk is intended to work alongside reconnaissance manned aircraft and space satellites, with the Block 10, Block 20, and Block 30 versions providing imagery intelligence (IMINT) through an integrated sensor suite comprising a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) with moving target indicator (MTI) plus electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) sensor systems.95 The Global Hawk Block 30 is also equipped with the Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload (ASIP) for signals intelligence (SIGINT). Thus, the Block 30 version has been designed to complement the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint due to its greater numbers and greater endurance.96 In this regard, it is possible that Global Hawk would be capable of conducting offensive cyber warfare with computer programs such as Suter.
 
The RQ-4B Global Hawk is intended as a future replacement of the famed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.97 In addition, it could serve as part of the AWACS Bistatic UAV Adjunct plan to extend the radar surveillance range of airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft. As mentioned above, the Bistatic UAV will operate in the future in combination with a radar satellite in lieu of an AEW aircraft.
 
The latest version of the Global Hawk, the RQ-4B Block 40, will be equipped with the new Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) AESA radar.98 As discussed above, the MP-RTIP would be capable of detecting and tracking moving targets on the ground, probably including also individuals, and air targets such as cruise missiles. Moreover, the RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 40 could be part of a bistatic UAV system in which it would receive ground surveillance radar emissions from a space satellite.
 
            Two YQ-4A Global Hawk UAS technology demonstrators were used during Operation Enduring Freedom over Afghanistan starting in November 2001, flying over 60 missions and 1,200 hours while collecting over 15,000 images transferred to U.S. Central Command.99 Only one Global Hawk, YQ-4A AV-3 (also another prototype) was used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, when from March 2003 it was able to capture about 3,655 images of targets including 300 Main Battle Tanks (MBT), considered to be 38 percent of the Iraqi tank force, 13 surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, over 70 single SAM mobile launchers, 50 SAM locations, and 300 missile containers.100 Although the Global Hawk flew only 5 percent of all USAF intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions of Operation Iraqi Freedom, it accounted for over 55 percent of collected images of ground targets needed to support air strikes against them.101 Global Hawks have participated more recently in surveying the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan, and in conducting ISR operations in Libya, where at least one aircraft has been involved.102  
 
            The early Global Hawks were designed to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights “in low to moderate risk environments.”103 The newer RQ-4B Block 30 has been criticized among other things that its infrared sensor is less capable at long distance, although “it operates well directly over the target.”104 This would not be a problem, as the extreme low observable MQ-L/O theater UAS would perform instead of Global Hawk ISR operations well inside enemy defended airspace.
 
 
MQ-1B Predator Unmanned Aircraft System:  The U.S. military and the USAF in particular have pioneered the use of unmanned aircraft systems over the battlefield. In addition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and other fronts of the War on Terror such as Somalia and Yemen, UAS have been used in the recent Libya Crisis to carry out air strike and target acquisition missions. The USAF MQ-1B Predator and MQ-9B Reaper, and the latest Predator C Avenger unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), all developed by General Atomics Aeronautical, are multirole platforms intended to perform intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) to locate, for example, roadside bombs, to intercept cell phone communications or to acquire a target for a manned aircraft to strike. These UAS can also be armed to perform close air support operations and to conduct precision strikes against insurgent forces and their leaders.105 More importantly, the unmanned aircraft can carry out their missions without risking the life of a pilot, for they are remotely piloted.
 
The tactical value of the unmanned aircraft system was stressed by the former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, retiring U.S. Marine General James Cartwright, who in relation to the use of Predator UAS in the Libya operation said that “[w]hat they will bring that is unique to the conflict is their ability to get down lower, therefore to be able to get better visibility on targets that have started to dig themselves into defensive positions…. They are uniquely suited for urban areas.”106 An example of the successful use of UAS in carrying out air strikes was the attack of August 10 in North Waziristan, Pakistan, in which the unmanned aircraft system fired two missiles against a house and a vehicle, eliminating no less than 21 insurgents.107 It is probable that the UAS that carried out the attack was a MQ-1B Predator.  
 
The multirole unmanned aircraft system has demonstrated its flexibility in support of air strike operations in Libya. It was reported that last May one of the two Predators sent initially to support NATO’s air campaign over Libya performed a surveillance operation for an extended period against Gaddafi’s “snipers and artillery observers” occupying the upper floors of a multistory building in Misratah. Then the Predator directed RAF GR.4 Tornado fighter bombers to the target through direct communication between the UAV and the British pilots, who confirmed the objective to the U.S. unmanned aircraft. Finally the RAF aircraft proceeded to bomb just the building’s two upper floors as directed by the Predator.108
 
            In Afghanistan, for example, the Predator has been used to provide real-time video images and target coordinates to AC-130H Spectre gunships used against the Taliban, and to relay real-time video to ROVER portable Remote Video Terminals (RVT) used by ground-based Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) – the term used now for Forward Air Controllers - of the U.S. Army and special forces, enabling the soldiers to see if there were insurgents behind a building or on the other side of a hill.109 The widespread use of Remote Video Terminals by JTAC represents a revolution in “air-land integration (ALI)” and in the use of close air support (CAS). This is so as the ROVER RVT allows the forward air controllers to see the downloaded video images that the UAS and manned aircraft collect in real-time over a combat zone.110 The Remote Video Terminals thus enable Joint Terminal Attack Controllers to clear more accurate close air support missions.     
 
To perform ISTAR operations these aircraft are equipped with a radar system and an electro-optic system that includes an infrared sensor and laser target designator. These UAS can be available 24 hours seven days a week, and Predator and Reaper operating in Afghanistan are being flown via satellite communications from ground stations located in Creech Air Force Base (AFB) in Nevada, with “take-off and landing controlled locally.” A Predator and Reaper system includes four unmanned aircraft “with sensors and weapons,” a ground control station (GCS), and a Predator Primary Satellite Link (PPSL) for “over-the-horizon communications.”111    
 
Despite their capabilities, in a conflict against a major power the low speed of the propeller-driven Predator and Reaper would make them relatively easy targets for enemy aircraft and an integrated air defense system. Thus, the Director of the USAF Remotely Piloted Aircraft Task Force said that “[i]n tomorrow’s conflict, or going even further to the right to an anti-access environment, the MQ-9…and MQ-1…are not well suited for that.” In addition to the classic threats posed by manned aircraft and ground-based air defenses, Colonel James Gear mentioned cyber attacks against the existing remotely piloted aircraft. He suggested the use against cyber warfare attacks of secure communications and encrypted datalinks protected against hacking and jamming.112 In this regard, the deputy commander of Air Force Command, Lieutenant General Michael Basla, said in relation to cyber security that “we can’t defend the whole network just like we can’t defend all the air domain. Instead, we defend the portion we need to operate in. We’ve done it…to assure we have cybercapabilities to support Predator…and space launch operations.”113
 
To further the concept of air-land integration (ALI), the Pentagon is supporting the Collaborative Unmanned Systems Technology Demonstrator (CUSTD), which would allow remotely piloted aircraft to communicate with each other to collaborate and coordinate their actions during operations. This technology would also enable remotely piloted aircraft to communicate and coordinate operations with unmanned ground vehicles (UGV).114    
 
            The employment of UAS in Afghanistan for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) over an extended territory like in Afghanistan allowed the use of a smaller contingent of ground soldiers to control it than what would have been required without the unmanned aircraft’s constant patrols.115 The USAF interest in unmanned aircraft systems was expressed by the then Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, now retired Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, who confirmed the service’s interest in using UAS – called Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) – to carry out one day all its missions. Thus, these would include air mobility and combat search and rescue (CSAR) operations in addition to air strike and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions.116     
 
The Predator is a medium altitude long-endurance unmanned aircraft system designed for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) operations and which is capable of conducting air strikes to fulfill the missions of close air support and air interdiction.117 To fulfill its missions the MQ-1B is equipped with the optronic Multi-spectral Targeting System MTS-A system integrating “an infrared sensor, a color/monochrome daylight TV camera, an image-intensified TV camera, a laser designator and a laser illuminator.”118 It can also be fitted with a Lynx I Multi-mode Radar, a synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indication (SAR/GMTI) radar system that has been described as having “all-weather” capability “that displays photographic quality imagery of targets.”119 Moreover, in 2007 the USAF began the development program to integrate into the Predator Northrop Grumman’s Airborne Signals Intelligence Payload-1C (ASIP-1C), which will enable the unmanned aircraft to carry out signals intelligence (SIGINT) electronic support measures (ESM) operations.120 It is likely that Predator has thus the capability of conducting cyber warfare operations with the Suter computer program.
 
In terms of commonality of equipment, the Predator’s ASIP-1C system would be a scaled version of Northrop Grumman’s ASIP SIGINT system installed in the “U-2S high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft” and the unmanned MQ-1B Predator, MQ-9 Reaper and the RQ-4 Global Hawk of the USAF, and in the SIGINT RC-12N-1 Guardrail aircraft of the U.S. Army.121 This equipment commonality contributes to the network centric integration of manned and unmanned platforms, a key goal of the USAF. As reported by Fulghum, Lt. General Deptula explained that “‘we are starting to integrate the pieces such as RC-12W, Compass Call and other [electronic-operations platforms]. [All must] be integrated with a plan for the effects we want to create. With cyber [operations] being part of the planning process….’”122
 
The propeller-driven Predator has a maximum endurance of 40 hours, and it can be armed with two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles.123 The Hellfire missiles the Predator could fire include the AGM-114K/K2 Hellfire II and the new AGM-114P, the High Altitude Hellfire, designed to be fired by unmanned aircraft systems. The warheads of the AGM-114P missile include HE (high explosive) blast/fragmentation to destroy “buildings and infrastructure,” and a thermobaric warhead with enhanced heat and blast pressure effects.124  
 
            The Predator has also shown its versatility by demonstrating “[i]nteroperability with E-8C Joint STARS, and communications/data relay to submerged submarine (USS Chicago) 100 n miles (185 km; 115 miles) away.” In addition, two Predators have also been tested conducting “surveillance and communications relay missions in collaboration with the cutter Hickory” of the U.S. Coast Guard in Alaska.125 In March of this year the U.S. Air Force received the last MQ-1B Predator, numbered 268, that it has ordered.126 Reportedly, the USAF had by August 2010 150 Predators, having presumably reached by 2011 a total of 198.127   
 
            In addition to the two Predators sent earlier for operations over Libya, the Pentagon added two more to carry out ISR flights and air strikes, with 101 strike missions carried out by the MQ-1B by August 22.128
 
MQ-8B Fire Scout: Produced by Northrop Grumman, the MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) system is a remotely piloted helicopter that gives the U.S. Navy a ship borne unmanned aerial platform for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR), communications relay as part of the Navy’s network-centric warfare Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), the delivery of sonobuoys for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting for anti-surface warfare (ASUW), mine countermeasures (MCM), air strikes, battle damage assessment in real-time, and limited cargo transport operations. Other missions envisaged for the MQ-8B are “to detect and engage swarming boats, [and] ensure landing areas are clear for amphibious craft.”128  The Fire Scout was designed to operate from “air-capable ships” including the new Littoral Combat Ship multi-mission modular frigate of the U.S. Navy.129   
 
            In terms of baseline capability the Fire Scout has an electro-optic system that includes a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor and a laser range-finder and designator (LRFD) system. The baseline MQ-8B also has a voice and data communication relay system that makes the Fire Scout a “communications node” for over-the-horizon (OTH) communications that is part of the Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) network. Additional payloads may include a Lynx synthetic aperture radar and ground-moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI) radar system, a signals intelligence (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT) system, a satellite communications (SATCOM) system, a magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) system, the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), sonobuoys for submarine detection, the COBRA airborne mine detection system, and countermeasures against an attack.130
 
A Fire Scout system could consist of up to 3 MQ-8B, and with its baseline payload it can operate for more than 8 hours. With “a standard payload” a system of 2 Fire Scouts can cover an area 200 km (110 nautical miles) away from the mother ship for more than 6 hours of uninterrupted flight. With its maximum payload capacity it can operate nonstop for over 5 hours.131 The Fire Scout remotely piloted helicopter can also conduct autonomous take off and landing on any ship with a helicopter platform and flight deck, and on any land-based landing zone.132
 
            Some of the weapon systems the Fire Scout can carry are two quadruple launcher pods for air-to-air Stinger (ATAS) short-range missiles, unguided rockets, Hydra 70 mm rockets with laser seekers, and Viper Strike Stand-Off Precision Guided Munition (SOPGM).133 It has been suggested that the Fire Scout could also launch a light anti-submarine warfare (ASW) torpedo designed for littoral waters, which would be the Mk 54 LHT (Lightweight Hybrid Torpedo).134 However, the reported weight of the helicopter-launched version of the Mk 54 ASW torpedo is of 285.8 kg, which would exceed the MQ-8B payload capacity of 272 kg (600 lb) including the electro-optical system, although it seems the Fire Scout can carry a maximum load of 363 kg (800 lb).135 Nonetheless, the ability of the Fire Scout to support ASW operations - by launching sonobuoys and carrying a magnetic anomaly detection system to locate submarines - would put a manned helicopter and its crew out of danger from the threat posed by new short-range submarine-launched anti-air missiles in the category of the German IDAS.136
 
            During tests conducted this year from the U.S. Navy guided-missile frigate USS Halyburton (FFG 40), 2 Fire Scouts carried by the ship successfully performed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions for the 5th Fleet in the area of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Aden. Among the tasks performed by the Fire Scouts were supporting U.S. special forces and operations against pirates or helping rescue Yemeni fishermen stranded at sea, with the MQ-8B at times working together with USS Halyburton’s embarked SH-60B Seahawk helicopter.137 It was during this deployment in the USS Halyburton that its embarked MQ-8B were used in Libya in support of Operation Unified Protector. It was on June 21 of this year that one of the Fire Scouts that was carrying out an ISR mission of the central and western coastal regions of Libya was shot down by Libyan government forces. In addition, the Fire Scout has been tried in Afghanistan.138 Originally the Navy planned to acquire 36 Fire Scouts in 12 systems while the U.S. Marine Corps planned 33 MQ-8B distributed in 11 systems as replacement to the RQ-2 Pioneer UAV.139 The U.S. Army had plans to procure the Fire Scout and equip each Brigade Combat Team with 32 of the remotely piloted aircraft, but then decided to cancel its acquisition. However, it has been reported it may reconsider this decision.140                            
 
Realizing the advantages of the Fire Scout concept, the U.S. Navy currently wants a bigger version named MQ-8C, based on the airframe of the Bell 407 helicopter, for greater range and endurance and to allow new and bigger payloads to be carried, probably like 2 Mk 54 LHT ASW torpedoes. The MQ-8C, the prototype of which is known as the Fire-X, would be able to operate from air-capable ships and it would support also special operations forces (SOF) in addition to naval and Marine Corps operations. The new MQ-8C would use 95 percent of the smaller MQ-8B software and 85 percent of its hardware. The Navy is already requesting funds for 12 MQ-8C in Fiscal Year 2012.141   
 
 
Airborne Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
 
EP-3E ARIES II:  Based on the airframe of the Lockheed P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), the land-based EP-3E ARIES II (Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System II) is the U.S. Navy’s signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection version of the Orion.142 The EP-3E ARIES II has been reclassified from SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft to Multi-Intelligence due to the expansion of its capabilities, which include “near real-time tactical SIGINT and full motion video intelligence.” According to the Navy’s description of the aircraft, of which it has a fleet of 16, “the EP-3E exploits a wide range of electronic emissions from deep within targeted territory. The crew fuses the collected intelligence along with off-board data [from other sensor platforms] and disseminates the collaborated information for direct threat warning, indications and warnings, information dominance, battle space situational awareness, suppression of enemy air defenses, destruction of enemy air-defense, anti-air warfare and anti-submarine warfare applications.”143
 
            The EP-3E ARIES II has supported NATO’s air campaign against Gaddafi’s forces in Libya alongside the Air Force’s RC-135 Rivet Joint, the EC-130H Compass Call, the EC-130J Commando Solo, and the Navy’s carrier-based EA-18G Growler. These aircraft conducted “electronic, cyber and information attacks” by jamming the Libyan government forces’ radars and communications, by penetrating their computer networks and sending, for example, messages to selected Libyan high-ranking military officers. Back in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom personal e-mails were sent to Iraqi field commanders telling them the way to inform U.S. forces and their allies that they would not offer resistance. According to David A. Fulghum, “[t]he U.S. …has the capability to fire data beams into antennas associated with particularly interesting networks. The embedded algorithms can pull information out of the network and to take over as system manager.”144  These are examples of cyber warfare and information warfare, and potentially computer viruses could be thus inserted wirelessly to disrupt enemy networks and computers.
 
            In a recent announcement made by Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, the U.S. Navy will retire its fleet of EP-3E aircraft in 2019-2020, to be replaced in SIGINT reconnaissance and in Multi-Intelligence operations by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). A sum of $8 billion will in turn be invested up to 2016 to develop at least three UAS, including $1.1 billion for the Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) system (presumably the bigger MQ-8C),  $1.1 billion in the planned Medium-Range Maritime Unmanned Aerial System (MRMUAS), which apparently is another VTUAV system, and $2.5 billion for a carrier-based ISR and strike platform, the UCLASS, likely to be the operational follow-up to the X-47B.145                     
 
Airborne Electronic Attack (EA) and Counter information:
 
EC-130H Compass Call:  Based on a modified Lockheed C-130 Hercules, the EC-130H Compass Call has been designed to back “tactical air, surface, and special operations forces” by conducting “[w]ide-area coverage electronic attack [EA] and offensive counter information.”146 Compass Call uses electronic warfare (EW) and command, control, communications countermeasures (C3CM) with the goal of jamming with noise enemy command and control communications, disrupting the adversary’s ability to command and coordinate its forces on the field.147 The EC-130H would carry out electronic attacks against “a wide range of hostile offensive/defensive counter air, close air support, air defence system, battlefield and naval voice/data communications links, …radio frequency triggering signals for Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and low-frequency early warning and target acquisition air defence radars.”148    The Compass Call aircraft do not operate as isolated individual platforms but as “linked …local area networks.”149 The 14 aircraft of the fleet are to be modified to the Block 35 upgrade by Fiscal Year 2011, including the addition of “digital signal processing,” the expansion of the system’s “frequency coverage,” fitting the Compass Call with the Tactical Radio Countermeasures Systems (TRACS), and adding the ability to conduct electronic attack against enemy early warning radars, target acquisition radars, and navigation systems.150 There are also plans to upgrade the Compass Call fleet to the Block 40 baseline.151
 
The EC-130H Compass Call, the EA-18G Growler, and the F-16CJ/DJ Block 50/52 are the three key platforms in U.S. airborne electronic warfare. Their role is to “suppress enemy air defenses while jamming communications, radar and command and control targets.”152 Compass Call has been operating in Libya alongside the RC-135 Rivet Joint, the EP-3E ARIES II, and the EC-130J Commando Solo to form a picture of the “Electronic Order of Battle” of Libya’s government defenses and forces, to know which and where those forces emitting signals were deployed so as to make a list of targets for U.S. and NATO’s air strike assets.153 
           
Airborne Information Warfare:
 
EC-130J Commando Solo III:  The EC-130J Commando Solo III is based on Lockheed’s C-130 Hercules modified to perform information warfare and psychological warfare for propaganda purposes through “information operations, psychological operations and civil affairs broadcasts in AM, FM, HF, TV and military communications bands.” The aircraft can also transmit “analog radio and analog color TV on all worldwide standards” aimed either at military or civilian audiences.154 The Commando Solo III fleet, under the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, consists of 3 EC-130J, and 4 EC-130J Super J, which supports special operations missions such as high altitude parachute drops of special forces, described as “high altitude, low opening [HALO] and high altitude, high opening missions.” Other missions performed by the EC-130J Super J are the air drop of the “joint precision aerial delivery system [JPADS], container delivery system [CDS] and psychological operations leaflet drops.”155 The EC-130J Super J could carry the “Multi-Mission C-130J Roll-On/Roll-Off Mission Suite” that includes the “Modular ‘Commando Solo’ (MCS) transmitter system” and a roll-on/roll-off signals intelligence (SIGINT) “capsule.” This mission modularity enables the Super J to transport cargo while performing information and psychological warfare operations.156
 
            Commando Solo III aircraft have been deployed in Afghanistan in 2001 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. The aircraft have also operated in the Middle East in 2003 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and later in the years 2005, 2007 and 2009.157  The Commando Solo III has taken part also in Libya, where it has broadcasted in English, French and Arabic urging pro-Gaddafi Libyans to stop fighting, to drop their arms and return to their homes or not to hurt their compatriots, recalling the UN resolution that established the no-fly zone.158 An example of such broadcasts is the following, said in English, French and Arabic: “Libyan ship or vessel: Remain anchored. Do not leave port….The Gadhafi regime forces are violating a United Nations resolution ordering the end of hostilities in your country. If you attempt to leave port, you will be attacked and destroyed immediately. For your own safety, do not leave port.”159
 
            Future capabilities that are planned are “a long-range broadcast system that would be capable of providing ‘commercial quality’ TV and radio transmission from ‘multiple’ platforms…to ‘targets’ at ranges of up to 1,287 km within ‘denied areas.’” Currently Commando Solo III has a “line-of-sight transmission range” of 174 km. According to Jane’s, in the future information and psychological warfare operations should cover “Internet broadcasting, direct satellite broadcasts, ‘scatterable media’ and UAV (winged and long-endurance airship formats) and cellular/wireless telephone delivery.”160  
 
Naval C4I-N:
 
USS Mount Whitney:  The LCC 20 Mount Whitney of the Blue Ridge class is one of two U.S. Navy’s “amphibious warfare command ships” (LCC) used as the flagship and nodal command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) ship of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.161 USS Mount Whitney was one of 11 U.S. navy vessels deployed in support of NATO’s joint Libyan operation, for which it played the role of command ship.162 Its crew is a mix of navy and civilian sailors, and the ship has been fitted with Kevlar armor for protection.
 
For its C4I role Mount Whitney is equipped with the Amphibious Command Information System (ACIS), the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS), the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) datalink communications system, the Ship Signals Exploitation Space (SSES), Flag Plot [displaying the location of ships or fleets over a “main tactical display”], Landing Force Operations Center (LFOC), Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC), Helicopter Logistics Support Group (HLSG), Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), Helicopter Direction Center (HDC), and Helicopter Coordination Section (HCS).”163 Even though the Blue Ridge class has no helicopter hangar, Mount Whitney and sister ship Blue Ridge (which is the flagship of the 7th Fleet in the Pacific Ocean, stationed in Yokosuka, Japan) have a helicopter deck and they can carry 123,510 gallons of aviation fuel.164 Both ships also carry satellite communication (SATCOM) systems, “the Joint Services Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-N),” “and photographic laboratories and document-publication facilities.”165
 
The Mount Whitney demonstrated the value of a specialized command ship during the Libya operation, where it acted as “the main command ship for the joint operation” by NATO.166  The Blue Ridge class ships, which are over 40 years old, should be replaced by a new class of joint command ships. The U.S. Navy had plans to do so with the proposed Joint Command and Control (JCC) ships. However, the Navy opted instead for the idea of deploying a number of multi-mission platforms, which could include aircraft carriers, guided-missile cruisers and amphibious warfare ships fitted with a command, control, communications and computers (C4) capability for joint operations.167 Yet the latest experience in Libya shows the usefulness of having a ship dedicated to manage and coordinate air and naval operations by U.S. and NATO forces closer to the area of operations. The Navy’s plan of deploying several multi-mission ships with C4I capabilities should be developed as a distributed complement and backup to the specialized command and control ship.   
 
Airborne Electronic Attack and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses:
 
EA-18G Growler:  The Boeing EA-18G Growler is a modern, “state-of-the-art” airborne electronic attack (AEA) and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) aircraft for the U.S. Navy that is based on the F/A-18E/F Block II Super Hornet multirole fighter.168 The Growler has been intended to replace the E-A6B Prowler in the electronic warfare (EW) role, and it is thus the first new airborne platform of its kind that has been designed and produced in over 35 years. The EA-18G, which achieved initial operational capability in 2009, combines the flight and multirole combat capabilities of the F/A-18E/F with its dedicated electronic attack (EA) abilities.169 
 
            One of the Growler’s electronic warfare capabilities is full electromagnetic spectrum surveillance and electronic attack, being able to gather radar emissions through the AN/ALQ-218(V)2 Tactical Jamming Receiver (TJR) system to jam the adversary’s air defense radars. In this regard, the Growler’s AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System is credited with being “effective against any radar-guided surface-to-air threat.”170 The EA-18G is equipped with the AN/APG-79 AESA radar that has the added capabilities of jamming radars and of passively detecting radar emissions.171 In addition, the Growler is credited with the capability of being able to detect and locate enemy radars more precisely and faster than other systems when its AN/APG-79 AESA radar operates in a passive mode together with the AN/ALQ-218(V) receiver system. This allows Growler to concentrate its jamming energy more accurately against the located enemy radar emitter.172
 
Another key capability of the EA-18G is its ability to jam enemy communications. For this reason the Growler was known first as the F/A-18 C2W,173 for Command and Control Warfare. For this purpose the EA-18G carries the AN/ALQ-227 Communications Countermeasures System (CCS) “communications jammer,” produced by Raytheon and reportedly developed from command, control, communications countermeasures (C3CM) systems carried by the EC-130H Compass Call.174 The Growler can also “maintain radio communications in a heavy jamming environment” thanks to the Interference Cancellation System (INCANS) equipping the aircraft, which also has satellite communications.175       
 
            The EA-18G can perform the mission of suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) through “reactive and pre-emptive jamming” and the use of 2 anti-radiation AGM-88 HARM (High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile) missiles targeting enemy electromagnetic emitters.176
 
Other missions performed by the Growler are: 1) stand-off jamming, which is jamming enemy radar at a safe distance; 2) escort jamming, when the Growlers accompany a group of strike aircraft for the duration of the bombing mission; 3) time-critical strike, in which the EA-18G can participate in a bombing mission with 2 AGM-154 JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon) guided glider bombs in addition to carrying 2 HARM missiles, making use of the AN/ASQ-228 Advanced Targeting Forward-Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) pod and supplying groups of strike aircraft with targeting information; and 4) full electromagnetic spectrum surveillance, in which the Growler uses its onboard sensors such as the Tactical Jamming Receiver and the AN/APG-79 AESA radar together with the AN/ASD-12V SHAred Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) carried in the aircraft’s center line to collect “radar, electro-optical and infra-red imagery,” comparing it to the known emplacements of enemy radars and supplying air strike groups with the collected data.177 For self-defense in all of these missions as well as in SEAD operations the EA-18G is armed also with 2 AMRAAM beyond visual range air-to-air missiles.178 There are plans to install in the Growler the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ), which has been “designed to attack enemy electronics with jamming, pulses of high-powered microwaves and packets of algorithms to infiltrate enemy networks.”179
 
Another type of mission is described as “Non-Traditional Electronic Attack,” in which because of the Growler’s “enhanced situational awareness and uninterrupted communications” it would be capable of achieving greater “integration with ground operations than has been previously achievable.”180 The “non-traditional” electronic warfare operations may include the EA-18G’s probable ability, thanks to its Communications Countermeasures System, to jam the radio signals used by insurgents to trigger improvised explosive devices (IED). In such case it would share this capability with the EC-130H Compass Call.
 
It is envisaged that the Growler would undertake electronic attacks and suppression of enemy air defenses at the beginning of an air offensive, to then carry out precision air strikes after air superiority has been achieved and the enemy’s air defenses have been neutralized.181 To perform its missions the EA-18G has 9 hard points to carry weapons, such as the HARM and AMRAAM missiles, JSOW bombs and the AGM-158A Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), and sensor payloads.182
 
The U.S. Navy received by May 2011 48 EA-18G Growlers, with a goal of 114 aircraft in total that will be met when a new order for 58 EA-18G is fulfilled by the end of 2015.183 The aircraft will operate from aircraft carriers and land bases, and there is a requirement for 88 EA-18G to be integrated in 10 aircraft carrier Electronic Attack Squadrons (VAQ).184  The Growler has taken part in the Libyan air campaign immediately after conducting operations in Iraq. The aircraft first deployed at the end of 2010.185
 
F-16C/D Block 50D/52D:  The Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Block 50D/52D is the U.S. Air Force version of the F-16C/D Fighting Falcon developed for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). An unofficial designation of the Block 50D/52D version is the F-16CJ/DJ.186 After undergoing the Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) modernization program, implemented by the USAF for 650 aircraft of the F-16C/D Block 40/42 and Block 50/52 versions, the SEAD F-16C/D (F-16CJ/DJ) Block 50D/52D became known F-16CM/DM Block 50D/52D.187 Jane’s estimated that by 2006 the number of F-16CJ (F-16CM after being modernized under CCIP) acquired by the U.S. Air Force was of 222.188 At the same time, by 2006 the number of available AN/ASQ-213 High-speed anti-radiation missile Targeting System (HTS) pods – used to provide targeting information for the AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missile – was of 200.189 In total, of about 240 F-16CM/DM Block 50/52 whose fire-control radar would be upgraded to the AN/APG-68(V)10 standard under the M5+ stage of the CCIP modernization program,190 some 222 would be F-16CM/DM Block 50D/52D designed for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), of which 200 aircraft would carry the HTS targeting pod for the HARM missile.     
 
            The first F-16C Block 50/52 was delivered for “operational testing” in 1991, and deliveries of the suppression of enemy air defenses version, the Block 50D/52D, began in 1993.191 The modernization to the Block 50/52 family, powered by Improved Performance Engines (IPE), to the F-16CM/DM standard gave the former F-16CJ/DJ dedicated to the SEAD mission a multirole fighter capability through phased equipment and computer software improvements.192 These include the installation of a Modular Mission Computer, a “glass cockpit” with color Multi-function Displays, the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) and Link 16 secure datalink communications, and the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) that provides the pilot with a helmet-mounted sight to direct a weapon to a target with the movement of the head.193 Weapon systems that can be fired by the F-16CM/DM Block 50D/52D after undergoing CCIP modernization include the AIM-9X Sidewinder short-range air-to-air missile, the AGM-158A Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), and the GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).194
                                                                                                                     
Thanks to the CCIP modernization, the Block 50D/52D aircraft have received through the M4.2+ upgrade stage improvements in both software and avionics hardware that allows the F-16CM/DM to use simultaneously the HTS targeting pod on the aircraft’s port side and the AN/AAQ-33 Sniper targeting pod on the starboard side. Sniper is an electro-optical targeting system that allows the Block 50D/52D Fighting Falcons to launch laser-guided bombs such as the GBU-12 Paveway II, making them multirole fighters.195 In addition, the U.S. Air Force has funded the modification of the AN/ASQ-213 HTS targeting system for the HARM missile into the improved HTS R7 Smart Targeting and Identification via Networked Geolocation (STING) system. The HTS R7 targeting system includes Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite navigation for pinpoint accuracy when targeting enemy radars, and “a precision emitter identification capability (including the potential to update real-time…electronic orders-of-battle).”196 The HTS R7 targeting pod can pass targeting information to the HARM missile and to the AGM-154 JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon).197 It should be added that the F-16CM/DM Block 50D/52D has the ability to perform destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) over the previous suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) due to the greater targeting accuracy and precision thanks to the mating of the new HTS R7 targeting system with the “M4.2+ operational flight programme software.”198
                                                                                                                           
            The AN/APG-68(V)10 version of the AN/APG-68(V) fire-control radar has, like the AN/APG-68(V)9 version used in exported F-16C/D Block50+/52+, a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode, greater detection range, and the ability to engage at the same time four aerial targets.199 It is recommended that the F-16CM/DM Block 50/52 – including the Block 50D/52D – should be upgraded with a modern AESA radar like the AN/APG-80, in place of the legacy AN/APG-68(V) radar. The AN/APG-80 AESA radar equips the latest version of the Fighting Falcon, the F-16E/F (previously known as the F-16C/D Block 60) that has been sold to the United Arab Emirates.200 The AN/APG-80 radar has a “track volume” of 140º compared to the 120º coverage (60º right, 60º left scan in azimuth) of the AN/APG-68(V) radar. Moreover, the AN/APG-80 can engage simultaneously six aerial targets, it can track 20 aerial targets and potentially 50, it has “a low radar-cross section,” a much higher degree of resolution of its synthetic aperture radar function (described as being ‘ultra’), and a GMTI (ground moving target indicator) capability,201 which could be also useful when engaging mobile SAM systems.
           
            F-16CM Block 50D fighters belonging to the USAF 480th Fighter Squadron – the “Warhawks” - stationed in Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany, have taken part in Operation Odyssey Dawn over Libya. The 480th Fighter Squadron is the only one in the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) operating the F-16CM/DM Block 50.202
 
Recommendations:  
 
  • Fund modernization of the legacy planes covered in this study and maintain them in operation. These aircraft are fundamental elements of the networked force of the 21st century necessary to prevail in the future air-land and air-sea battle through their ISR, electronic warfare, airborne cyber attack, airborne information attack, and communications relay capabilities. In addition, the new EA-18G Growler with its airborne electronic attack (ABE) capability is essential to engage the assets of an enemy’s electronic order of battle. All these aircraft should be kept in service until new generation platforms such as unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) can reliably replace them after a transition period operating alongside the manned aircraft.    
 
  • Continue funding and acquisition of ISR unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Unmanned aircraft systems are an essential element of 21st century air power, one in which currently the U.S. armed forces enjoy an advantage. America’s technological and numerical advantage in UAS should not be lost. Unmanned aircraft systems represent the future of U.S. air power, as many of the current manned airborne platforms will be first complemented by and then eventually replaced by UAS. Current UAS designs should be followed by more advanced versions and by new designs to maintain the technological edge over competing world powers. Moreover, UAS and unmanned combat air systems (UCAS) are essential and at the heart of the Air-Sea Battle concept and the neutralization of the Anti-Access and Area Denial threat.
 
  • Spare from budgetary cuts our C4ISR platforms. Our military’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities must be spared the budgetary axe from the agreed cuts of $465 billion in defense spending planned for the next ten years, and from the additional $585 billion in defense spending cuts due to sequestration.203 The platforms containing systems with these capabilities, such as those included in this study, constitute the eyes, brains, and nervous system of our military forces and military leadership. If we want to avoid another surprise attack like the one on Pearl Harbor 70 years ago, this time involving missiles, we need to preserve the platforms and systems that allow our armed forces to remain alert and thus spare our country from a military catastrophe. 
 
Conclusion:
 
      The ISR, electronic warfare, cyber warfare and information warfare platforms and systems included in this study are essential to our armed forces’ ability to fight and win in the conflicts of the new millennium, including military operations such as the one in Libya. Those capabilities are at the heart of the Air-Sea Battle concept and the neutralization of the Anti-Access and Area Denial threat. It would be “catastrophic”204 to our national defense and to our national security commitments abroad if these platforms and systems are not upgraded when needed and are retired without replacements, as the United States will be left behind technologically in its ability to wage war in the 21st century, thus losing its military technical edge to rival world powers. America’s ability to defend itself, its allies, and freedom and democracy will be compromised, to our own and the free world’s peril.
 
 


1 Lauren Gelfand, “Libya heeds ceasefire call in face of UN resolution,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 23, 2011, p. 4.
2 Jim Garamone, “Coalition Launches ‘Operation Odyssey Dawn,’” U.S. Department of Defense, March 19, 2011, at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63225 (June 13, 2011); Lauren Gelfand, “End to Libya conflict tops agenda at global talks,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 20, 2011, p. 6; BBC News, “Libya: UK Apache helicopters used in Nato attacks,” June 4, 2011, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13651736 (June 4, 2011).
3 BBC News, “Libya crisis mapped: Saturday 19 March,” at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12970085 (June 12, 2011); Brooks Tigner and Luca Peruzzi, “NATO takes control of Libyan allied operations,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 6, 2011, p. 5.
4 AFP, “US flies a quarter of all NATO sorties in Libya,” August 22, 2011, at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iwPIjVTq38bU-qQs4UEnV4RsWJfw?docId=CNG.f83ec61b463c427ae51d6ee4c5c2e5c7.751 (September 5, 2011).
5 Networks refer to Network Centric Warfare.
6 David A. Fulghum, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 56; David A. Fulghum, “UAS Combat,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 73.
7 Air Vice-Marshal Tony Mason, The Aerospace Revolution. Role Revision & Technology: An Overview, Brassey’s Air Power: Aircraft, Weapons Systems and Technology Series (London: Brassey’s, 1998), p. 1.  
8 David A. Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, pp. 70-71.
9 David A. Fulghum and Bill Sweetman, “Future ISR,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, pp. 45-46.
10 David A. Fulghum, “Technology Will Be Key to Iraq Buildup,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, January 14, 2007, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/aw011507p2.xml (November 11, 2011).
11 Jonathan Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” Proceedings, December 2011, p. 23.
12 Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 71; idem, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” p. 57.
13 Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 71.
14 Fulghum, “Technology Will Be Key to Iraq Buildup;” idem, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” p. 56; Alon Ben-David, “Fast Response,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 63.
15 Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 71.
16 David A. Fulghum, “F-35 To Become Electronic Attack Aircraft,” November 30, 2008, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw120108p2.xml (November 8, 2011); idem, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 70.
17 Fulghum, “UAS Combat,” p. 73
18 The History Channel, Dogfights of the Future, A&E Television Networks AAE-131240, 2007, DVD. 
19 Fulghum, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” pp. 56-57.
20 Ben-David, “Fast Response,” p. 63. 
21 David A. Fulghum, “Why Syria’s Air Defenses Failed to Detect Israelis,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, in Aviation Week.com, October 3, 2007, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogscript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3A2710d024-5eda-416c-b117-ae6d649146cd (November 11, 2011).
22 Fulghum, “UAS Combat,” p. 73.
23 David A. Fulghum, Michael A. Dornheim, and William B. Scott, “Pictures Give Insight Into Stealth Projects,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 12, 2005, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/02145p04.xml&headline=Pictures%20Give%20Insights%20Into%20Stealth%20Projects (November 11, 2011); Fulghum, “Technology Will Be Key to Iraq Buildup.”
24 Fulghum, Dornheim, and Scott, “Pictures Give Insight Into Stealth Projects.”
25 Fulghum, Dornheim, and Scott, “Pictures Give Insight Into Stealth Projects;” Fulghum, “Why Syria’s Air Defenses Failed to Detect Israelis.”                                      
26 Bill Gertz, “Pentagon battle concept has Cold War posture on China,” The Washington Times, November 9, 2011, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/9/pentagon-battle-concept-signals-cold-war-posture-o/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&utm_medium=RSS (November 11, 2011); Bill Gertz, “Inside the Ring: Air Sea Battle Fight,” The Washington Times, October 13, 2011, p. A10; Bill Sweetman, “Big Wing,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, pp. 46-47; Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, No. 48 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2008), pp. 25-26.
27 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” pp. 46-48; Gertz, “Pentagon battle concept has Cold War posture on China.”
28 Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” p. 23.
29 The Information Warfare Site, “Information Dominance vs. Information Superiority,” Issue Paper, April 1, 1997, at http://www.iwar.org.uk/iwar/resources/info-dominance/issue-paper.htm (July 27, 2011).
30 Robert F. Dorr, “U.S. Air Force Improving AWACS Capabilities,” Defense Media Network, January 27, 2011, at http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/u-s-air-force-improving-awacs-capabilities/ (June 15, 2011); International Institute of Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2010 (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2010), pp. 40, 39.
31 Martin Streetly, ed., Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, No. 21 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2008), p. 14. 
32 NATO AEW&C Programme Management Agency (NAPMA), “AWACS: NATO’s ‘Eye In The Sky,’” at http://www.napma.nato.int/ (June 15, 2011).
33 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: E-3 Sentry (AWACS),” November 20, 2009, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=98 (June 18, 2011).
34 Brooks Tigner, “NATO prepares for Libya contingency operations,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 16, 2011, p. 4.
35 Ibid. See also BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower,” March 29, 2011, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12806112 (June 10, 2011).
36 Dorr, “U.S. Air Force Improving AWACS Capabilities;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 14, 16, 20; Patty Welsh, “Major AWACS upgrade set to begin,” Hanscom Air Force Base, November 18, 2010, at http://www.hanscom.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123231536 (June 15, 2011).
37 Dorr, “U.S. Air Force Improving AWACS Capabilities;” Welsh, “Major AWACS upgrade set to begin.”
38 Jamie Hunter, ed., Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, 14th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2006), p. 155.
39 The maiden flight of the first prototype of the Boeing 707 took place in the summer of 1954. See Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 207.
40 Jon Lake, “Boeing 707 military variants: Part 2,” International Air Power Review, Vol. 17 (Westport, Conn.: AIRtime Publishing, 2005), p. 104; Federation of American Scientists, “E-3 Sentry (AWACS),” at http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/special/e3.html (June 18, 2011). On the Dark Star HALE UAV see Norman Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010), pp. 204-5.
41 Federation of American Scientists, “E-3 Sentry (AWACS).” On the E-2D see Northrop Grumman, “E-2D Advanced Hawkeye,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/e2dhawkeye/index.html (June 25, 2011).
42 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” pp. 46, 48.
43 Federation of American Scientists, “E-3 Sentry (AWACS).”
44 Laura L. Myers and Ben Iannotta, “The battle for JSTARS,” C4ISR Journal, June 1, 2011, at http://www.c4isrjournal.com/story.php?F=6367822 (June 16, 2011).
45 Federation of American Scientists, “E-3 Sentry (AWACS).”
46 David A. Fulghum and Bill Sweetman, “In and Out of Sight,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 29/September 5, 2011, p. 49.
47 Tim Ripley, Air War Afghanistan: US and NATO Air Operations from 2001 (Barnsley, U.K.: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2011), p. 119; UK Ministry of Defence, “Last Flight of the Nimrod MR2,” Defence Talk, April 2, 2010, at http://www.defencetalk.com/last-flight-of-the-nimrod-mr2-25434/ (August 13, 2011).
48 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: E-8C Joint Stars,” February 23, 2011, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=100 (June 16, 2011).
49 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: E-8C Joint Stars;” Shelby G. Spires, “116th deployed indefinitely to support operations in Libya,” The Sun News, April 22, 2011, at http://www.macon.com/2011/04/22/1533834/116th-acw-deployed-indefinitely.html (June 16, 2011).
50 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: E-8C Joint Stars.”
51 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: E-8C Joint Stars.”
52 Paul Jackson, ed., Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, 97th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2006), p. 838; John A. Tirpak, “The Big Squeeze,” Air Force Magazine, October 2007, at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2007/October%202007/1007squeeze.aspx (June 15, 2011).
53 Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 838; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 666.
54 Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 838.
55 Myers and Iannotta, “The battle for JSTARS;” Boeing, “P-8 Airborne Ground Surveillance,” at http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/p8ags/index.html (July 3, 2011).
56 Boeing, “P-8 Airborne Ground Surveillance,” Backgrounder, at http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/p8ags/bkgd_%20p8ags_04-11.pdf (July 3, 2011); Martin Streetly, ed., Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2008-2009, 20th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2008), p. 214; Myers and Iannotta, “The battle for JSTARS;” Keith Button, “Revealing radar,” C4ISR Journal, January 1, 2009, at http://www.c4isrjournal.com/story.php?F=3816224 (July 3, 2011); Jane’s Information Group, “AN/APS-149 (United States), Airborne surveillance, maritime patrol and navigation radars,” Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems, April 28, 2010, at http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Radar-and-Electronic-Warfare-Systems/AN-APS-149-United-States.html (July 3, 2011).
57 Myers and Iannotta, “The battle for JSTARS;” Keith Button, “Revealing radar.”
58 Boeing, “P-8 Airborne Ground Surveillance;” Myers and Iannotta, “The battle for JSTARS;” Keith Button, “Revealing radar.”
59 Myers and Iannotta, “The battle for JSTARS.”
60 Streetly, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2008-2009, p. 218; idem, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 197.
61 Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 838.
62 Streetly, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2008-2009, p. 218; Keith Button, “Revealing radar;” Jane’s, “AN/APS-149 (United States), Airborne surveillance, maritime patrol and navigation radars.”
63 Myers and Iannotta, “The battle for JSTARS;” U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: E-8C Joint Stars.”
64 Streetly, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2008-2009, p. 218; idem, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 666.
65 Sweetman, “Big Wing,” p. 46.
66 Research School on Multi Modal Sensor Systems for Environmental Exploration and International Postgraduate Programme Multi Sensorics (ZESS), “2D/3D Remote Sensing with mono and bistatic Synthetic Aperture Radar Systems (SAR),” University of Siegen, at http://www.zess.uni-siegen.de/ipp_home/moses/fields-of-research/2d-3d-remote-sensing/ (June 18, 2011).
67 Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 838.
68 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 44; Northrop Grumman, “E-2D Advanced Hawkeye,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/e2dhawkeye/index.html (July 9, 2011).
69 Northrop Grumman, “E-2D Advanced Hawkeye;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 44; Department of the Navy, FORCEnet: A Functional Concept for the 21st Century, p. 4, at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/policy/forcenet/forcenet21.pdf (July 10, 2011).
70 Northrop Grumman, “E-2D Advanced Hawkeye;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 44.
71 Northrop Grumman, “E-2D Advanced Hawkeye;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 44.
72 Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, p. 359.
73 Federation of American Scientists, “E-3 Sentry (AWACS).”
74 BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower.”
75 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 312, 314-15.
76 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: RC-135V/W Rivet Joint,” March 31, 2009, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=121 (July 10, 2011).
77 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 314; Andrew Chuter, “UK Signs Near-$1B Rivet Joint Support Deal,” Defense News, July 8, 2011, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7042952&c=AME&s=AIR (July 11, 2011).
78 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: RC-135V/W Rivet Joint;” Chuter, “UK Signs Near-$1B Rivet Joint Support Deal.”
79 Ripley, Air War Afghanistan: US and NATO Air Operations from 2001, p. 113.
80 Defense Tech, “Commandos to Rivet Joints May be Hunting Gadhafi,” Military.com, August 25, 2011, at http://defensetech.org/2011/08/25/commandos-to-rivet-joints-may-be-hunting-gadhafi/ (September 5, 2011).
81 Roxana Tiron, “Northrop’s $12.4 Billion Global Hawk Still Vital, Pentagon Says,” Bloomberg, June 15, 2011, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-15/northrop-s-12-4-billion-drone-still-vital-pentagon.html (July 10, 2011).
82 Fulghum, Dornheim, and Scott, “Pictures Give Insight Into Stealth Projects.”
83 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: RC-135U Combat Sent,” September 28, 2007, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=191 (July 11, 2011); Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 312.
84 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: RC-135U Combat Sent.”
85 Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, pp. 162, 160.
86 BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower.”
87 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: RQ-4 Global Hawk,” November 19, 2009, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=13225 (July 15, 2011).
88 Steven J. Zaloga, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Robotic Air Warfare 1917-2007, New Vanguard No. 144 (Oxford, U.K.: Osprey Publishing, 2008), p. 33.
89 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 207.
90 Ibid.; Mark Daly, Martin Streetly, and Kenneth Munson, eds., Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, No. 29 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2007), p. 307.
91 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: RQ-4 Global Hawk,.
92 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 207.
93 Tiron, “Northrop’s $12.4 Billion Global Hawk Still Vital, Pentagon Says;” Daly, Streetly, and Munson,  Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, pp. 305-6; Amy Butler, “Testy Trials: Global Hawk earns poor test marks, though international interest continues,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, June 13, 2011, p. 35; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 193.
94 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 207; Butler, “Testy Trials: Global Hawk earns poor test marks, though international interest continues,” p. 35.
95 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: RQ-4 Global Hawk;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 193-97.
96 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 208; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 196-97; Tiron, “Northrop’s $12.4 Billion Global Hawk Still Vital, Pentagon Says.”
97 U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: RQ-4 Global Hawk,” Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 206-7.
98 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 197; Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 306; Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 208.
99 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 307; Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 207; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 193, 197.
100 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 307; Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 207; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 197.
101 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 307; Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 207.
102 Defense Tech, “Global Hawk Drone and E-8 JSTARS May Be Helping the Libya Fight,” Military.com, March 22, 2011, at http://defensetech.org/2011/03/22/e-8-jstars-and-global-hawk-drone-may-be-helping-the-libya-fight/ (June 16, 2011); AFP, “US flies a quarter of all NATO sorties in Libya;” Defense Tech, “Commandos to Rivet Joints May be Hunting Gadhafi;” BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower.”
103 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 194.
104 Butler, “Testy Trials: Global Hawk earns poor test marks, though international interest continues,” p. 36.
105 BBC News, “Military fact files: Drones,” July 22, 2010, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-10713898 (April 22, 2011).
106 Associated Press, “Libya: Obama sanctions use of US Predator drones,” guardian.co.uk, April 21, 2011, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/21/us-obama-predator-drones-libya (June 10, 2011).
107 BBC News, “US drone attack kills 21 ‘militants’ in Pakistan,” August 10, 2011, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14471791 (August 11, 2011); Reuters, “US drone strike kills 21suspected militants inn Pakistan,” guardian.co.uk, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/10/us-drone-hits-pakistan-taliban (August 12, 2011).
108 The Predator that assisted in the air strike was identified in the article as a MQ-9, which is in fact the designation of the more capable Reaper UAV. The designation of the Predator is MQ-1B. See Tim Ripley, “USAF Predators direct Tornado strikes,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 18, 2011, p. 6. See also BBC News, “Libya: US to deploy armed drones – Robert Gates,” April 22, 2011, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13166441 (August 12, 2011).
109 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 264; Ripley, Air War Afghanistan: US and NATO Air Operations from 2001, pp. 103, 163; Defense Update, “ROVER III / OSRVT,” at http://defense-update.com/products/r/rover.htm (August 13, 2011).
110 Ripley, Air War Afghanistan: US and NATO Air Operations from 2001, pp. 171-73, 168, 169.
111 BBC News, “Military fact files: Drones;” U.S. Air Force, “MQ-1B Predator,” July 20, 2010, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122 (August 8, 2011); U.S. Air Force, “MQ-9 Reaper,” August 18, 2010, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=6405 (August 8, 2011).
112 Alysha Sideman, “Raise the bar for new Reaper, colonel says,” Defense Systems, February 3, 2011, at http://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/02/03/air-force-gear-uav-reaper-mq-9-cyber-warfare.aspx (August 25, 2011).
113 David A. Fulghum, “Digital Deluge,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 23, 2011, p. 44.
114 Clay Dillow, “The DoD Wants All Its Robots To Collaborate on the Battlefield Without Human Involvement,” Popular Science, February 23, 2011, at http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2011-02/dod-wants-warfighting-robots-can-collaborate-battlefield (August 25, 2011).
115 Ripley, Air War Afghanistan: US and NATO Air Operations from 2001, p. 201.
116 John A. Tirpak, “The RPA Boom,” airforce-magazine.com, August 2010, at http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August%202010/0810RPA.aspx (August 24, 2011).
117 General Atomics Aeronautical, “MQ-1 Predator/Predator,” at http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/pdf/MQ-1_Predator.pdf (August 8, 2011); U.S. Air Force, “MQ-1B Predator.” 
118 U.S. Air Force, “MQ-1B Predator.” 
119 General Atomics Aeronautical, “Predator UAS,” at http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator.php (August 8, 2011); Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 128.
120 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 263; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 130.
121 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 130. On the RC-12N-1 Guardrail see Stephen Trimble, “US Army makes unexpected Guardrail update,” Flightglobal, September 10, 2007, at http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/09/10/216672/us-army-makes-unexpected-guardrail-update.html (August 15, 2011).
122 Fulghum, “ISR, Cyber, EW Hook Up,” p. 56.
123 General Atomics Aeronautical, “MQ-1 Predator/Predator;” U.S. Air Force, “MQ-1B Predator.”
124 BBC News, “Military fact files: Drones;” Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, No. 56 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, September 2010), pp. 187-88.
125 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 264.
126 General Atomics Aeronautical, “Air Force accepts delivery of last Predator,” March 7, 2011, at http://www.ga-asi.com/news_events/index.php?read=1&id=341&date=2011 (August 8, 2011).
127 Tirpak, “The RPA Boom;” Military Technology, The World Defence Almanac 2011 (Bonn, Germany: Mönch Publishing Group, May 2011), p. 52.
128 Courtney Kube and Jim Miklaszewski, “NBC: US sends more Predator drones to Libya,” Msnbc.com, August 16, 2011, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44166967/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/nbc-us-sends-more-predator-drones-libya/# (August 29, 2011); AFP, “US flies a quarter of all NATO sorties in Libya.” By August 25 it was said that the Predators conducted in Libya a total of 102 air strikes. See Defense Tech, “Commandos to Rivet Joints May be Hunting Gadhafi.”
128 Northrop Grumman, “MQ-8B Fire Scout,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/index.html (September 1, 2011); Northrop Grumman, “Fire Scout Brochure: MQ-8B Fire Scout,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/firescout-new-brochure.pdf (September 1, 2011); Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 300; Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 18th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005)), p. 171.  
129 Northrop Grumman, “MQ-8B Fire Scout;” Northrop Grumman, “Northrop Grumman Fire Scout Completes First Unmanned Test Flights on Littoral Combat Ship,” February 24, 2011, at http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=214689 (September 1, 2011); Naval Air Systems Command, “MQ-8B Fire Scout,” at http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.display&key=8250AFBA-DF2B-4999-9EF3-0B0E46144D03 (September 2, 2011); Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 212; Defense Update, “LCS Entering Deep Water,” August 8, 2008, at http://defense-update.com/features/2008/august08/lcs.html#more (September 2, 2011).
130 Northrop Grumman, “MQ-8B Fire Scout;” Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 300; Northrop Grumman, “Fire Scout Brochure: MQ-8B Fire Scout;” Northrop Grumman, “Fire Scout Fact Sheet: MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Unmanned Aircraft System,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/fs-fact-sheet.pdf (September 1, 2011); Northrop Grumman, “COBRA airborne mine detection system ready for low rate initial production,” Shephard  Group, April 28, 2009, at http://www.shephard.co.uk/news/uvonline/cobra-airborne-mine-detection-system-ready-for-low-rate-initial-production/2536/ (September 2, 2011).
131 Northrop Grumman, “Fire Scout Data Sheet: MQ-8B Fire Scout,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/fsn_ds.pdf (September 1, 2011); United States Navy, “RQ-8A and MQ-8B Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV),” Navy.mil, February 18, 2009, at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=2150&ct=1 (September 2, 2011); Greenert, “Navy, 2025: Forward Warfighters,” p. 22.
132 Northrop Grumman, “MQ-8B Fire Scout;” idem, “Fire Scout Fact Sheet: MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Unmanned Aircraft System.”
133 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 300; Northrop Grumman, “Fire Scout Cutaway Drawing: Northrop Grumman MQ-8B Fire Scout,” at http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/mq8bfirescout_navy/assets/MQ-8B_FireScout_Cutaway_WEB.pdf (September 4, 2011); Hewson, Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, pp. 639-42, 195-96.
134 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 212.
135 Clifford Funnell, ed., Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems 2008-2009, 20th ed. (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2008), p. 356; United States Navy, “RQ-8A and MQ-8B Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV);” Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, pp. 300-301.
136 Jane’s Information Group, “IDAS (Germany), Underwater weapons,” Jane’s Naval Weapon Systems, June 13, 2011, at http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Naval-Weapon-Systems/IDAS-Germany.html (August 8, 2011); Lok, “Updated with New Photos: Submerged IDAS Missile Firing.” 
137 Northrop Grumman, “Photo Release – Northrop Grumman Fire Scout Completes Successful At-Sea Deployment,” August 17, 2011, at http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=229732 (September 1, 2011); Brooks Tigner and Sam LaGrone, “NATO: Fire Scout lost over Libya,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 29, 2011, p. 17.
138 Sam LaGrone, “UAV shot down by Ghadaffi forces, says NAVAIR,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August 24, 2011, p. 8; Tigner and LaGrone, “NATO: Fire Scout lost over Libya,” p. 17.
139 Daly, Streetly, and Munson, Jane’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Targets, p. 301.
140 Friedman, Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation, p. 212; Defense Industry Daily, “MQ-8 Fire Scout VTUAV Program: By Land or By Sea,” August 29, 2011, at http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-fire-scout-vtuav-program-by-land-and-by-sea-updated-01316/#program (September 2, 2011).
141 Graham Warwick, “U.S. Navy Wants Larger Fire Scout Airframe,” Aviation Week.com, February 17, 2011, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/asd/2011/02/17/02.xml&headline=U.S.%20Navy%20Wants%20Larger%20Fire%20Scout%20Airframe (September 5, 2011).
142 United States Navy, “EP-3E (ARIES II) signals intelligence reconnaissance aircraft,” Navy.mil, February 17, 2009, at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1000&ct=1 (September 5, 2011). 
143 U.S. Navy Naval Air Systems Command, “EP-3E Aries II,” at http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.displayPlatform&key=5B7DC7D0-C4DB-45E3-92EA-662605B57409 (September 5, 2011).
144 David A. Fulghum, “Libyan Leaders, Soldiers Face Cyber and Information Attacks,” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, in Aviation Week.com, March 25, 2011, at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post%3Ac3f95ee8-3fce-41ee-aedc-b69053fbbd1a (September 5, 2011).
 
145 Stephen Trimble, “US Navy to replace EP-3s with unmanned aircraft,” Flight International, in Flightglobal, August 11, 2011, at http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/08/11/360617/us-navy-to-replace-ep-3s-with-unmanned-aircraft.html (September 5, 2011); Warwick, “U.S. Navy Wants Larger Fire Scout Airframe.”
146 U.S. Air Force, “EC-130H Compass Call,” AF.mil, November 5, 2010, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=190 (June 26, 2011); Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 258.
147 Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 467; U.S. Air Force, “EC-130H Compass Call.”
148 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 258.
149 Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 467.
150 U.S. Air Force, “EC-130H Compass Call;” Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 467.
151 Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 467.
152 U.S. Air Force, “EC-130H Compass Call;” Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 489.
153 David Cenciotti, “Why NATO, French and US AWACS have been constantly monitoring the Libyan airspace well before the No-Fly Zone was voted,” David Cenciotti’s Weblog, March 17, 2011, at http://cencio4.wordpress.com/tag/ec-130h/ (September 5, 2011); Fulghum, “Libyan Leaders, Soldiers Face Cyber and Information Attacks;” David Cenciotti, “Libyan airspace most interesting movements of last week,” David Cenciotti’s Weblog, March 11, 2011, at http://cencio4.wordpress.com/tag/ec-130h/ (September 5, 2011); Fulghum, “Technology Will Be Key to Iraq Buildup.”
154 BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower;” U.S. Air Force, “EC-130J Commando Solo,” AF.mil, September 9, 2011, at http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=182 (September 30, 2011); Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 79.
155 U.S. Air Force, “EC-130J Commando Solo;” Defense Update, “JPADS – The Way Ahead,” March 2007, at http://defense-update.com/features/du-1-07/aerialdelivery5-future.htm (September 30, 2011).
156 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 80.
157 U.S. Air Force, “EC-130J Commando Solo.”
158 Associated Press, “U.S. fights with words as well as arms,” CBS News, March 29, 2011, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/03/29/501364/main20048245.shtml (September 4, 2011); Scott Fontaine, “EC-130J transmissions over Libya posted online,” Air Force Times, March 22, 2011, at http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/03/airforce-ec-130j-transmissions-psyops-libya-032111w/ (September 4, 2011); BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower.”
159 Fontaine, “EC-130J transmissions over Libya posted online.”
160 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 81, 80.
161 Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, p. 919; BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower;” United States Navy, “Amphibious Command Ships – LCC,” Navy.mil, September 17, 2010, at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=500&ct=4 (October 1, 2011).
162 BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower.”
163 Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, p. 919; U.S. Marine Corps, Amphibious Ships and Landing Craft Data Book, at http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/MCRP%203-31B%20Amphibious%20Ships%20and%20Landing%20Craft%20Data%20Book.pdf (October 1, 2011); Gregory Vistica, Fall from glory: the men who sank the U.S. Navy, p. 118, in Google books, at http://books.google.com/books?id=ky-3B5ARy2sC&pg=PA118&lpg=PA118&dq=Flag+Plot+Navy&source=bl&ots=4hhHhInbzI&sig=0DEl8lcC--0pcB-DDOyXLImROGQ&hl=en&ei=QjiHTteBKOyqsAL4_pC-Dw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=9&ved=0CI0BEOgBMAg#v=onepage&q=Flag%20Plot%20Navy&f=false (October 1, 2011).
164 Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, p. 919; United States Navy, “Amphibious Command Ships – LCC.”
165 Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems, p. 919.
166 BBC News, “Libya no-fly zone: Coalition firepower.”
167 Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, p. 175.
168 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft,” at http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/ea18g/index.html (July 22, 2011); Boeing, “EA-18G Growler: The World’s Premier Electronic Attack Aircraft,” at http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/ea18g/docs/EA-18G_product.pdf (October 3, 2011); Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 242; Boeing, “Boeing EA-18G Growlers Complete 1st Combat Deployment,” July 12, 2011, at http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1834 (July 14, 2011). 
169 United States Navy, “EA-18G Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft,” Navy.mil, June 30, 2011, at http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=950&ct=1 (October 1, 2011); Boeing, “EA-18G Growler,” May 2011, at http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/ea18g/docs/EA-18G_overview.pdf (October 3, 2011); Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 661.
170 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft;” idem, “EA-18G Growler: The World’s Premier Electronic Attack Aircraft;” idem, “Boeing EA-18G Growlers Complete 1st Combat Deployment;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 242-43, 484, 473; Northrop Grumman, “AN/ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming Receiver,” at http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solutions/alq218/ (October 5, 2011).
171 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 242.
172 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 242.
173 Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 661.
174 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 242; Boeing, “EA-18G Growler: The World’s Premier Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
175 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft;” idem, “EA-18G Growler: The World’s Premier Electronic Attack Aircraft;” United States Navy, “EA-18G Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
176 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 242-43.
177 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft;” Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 243, 532, 528-29; Boeing, “EA-18G Growler: The World’s Premier Electronic Attack Aircraft;” idem, “Boeing EA-18G Growlers Complete 1st Combat Deployment;” Raytheon, “AN/ASQ-228 ATFLIR,” at http://www.raytheon.com/businesses/stellent/groups/public/documents/content/atflir_brochure.pdf (October 5, 2011); Jane’s Information Group, “AN/ASD-12(V) SHAred Reconnaissance Pod (SHARP) (United States), Payloads,” Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, January 11, 2011, at http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Electronic-Mission-Aircraft/AN-ASD-12-V-SHAred-Reconnaissance-Pod-SHARP-United-States.html (October 5, 2011); Hewson, Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, p. 357. 
178 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 243; Boeing, “EA-18G Growler: The World’s Premier Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
179 Fulghum, “‘Spectral High Ground,’” p. 70; idem, “F-35 To Become Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
180 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
181 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 243.
182 Boeing, “EA-18G Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft;” Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, p. 423; Hewson, Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, p. 296; United States Navy, “EA-18G Growler Airborne Electronic Attack Aircraft.”  
183 Boeing, “EA-18G Growler;” Stephen Trimble, “US DoD agrees to buy 124 F/A-18E/Fs and EA-18Gs over 4 years,” Flight International, in Flightglobal, May 14, 2010, at http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/us-dod-agrees-to-buy-124-fa-18efs-and-ea-18gs-over-4-342005/ ( October 7, 2011).
184 Boeing, “Boeing EA-18G Growlers Complete 1st Combat Deployment;” idem, “EA-18G Growler: The World’s Premier Electronic Attack Aircraft.”
185 Gelfand, “End to Libya conflict tops agenda at global talks,” p. 6; Boeing, “Boeing EA-18G Growlers Complete 1st Combat Deployment;” idem, “EA-18G Growler.”
186 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 264; Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 489; Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 810.
187 Jane’s Information Group, “Lockheed Martin (General Dynamics) F-16 Fighting Falcon – Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) (United States), Aircraft – Fixed wing – Military,” Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades, May 12, 2010, at http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Aircraft-Upgrades/Lockheed-Martin-General-Dynamics-F-16-Fighting-Falcon--Common-Configuration-Implementation-Program-CCIP-United-States.html (October 6, 2011); Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, pp. 495-96.
188 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 266.
189 Ibid., pp. 531-32.
190 Streetly, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2008-2009, pp. 252-53; Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 496.
191 Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 809.
192 Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, pp. 495-96, 489.
193 Jane’s Information Group, “Lockheed Martin (General Dynamics) F-16 Fighting Falcon – Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) (United States), Aircraft – Fixed wing – Military;” Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 496; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 266; Boeing, “Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS),” at http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/jhmcs/index.html (October 6, 2011).
194 Jane’s Information Group, “Lockheed Martin (General Dynamics) F-16 Fighting Falcon – Common Configuration Implementation Program (CCIP) (United States), Aircraft – Fixed wing – Military;” Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 496; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 266.
195 Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 496; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 266, 465; Michael J. Gething, ed., Jane’s Electro-Optic Systems 2009-2010 (Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane’s Information Group, 2009), pp. 518-19.
196 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 268, 531-32; idem, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2008-2009, pp. 507-8.
197 Hewson, Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, p. 359; Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 266, 531.
198 Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, pp. 268, 532.
199 Jackson, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 2006-2007, p. 810; Hunter, Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2006-2007, p. 496; Streetly, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2008-2009, pp. 251-53.
200 Streetly, Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2008-2009, pp. 259, 251.
201 Ibid.; Stephen R. Dines, “How to Quickly and Effectively Locate and Lock Air-to-Air, Beyond Visual Range – Threats Using the AN/APG-68,” 388th Training Document, at http://www.388th.org/images/userstuff/A-toA%20Radar.pdf (October 7, 2011).
202 Spangdahlem Air Base, “480th Fighter Squadron,” AF.mil, October 21, 2010, at http://www.spangdahlem.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=17405 (October 6, 2011); Streetly, Jane’s Electronic Mission Aircraft, p. 269; ubdumb, “F-16CJ Operation Odyssey Dawn,” LiveLeak.com, March 22, 2011, at http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=034_1300843214 (October 7, 2011). In this video one can see on the tail of the F-16 the code “SP,” which now identifies the 480th Fighter Squadron. The fighter, an F-16CM Block 50D, is seen armed with a HARM anti-radiation missile (ARM) – the bigger missile - and 2 AMRAAM missiles per wing. The aircraft also has on the engine inlet’s port side pylon the AN/ASQ-213 HTS targeting system for the HARM missile, and one can see the front side of the AN/AAQ-33 Sniper targeting pod on the starboard pylon of the engine inlet. See also boazgu5, “US v. Gaddafi Operation Odyssey Dawn 480th Fighter Squadron Pilots 50 F-16CJ v. Lybia (sic) 23/3/11 P.11,” YouTube, March 23, 2011, at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1qFvdV7A2I (October 7, 2011). 
203 Rowan Scarborough, “Service chiefs warn $1T cut would be ‘catastrophic,’” The Washington Times, November 2, 2011, at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/2/service-chiefs-warn-1t-cut-would-be-catastrophic/?page=all (December 7, 2011).
204 Ibid.
 
 

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