By
Dr. Lajos F. Szaszdi
*This paper, produced in 2006 and revised
in 2007, has been updated in 2014.
The following paper will intend to provide an analysis of the naval
strike capabilities of the Russian multirole fighters recently purchased by
Venezuela, a synopsis of the anti-ship missiles these aircraft can carry, and a
brief study of the characteristics and weapon systems of the Amur class
of Russian submarines the Venezuelan Navy appears interested in buying. The article is also set to contribute an
analysis of the possible motives behind the acquisition of the fighters from
Russia, and an examination of the military preparedness and combat capabilities
of the Venezuelan Air Force. The
objective of this work is to give the reader a clear picture of the potential
capabilities of the aircraft and submarines here discussed, and of the
situations in which the new weapons might be used, based on the reasons driving
their purchase.
On June 14 of 2006, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez declared his
government’s intention to buy 24 Sukhoi Su-30 multirole fighter aircraft from
Russia.1
Venezuela’s goal to acquire these high-performance Russian fighters
follows contracts to purchase 100,000 AK-103 and AK-104 Kalashnikov assault
rifles and a total of 15 military helicopters, with 6 transport/assault Mi-17,
8 attack Mi-35 and one heavy transport Mi-26TS.2 Then, on July 21, the Russian Defense
Minister, Sergei Ivanov, announced that “the deal has been closed,” worth more
than $1 billion, for his country to export to Venezuela 30 Su-30 fighters and
30 helicopters.3 The Russian jets in question are of the
Su-30MK family of multirole fighters,4
whose design is based on the original Su-27 “Flanker” fighter interceptor. The latest air superiority fighters of the
Su-30MK family are superior and more advanced than the tactical F-16A/B
fighters of the Venezuelan Air Force, delivered over twenty years ago.5
The sale of Russian weapons in general and of the multirole fighters
in particular was publicly the result of the Bush Administration’s refusal to
allow the export to Venezuela of U.S. military equipment, and more specifically
of spare parts and upgrades needed to maintain operational the country’s ageing
F-16A/B fighters.6 This measure was the result of the
anti-American rhetoric and actions of the Chávez government, although
ostensibly the reason for the U.S. arms embargo was the claim that Venezuela
was “not fully co-operating with the anti-terrorism efforts” of the United
States.7
Since the F-16A/B constituted the backbone of the Venezuelan Air Force’s
fighter fleet, their maintenance and modernization were urgently needed, the
more so because of the original number of 24 aircraft, 21 are left, of which at
least 14 are fully serviceable.8 The U.S. State Department’s ban on military
sales to Venezuela include U.S.-made equipment such as aircraft engines,
avionics, radars, and communication systems forming part of foreign military
platforms offered for export to Caracas.
Thus, the agreed sale by Spain to Venezuela of 10 C-295 transport
aircraft and of 2 CN-235 maritime patrol aircraft fell through due to the U.S.
prohibition.9 Moreover, Washington also blocked the sale of
24 Brazilian Super Tucano light trainers to Caracas10
In its several versions, the Su-30MK is a twin-seat 4th
plus generation multirole fighter that is in the category of the U.S. F-15
Eagle air superiority fighter. More
specifically, the Su-30MK versions are of a type in the same range of the F-15E
Strike Eagle, although the USAF fighter is faster and can carry a heavier
weapons load.11 However, the thrust vectoring control (TVC)
nozzles of the twin engines12 of some
members of the Su-30MK family, such as the Su-30MKI of India, would afford the
Russian fighter super maneuverability in close air combat, which would give it
a clear advantage over the F-15 in a dog-fight.
The Su-27, from which the Su-30MK fighters are derived, was designed to
match the performance of the F-15, and probably of the U.S. Navy’s F-14 Tomcat
as well.13
Moreover, being armed with the Beyond Visual Range (BVR) R-77, RVV-AE,
air-to-air missile, with an estimated 75-80 km maximum range,14 the various versions of the Su-30MK can
hit first an air opponent carrying the U.S. Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air
Missile (AMRAAM), which has a maximum range of about 50 km.15
The Su-30MK2 and Venezuela
According to Viktor Litovkin, defense commentator for the Russian
state news agency RIA Novosti, the fighter sold to Venezuela is the Su-30MK2
variant.16
This aircraft is a naval strike version of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Su-30MKK, with 24 Su-MK2 delivered by Russia
to China in 2004 for the People’s Liberation Army/Navy.17
The Su-30MKK is the version of the Su-30MK specifically tailored for
China, and manufactured in Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Russian Far East.18
As opposed to the Su-30MKI of the Indian Air Force, the Chinese Su-30MKK
lacks TVC capability in its engines.19
The NATO identification name for the Su-30MKK/Su-30MK2 is “Flanker-G.”20
It is interesting to note that Russia expected back in 2004 to have
sold to China an additional batch of 24 Su-30MK2, which would have been
transferred in 2005 and 2006.21 However, this second sale of Su-30MK2
seemingly never took place. It might be
that Russia has sold to Venezuela Su-30MK2 aircraft belonging to the second lot
of 24 naval strike fighters it originally intended selling to China.22
The fact is that the two fighters of the version that presumably the
Venezuelan Air Force was considering acquiring and which flew from Russia to
Venezuela in a demonstration flight, to participate in the 2006 celebrations of
the South American country’s Independence Day (July 5), were actually the first
and second prototypes of the made-for-China Su-30MKK.23
Hugo Chávez’ stated intention for buying the Su-30MK2 is to attack
the Navy’s aircraft carriers in order to defeat an eventual U.S. invasion of
Venezuela. Thus, the Venezuelan President
declared: “An F-16 launches a missile, maximum distance: 60km . . . . Do you
all know from what distance the Sukhoi S-30 can launch? 200km.” Chávez continued: “That’s to say, an aircraft
carrier that stops in the Caribbean. They . . . like to stop [sic] aircraft
carriers in the Caribbean to invade.”24 In this connection, the Venezuelan leader
stated on another occasion that the U.S. military installations in the Dutch
insular territories of Aruba and Curaçao could serve as a staging point for a
military intervention aimed at ousting his regime.25
The Su-30MK2’s range with internal fuel probably might reach as much
as 3,200 km at high altitude due to the additional fuel tanks inside its tail
fins, borrowed from the Su-35 design.26 This would allow the fighter without air
refueling to cover within its radius of operation the eastern, central and
western Caribbean Sea, part of the northwestern section of this sea southeast
of the Yucatan Channel, the islands of Hispaniola, Jamaica and Puerto Rico, the
central and eastern parts of Cuba, and the Windward and Leeward Islands of the
Lesser Antilles. The combat radius of
the Su-30MK2 with internal fuel could be as high as 1,600 km, enough to reach
Puerto Rico. The estimated distance in a straight line from Caracas to San
Juan, Puerto Rico is of about 891 km.27
With one in-flight refueling, the Su-30MK2 might have a range of 5,200 km at
high altitude and a combat radius of 2,600 km,28
which in theory would enable the aircraft to operate over the Florida Peninsula,
the central part of the Gulf of Mexico, the Bahamas, and up to the Bermudas in
the Atlantic. Two aerial refueling
operations would give the fighter a maximum range of 6,990 km.29
This would give Su-30MK2 fighters a combat radius of 3,495 km flying at
high altitude. To better illustrate the
distances being considered from a geographical context, two air refueling
missions could in theory permit the Su-30MK2 to reach Norfolk in Virginia and
operate off the eastern seaboard of the United States from the Maryland coast
down to Florida. These considerations,
however, are not meant to back a belief that Venezuelan might attempt one day
to attack the continental U.S. They are
rather included to show the potential capability in terms of range of the Russian
fighter.
The Venezuelan Air Force possessed two tanker aircraft to provide
in-flight refueling for its fighter force.
The Venezuelan Boeing 707-384C tankers, identified by the registration
numbers 6944 and 8747, were equipped with the two air refueling systems of
probe and drogue, to supply with fuel the Mirage 50 and F-5 fighter fleet, and
of a flying boom for refueling the F-16.30 The new Su-30MK2 uses the probe and drogue
system of air-to-air refueling. If the reported
plans to acquire up to 150 “supersonic aircraft” ever materialize,31 and the Venezuelan Air Force would
consider conducting long range and long endurance operations, Caracas may opt
then to obtain more tanker aircraft like the Russian Ilyushin IL-78 “Midas,”32 provided that funding is available.
Reports from 2008 mentioned plans by Venezuela to purchase 10
Ilyushin Il-76 “Candid” military transport planes and 2 Il-78 air tankers.33 So far there are no indications that
Venezuela has received the aircraft. A determining reason for the Venezuelan
air force not receiving the Ilyushin transport aircraft might be the fact that
the aviation plant in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, that assembled the Il-76 in Soviet
days was unable to build the aircraft, filing “bankruptcy proceedings” in 2010 and
outright ending the assembly of planes in 2012. The failure of the Tashkent
plant to produce the aircraft was incidentally the reason why in 2005 Russia
failed to fulfill a large order placed by China to purchase 34 Il-76 transport
aircraft and 4 Il-78 air refueling tankers.34
In addition, the Venezuelan air force might be interested in acquiring the
Il-476 transport aircraft, an improved variant of the Il-76 that is also known
as the Il-76MD-90A, and the new Il-78 tanker aircraft, based on the Il-476.35
Russia will begin large-scale production of the Il-476 cargo plane
at the Aviastar aircraft production plant in the Russian region of Ulyanovsk.36 The United Aircraft Corporation of
Russia reportedly will produce 48 Il-476 transport planes for the Military
Transport Aviation of the Russian Air Force by the year 2020.37 In addition, Russian media reports had
estimated that the Russian Ministry of Defense may order 31 modern Il-78 air
refueling aircraft probably based on the Il-476 transport plane.38
Currently there appears to be only one Boeing 707-384C tanker that
is operational, the aircraft with registration number 6944, with the other
707-384C being cannibalized for spare parts to keep the one air tanker
operational,39 this again being the
result of the U.S. ban on military sales to Venezuela. The same problem is
affecting the fleet of Lockheed Martin C-130H Hercules transport aircraft of
the Venezuelan air force – officially now known as the Bolivarian Military
Aviation.40 Thus, Venezuela acquired
8 Y-8 Chinese transport planes as less Hercules were operational due to a lack
of U.S. spare parts, leading to the cannibalization of parts from C-130H to
keep the other aircraft flying.41 It is
probable that Venezuela may order the new Il-476 transport aircraft and its
Il-78 variant, now that large-scale production of these planes is set to start
at the Aviastar aircraft production plant in Russia.42 Hence the older Lockheed Martin C-130H
Hercules and the Boeing 707-384C would be replaced by the new Ilyushin
aircraft, which was the intention behind the earlier order for 10 Il-76 and 2
Il-78.43
Naval strike capabilities of the Su-30MK2
The Su-30MK2 is equipped with an improved N001VEP radar with the
capability to search and track objectives on the sea surface and of
“suppressing the sea surface clutter,” being able of performing in spite of
enemy electronic countermeasures (ECM) activity.44
The Su-30MK2 can launch both land attack and anti-ship precision
weapons. It can thus be armed with the
supersonic Kh-31A (NATO designation: AS-17 “Krypton”) anti-ship cruise missile
and its anti-radiation version, the Kh-31P.45 The Venezuelan Su-30MK2 may be armed also
with two and possibly up to three air–to-surface supersonic Russo-Indian
BrahMos anti-ship cruise missiles.46 Currently the BrahMos is being integrated
with the Su-30MKI, and it is expected that the process will be complete by the
end of 2007. Both Russia and India want
to export the version to Latin America.47 The new Venezuelan fighters could carry instead
the air-launched version of the Russian Yakhont, the missile from which the
BrahMos was derived.48 Another supersonic anti-ship missile that
probably is in the Su-30MK2’s weapons inventory is the Kh-41 Moskit.49
The Moskit has been regarded as a successor to the Kh-22 Burya (NATO
designation: AS-4 “Kitchen”) and the Kh-26 (AS-6 “Kingfish”) air-launched
anti-ship cruise missiles.50 Versions of the Kh-22 and Kh-26, which can be
carried by the Tu-22M3 “Backfire C” bomber, have been developed to attack
large-sized vessels such as aircraft carriers.
The Tu-22M3 can be armed with three Kh-22 cruise missiles and could
probably carry up to three Kh-26 missiles.51
The Venezuelan Su-30MK2s may also carry the Kh-35 (NATO designation:
AS-20 “Switchblade”) subsonic anti-ship missile.52 The Su-30MK253
could be armed with at least two AS-20 per mission, and possibly with up to 4
of these missiles. In this connection,
it has been reported that the Kh-35’s active radar is “being effective when
used in a salvo of missiles.”54 In addition, the Kh-59ME (NATO designation:
AS-18 “Kazoo”)55 air-to-surface cruise
missile is probably one of the weapons carried by the Chinese Su-30MKK,56 and it could be offered to Venezuela
for use in its new fighters. A newer variant
of the AS-18, the Kh-59MK, is a dedicated naval strike version believed to be
one of the weapons carried by the Chinese Su-30MK2 fighters.57
The Su-30MKK can carry 8,000 kg of weapons and external loads in 12 hard
points.58
Perhaps Chávez’ comments on the Su-30’s ability to launch a weapon
against a target located at a distance of 200 km was a reference to cruise
missiles such as the Yakhont, the Kh-31P Mod 2 missile, the Moskit, the
improved AS-20, and the Kh-59ME/MK. It must be added that any hesitation that
Moscow may have had in the past to sell more powerful weapon systems for the
Venezuelan Su-30MK2, for fear of damaging its relations with Washington, may be
dispelled as bilateral relations continue to worsen and sink into a new Cold
War due to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and to its intervention in Eastern and
Southern Ukraine.
Future air-to-air capabilities of the Venezuelan
“Flankers”
To address this point, we have to go back to the comments made by
Hugo Chávez on the weapon range capabilities of the F-16 versus the Su-30MK. The Venezuelan President declared that the
Russian fighters could launch a missile at a target as far away as 200 km,
while in comparison the F-16’s missile could reach its objective at a distance
of only 60 km. It may be that Chávez was
referring to the air-to air capability of the Sukhoi fighters, instead of the
air-to-surface, offensive weapons the Su-30MK can launch as described
above. To further discuss this
contention, it is useful to mention the Israeli upgrades with which Venezuela
sought to modernize its F-16 fleet, but which the United States vetoed.59
Already, Israel modernized the combat potential of the Venezuelan F-16s
by providing Python 4 short-range air-to-air missiles, Lizard precision bombs,
and the Litening electro-optic targeting pod.60
The Venezuelan Air Force’s aim was to upgrade its F-16A/B to the C/D
standard, and the desired modernization of the aircraft with Israeli help would
have reportedly fulfilled this requirement.
Thus, Venezuela was considering improving the radar and avionics suite
of its F-16 before the cancellation of the project due to U.S. pressure. Among the upgrades were the installation of
color multi-function displays (MFD) and holographic head-up displays (HUD) in
the cockpits, fire-control radars with synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
capability, an advanced electronic warfare suite, and the acquisition of both
air-to-surface stand off weapons, such as the SPICE enhancements to gravity
bombs, and beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missiles.61
The new radar planned for the F-16s would probably have been the Elta
EL/M-2032.62 The Israeli Derby and the U.S. AMRAAM were
the likely candidates for the BVR air-to-air missiles sought by the Venezuelan
Air Force.
It must be added that an upgraded version of the Lizard
precision-guided bomb fitted with wings can extend the weapon’s range to 60-70
km, and that SPICE-modified gravity bombs can reach with this improvement a
target “over 50 km” away from the launch platform.63
This notwithstanding, President Chávez’ comments about the F-16 firing a
missile with a range of 60 km might have been a reference to the Derby BVR
air-to-air missile, with a reported range of more than 63 km when engaging an
aircraft flying “head-on.”64 Chávez could have been referring also to the
AMRAAM, due to “the baseline missile’s 30 n mile-plus distance,”65 equivalent to 55.6 km-plus.
Moreover, the Venezuelan leader’s allusion to the 200 km range of
the Su-30MK’s missiles might have been made with new types of Russian
fire-and-forget BVR air-to-air missiles in mind, like the R-77M or the R-37M
currently being developed.66 The R-77M missile, featuring a dual mode
active/passive radar seeker and expected to be developed by 2010, will have 200
to 350 percent more range than that of the R-77 missile, which is reported to
have a range of 80 km and one of 50 km “against a fast-moving manoeuvring
target.” The heights where the R-77M
would engage its objectives are planned to be between 25,000 meters and 500
meters.67
The estimated maximum range of the R-77M missile would be of 160 km to
280 km. The R-77M has been designed to
outperform the AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM as well as future enhanced versions of this
missile, such as the AIM-120D.68 The R-37M missile, on the other hand, would
have ranges of 300-400 km.69 The R-37M would be intended for the Su-35
multirole fighter, and a variant proposed for foreign users is currently
awaiting Russian government approval for its export.70
Future
submarine acquisitions
Also in June 2006 it was revealed by
Jane’s Defence Weekly that the Russian diesel-electric submarine of the
Amur 950 type was the favorite for the Venezuelan Navy’s requirement for three
submarines. The submarines are of the 4th
generation Amur class, an export version of the Lada class. It was reported that a delegation of experts
from Venezuela sent to Russia to examine its latest conventional submarine
designs gave a very positive assessment of the Sankt Petersburg, the
lead ship of the Lada class that has been commissioned into the Russian
Navy.71
The Sankt Petersburg has a submerged displacement of 2,700 tons,
and the export versions being offered to Venezuela, the Amur 1650 and Amur 950,
displace submerged 2,300 tons and 1,300 tons respectively.72
The Venezuelans apparently prefer the Amur 950 submarine since it has
been designed to operate in a littoral environment. According to Jane’s, Venezuela would use the
new submarines for “patrolling and blocking sea lanes, actions against surface
and submarine forces, attacks against land targets and insertion of special
forces.”73
Having a crew of 21, the Amur 950
can operate at a maximum depth of 250 meters.
It has a speed of 19 knots submerged, a range of 350 nautical miles
traveling underwater, a range of 4,000 nautical miles using snorkel, and an
endurance of 30 days.74 The single-hull submarine is reportedly “8-10
times” more silent than the Project 877 “Kilo” class boats.75
According to Jane’s, the submarine is less noisy “by stringent control
of acoustic emission from equipment, double elastic mounting of all equipment
and the use of anechoic cladding on the outer hull.”76
The Lada class can have a 12 meter segment with a fuel cell-based
air-independent propulsion (AIP) system retrofitted to the submarine’s hull.77
It might be possible that such an option will be offered to users of the
Amur class. An AIP system would
greatly reduce the indiscretion rate of a diesel-electric submarine by allowing
it to remain submerged for longer time without the need to snorkel to recharge
its batteries after relatively short periods of underwater travel. Moreover, the Amur class design is
“fully tropicalised,” enabling the submarine to operate in any marine environment
local to the vessel’s potential customers.78
The submarine carries four 21-inch torpedo tubes (TT) and a combat
load of up to 12 weapons, including the most modern torpedoes Russia can offer,
the anti-ship, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and land attack versions of the
Club-S (NATO designation: SS-N-27) submarine-launched cruise missile, sea
mines, acoustic countermeasures, and possibly also the Shkval rocket-propelled
torpedo.79
The boat would likely be able to launch a salvo of torpedoes from its
four TT. Like the Lada class, the
Amur 950 type submarine probably has a torpedo reload system that can
automatically load the TT in a period of time shorter than 20 seconds after
having launched an initial salvo.80 The Amur 950s might be able to deploy up to
24 MDM-1 and/or RM-2G sea mines when not carrying other weapons, or possibly a
mix of 4 torpedoes plus 16 mines.81
The Club-S family of cruise missiles includes the following, which
can be launched from 21-inch TT: 1) The 3M54 anti-ship missile, composed of
three stages, with a maximum range of 220 km, travels guided by an inertial
navigation system with a sustained speed of Mach 0.55-Mach 0.8 at heights above
10,000 meters or down to 10-15 meters until it reaches its terminal phase.
Then, the third stage, which contains a 220 kg HE warhead and an active radar
guidance system, detaches from the second stage, flying at Mach 3 and 5-10
meters above the sea surface towards its target. 2) The 3M54M1 anti-ship
missile, being designed with two stages, has a maximum range of 300 km. It has
a 450 kg HE warhead in the second stage with the same active radar assembly as
the 3M54. The missile flies at a
constant speed of Mach 0.55-Mach 0.8, with the second stage making the final
run towards the target at a sea-skimming altitude of 5 meters. 3) The 3M14 land
attack missile, a variant of the 3M54M1 design, has a maximum range of 300 km
and makes use of inertial navigation together with satellite navigation to
reach its objective, carrying also a 450 kg HE warhead. 4) The 91R1 ASW
missile, which can be launched by a submarine at a depth of 150 meters, carries
a torpedo to the area where its intended target is located and as far as 50 km
from its launch platform.82 Moreover, the radar of the 3M54 and 3M54M1
anti-ship missiles is also “effective” when the weapons are fired in salvos
against their target.83
The Amur 950 submarines may also carry the VA-111 Shkval
rocket-propelled torpedo, as it seems to be part of the Lada class
weapons inventory.84 The Shkval is an anti-submarine torpedo with a
speed of 195 kts and a range of 7 or 10 km.
Reportedly, a new version of the Shkval with a speed of 300 kts is being
developed, probably featuring a “target sensor” as the Shkval-E variant of the
weapon.85
If acquired, the Amur 950 type submarines would operate initially in
parallel to the Venezuelan Navy’s two Type 209/1300 German-built
diesel-electric submarines of the Sábalo class, now being refitted and
modernized. Eventually, the 3 new
submarines will substitute the Sábalos after the latter are stricken
from service.86 It is of interest to note that the Sábalo
class has a submerged displacement of 1,265 tons, not that different from the
1,300 submerged displacement of the Amur 950.
However, the German-built boats have an endurance of 50 days compared to
the 30 days of the Russian submarines.87
Probable reasons behind Venezuela’s defense acquisitions
The acquisition of Sukhoi fighters
and submarines by the government of Hugo Chávez points towards a defensive
strategy, but one not aimed at Venezuela’s neighbors but against a hypothetical
U.S. military threat. Thus, it is
believed that the Venezuelan military buildup is not intended to back up a
future policy of territorial expansion and armed aggression against Venezuela’s
neighboring countries and islands,88
although with the new weapons Venezuela would certainly have the capability to
do so. Chávez wants to consolidate his
leftist regime within Venezuela, and the Russian weapons are meant to dissuade
a feared future U.S. attack from the sea aimed at regime change in
Caracas. The planned total purchase by
the Venezuelan Air Force of more than 60 Su-30/Su-35 multirole fighters89 is part of such a conventional weapons
deterrence directed at the U.S. Navy.
Another reason why the Venezuelans
are buying and plan to buy such sophisticated fighter aircraft in large numbers
is simply to show off that their armed forces have the most powerful, modern,
and “meanest” weapon systems of Latin America.
In the past, Venezuelan governments have demonstrated they are capable
of engaging in “lavish defence spending” thanks to the country’s oil
revenues. Back in the 1950s, such
expenditures made the Venezuelan Air Force the “most modern” in the region,
with “jet fighter-bombers” and “jet bombers.”90 Another instance in which Venezuela wanted to
indulge its air force with a large and powerful fighter force was in the 1980s,
when it planned to buy 72 F-16A/B from the United States. However, President Reagan only authorized the
sale of 24 of the aircraft.91 According to Adrian J. English from Jane’s,
it appears that the Venezuelan government actually wanted to procure then 48
F-16 fighters, 24 Hawk dedicated “fighter/ground attack aircraft” from British
Aerospace, some other 24 Hawk aircraft of the trainer version, and 22 Vought
A-7 Corsair II strike aircraft.92
It is probable that the additional 30 or so fighters that Venezuela
could buy from Russia in the future may include the Su-35UB, a twin-seat version
of the advanced Su-35 multirole fighter.
The Su-35UB has been described as possessing at present “the most
sophisticated avionics suite” when compared to the current variants of the
Su-30MK family. Featuring a more
advanced fire-control radar than that of the Su-30MKK, the Su-35UB will be able
to launch all air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, and smart bombs existing
in Russia (operational and in prototype stage).
In addition, the fighter is equipped with a fire-control radar in its
rear “sting.” Also, the TVC nozzles in
its engines will give the Su-35UB super maneuverability in close air combat.93
The fact is that the Russian weapons
Venezuela is acquiring or plans to buy are based on designs and principles
developed at the time of the Soviet Union specifically to match and defeat
Western military technology in general and U.S. weapon systems in
particular. This is a consideration that
might have made the Russian hardware the more attractive to the Chávez
government. What is clear is that Russia
is willing to sell the arms, and Venezuela has the petrodollars and the will to
buy them.
Considerations regarding the Venezuelan Air Force
It can be expected that the
Venezuelan Air Force will adapt itself to the new equipment it is buying from
Russia. Once they have become used to
the new Russian fighters and weaponry, the Venezuelan pilots can be as capable,
in terms of training, professionalism and combat potential, as the pilots of
any serious air force. Showing what
Latin American combat aviators were capable of achieving, the pilots of the
Argentine Air Force and Naval Aviation sank or burned beyond repair during the
1982 conflict over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands 6 ships of the Royal Navy’s
Task Force, including two guided-missile destroyers, one container ship
transporting helicopters, two frigates, and one landing ship, logistic
(LSL). Several more ships would have
probably been sunk if all or most of the U.S.-made bombs that damaged them
would have exploded.94 This reference to the performance of the
Argentinean pilots in war is useful, to dispel misconceptions that “Hispanic”
air forces might not be up to the task in a combat situation.
As Jane’s Sentinel has stated, “since the mid-1950s the
Venezuelan Air Force (FAV) has been, and remains one of the most efficient and
best equipped in Latin America.”95 Another testimony of the quality of the
Venezuelan fighter pilots was made in 1991 by U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General
Thomas Baker, then commander of the 12th Air Force, who praised the
high level of professionalism demonstrated by the Venezuelan F-16 pilots,
placing them among the best in the world.
Baker’s comments came in the aftermath of joint air exercises between
the Venezuelan F-16 and visiting F-15E Strike Eagle fighters belonging to the
USAF 8th Tactical Fighter Squadron.96 It must be pointed out that the Venezuelan
Air Force pilots spend an average of 155 flying hours per year, compared to the
150 flying hours per year of the German Luftwaffe pilots.97
The new Venezuelan Su-30MKs will
probably be based at the Air Base “El Libertador” in Palo Negro, not far from
Maracay and west of Caracas. This is the
Venezuelan Air Force’s most important base where its 21 F-16A/B and 15-16
Mirage 50D/EV fighters are stationed.98 The Venezuelan Mirage 50s can be armed with
the famous Exocet AM-39 anti-ship missile for naval strike missions.99
If Venezuela acquires a total of more than 60 Russian multirole
fighters, another location that may host these aircraft is the Air Base “Luis
del Valle García” in Barcelona, east of Caracas and very close to the sea. The Air Base “Teniente Vicente Landaeta Gil”
by the western city of Barquisimeto is other place where Su-30MK or Su-35 could
be deployed. The Venezuelan Air Force’s
fleet of 21-23 CF-5A/D Freedom Fighter and NF-5A/B Tiger fighters currently
operate from this base.100
Already in the 1980s, Venezuela’s
internal system of air communications was reportedly “highly developed,” and by
2001, 295 airfields had “permanently paved runways” out of a total of 431
airfields.101 The country has 12 main air bases and
airports shared for civil and military purposes.102 Venezuela has spent “lavishly” to develop its
road system, creating “the best and most comprehensive highway network in South
America,”103 with 31,200 km of paved
roads in 2001.104 Thus, in case of conflict the Venezuelan Air
Force can follow a strategy of dispersal, scattering its air combat assets
throughout several of its airfields, even operating fighters from highways to
prevent the aircraft from being found and destroyed in their air bases by
cruise missile strikes or precision-guided bomb attacks.
Russia’s reasons behind the arms exports
As for Russia’s motives for its military exports to Venezuela, the
Kremlin has a clear commercial interest to expand its arms sales into a Latin
American market long dominated by U.S., European and Israeli defense
corporations, particularly in the face of a shrinking Central and East European
market.105 However, Moscow is also keen to develop
through defense exports key international partnerships in support of its goal
to achieve a multipolar world order, vis-à-vis the present unipolar system
dominated by the United States. Thus, it
is not surprising that after meeting the visiting Russian Deputy Prime
Minister, Alexander Zhukov, last November, Chávez stated that “what the U.S.
elite want is to avoid us having relations with Russia or with China, or with
France or with India. . . . They try to have a unipolar world, and we want a pluri-polar
model.”106 The point was echoed by Russian President
Vladimir Putin at a press conference with the Venezuelan President, during the
latter’s July visit to Russia. Stressing
Russo-Venezuelan ties, Putin declared that “we are actively cooperating in the
international arena and believe that the world order should be firmly based on
international law. We are in favor of a multipolar world.”107
By arming countries whose regimes follow a foreign policy
independent of, at variance with or outright opposed to U.S. foreign policy,
Russia reinforces the survival of those poles that form its desired multipolar
world order. Russia’s influence and
prestige in international affairs is set to grow, as it becomes the main supplier
of advanced weapons to states and sub-state forces that oppose the unipolar
world order.
1 Christopher Toothaker, “Venezuela to Buy 24 Russian Fighter Jets,” Washington
Post, 15 June 2006 [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/15/AR2006061500941_pf.html;
Internet; accessed 17 June 2006.
2 “Russia to Deliver 30,000 Kalashnikovs and 3 Helicopters to
Venezuela by Year-End,” MosNews.com, 11 November 2005 [newspaper
on-line]; available from
http://www.mosnews.com/money/2005/11/11/venezuelaarms.shtml;
Internet; accessed 18 January 2006; “Russian warplanes to take to Venezuelan
skies in parade,” RIA Novosti, 5 July 2006 [news agency on-line];
available from http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060705/50917908-print.html;
Internet; accessed 16 July 2006; The World Defence Almanac 2006. Military
Technology 30, no. 1 (May 2006): 85; Yefim Gordon, Dmitriy Komissarov, and
Sergey Komissarov, Mil’s Heavylift Helicopter. Mi-6/Mi-10/V-12/Mi-26,
Red Star Volume 22 (Hinckley, England: Midland Publishing, 2005), 96.
3 “Russia signs $1bln aircraft contract with Venezuela-Ivanov,” RIA
Novosti, 21 July 2006 [news agency on-line]; available from http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060721/51667738-print.html;
Internet; accessed 21 July 2006; “Russia/Venezuela one billion US dollars arms
deal,” MercoPress News Agency, 22 July 2006 [news agency on-line];
available from http://www.mercopress.com/Detalle.asp?NUM=8376;
Internet; accessed 22 July 2006.
4 “Talks on Su sales to Venezuela could be positive – Sukhoi head,” RIA
Novosti, 18 July 2006 [news agency on-line]; available from http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060718/51524678-print.html;
Internet; accessed 20 July 2006; Paul Jackson, ed., Jane’s All the World’s
Aircraft 2004-2005, 95th ed. (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s
Information Group, 2004), 442.
5 Erwin Fuguett, “Caribes y Gavilanes,” FAV Club [information
site on-line]; available from http://www.fav-club.com/articulos/caribes.htm;
Internet; accessed 30 August 2006.
6 “Venezuela may buy Russian Sukhoi planes – Chavez,” DefenceTalk.com,
8 May 2006 [news site on-line]; available from http://www.defencetalk.com/news/publish/printer/printer_5909.php;
Internet; accessed 8 May 2006.
7 James Murphy, “US extends arms embargo on Venezuela,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly 43, no. 35 (30 August 2006): 19; James Murphy, “US moves to
impose arms ban on Venezuela,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 43, no. 21 (24 May
2006): 18.
8 José J. Lugo M., “Grupo Aéreo de Caza Nº 16 de la Fuerza Aérea
Venezolana,” FAV Club, May 2003 [information site on-line]; available
from http://www.fav-club.com/articulos/vipers/vipers.htm;
Internet; accessed 30 August 2006; World Defence Almanac, 86; Murphy,
“US moves to impose arms ban.”
9 Idem, “US extends arms embargo on Venezuela;” Idem, “US moves to
impose arms ban;” José Higuera, “Spain seals Venezuela deal in face of opposition,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly 42, no. 49 (7 December 2005): 4; Jeremy McDermott,
“First three of 15 Mi-17s enter service with Venezuela,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly 43, no. 16 (19 April 2006): 8; World Defence Almanac,
86.
10 Ibid.; McDermott, 8;
11 The Su-30MK has a reported maximum speed at high altitude of Mach
2, while that of the F-15 is Mach 2.5. See Jackson, 442, 443, 582-84.
12 Ibid., 442.
13 Yefim Gordon, Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker Air Superiority Fighter,
trans. Dimitriy Komissarov (Shrewsbury, England: Airlife, 1999), 7.
14 Yevgeniy Letunovsky, “Long-range ‘teeth’ for Russia’s
next-generation fighter,” Jane’s Missiles & Rockets 10, no. 7 (July
2006): 11-12; Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, 43rd
ed. (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004), 71-72.
15 Hewson, 112.
16 Viktor Litovkin, “Weapons for Venezuela: Nothing personal,” RIA
Novosti, 31 July 2006 [news agency on-line]; available from http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060731/52067937-print.html;
Internet; accessed 31 July 2006. See also Felipe Salles, Rodrigo Bendoraytes,
and Ailton José de Oliveira Júnior, “Su-30 – A Venezuela Joga Pesado,” Base
Militar Web Magazine [magazine on-line]; available from http://www.alide.com.br/artigos/flankersvenezuela/index.htm; Internet; accessed 19 August 2006; M.K. Bhadrakumar, “Venezuela,
Russia: Comrades in arms,” Asia Times Online, 2 August 2006 [newspaper
on-line]; available from http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/HH02Ag01.html;
Internet; accessed 25 August 2006.
17 Jackson, 443; “China accepts Su-30MK2 fighters,” Jane’s Defence
Weekly 41, no. 13 (31 March 2004): 19; Jiang Jintao, “Sukhoi completes
delivery of fighter aircraft to China,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 41, no. 35
(1 September 2004): 15.
18 Jackson, 442; Yefim Gordon and Peter Davison, Sukhoi Su-27
Flanker, Warbird Tech Series Volume 42 (North Branch, Minn.: Specialty
Press, 2006), 47
14 Yefim Gordon, Flankers. The New Generation, Red Star Volume
2 (Hinckley, England: Midland Publishing, 2001), 50; Gordon and Davison, 47.
20 “Sukhoi Su-30MK2,” FAV-Club, January 28, 2014, accessed May 19,
2014, http://www.fav-club.com/sukhoi-su-30mk2/.
21 Jintao.
22 It seems that in November 2004 Vietnam took delivery of 4 Su-30MK2,
possibly belonging to the second batch of 24 of these fighters Russia offered
unsuccessfully to sell to China. The Vietnamese fighters are identified as the
Su-30MK2V. See Salles, Bendoraytes, and de Oliveira Júnior.
23 “Russian warplanes to take to Venezuelan skies in parade,” RIA
Novosti, 5 July 2006 [news agency on-line]; available from http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060705/50917908-print.html;
Internet; accessed 16 July 2006; Rafael Cruz and Felipe Salles, “Su-30MK –
Super Flankers no Brasil!,” Defesa@net, 4 July 2006 [news site on-line];
available from http://www.defesanet.com.br/america_latina/venezuela_su-30mk.htm;
Internet; accessed 16 August 2006; Gordon, Flankers, 48-51; Jackson,
442; Gordon and Davison, 47-48.
24 “Venezuela to get Russian aircraft,” BBC News, 15 June 2006
[news agency on-line]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5082006.stm;
Internet; accessed 8 August 2006.
25 Joris Janssen Lok, “Thales deal helps thaw Dutch-Venezuelan
relations,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 43, no. 29 (19 July 2006): 43.
26 Gordon and Davison, 96, 47; Gordon, Flankers, 50; Jackson,
442-43.
27 Approximate distance between Caracas and San Juan, Puerto Rico
calculated at DistanceFromTo, accessed May 17, 2014, http://www.distancefromto.net/.
28 Gordon and Davison, 96; Jackson, 443.
29 Gordon and Davison, 96.
30 “Boeing 707-384C(KC),” AviacionCR.net, accessed May 17, 2014, http://www.aviacioncr.net/buscar.php?aeronave=Boeing
707-384C(KC); World Defence Almanac, 86; The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006 (Abingdon, England:
Routledge, 2006), 344; Jamie Hunter, ed., Jane’s Aircraft Upgrades 2002-2003,
10th ed. (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2002), 495,
191; Erwin Fuguett Gedde, “Los 25 años del Mirage en Venezuela,” FAV Club
[information site on-line]; available from http://www.fav-club.com/articulos/mirage5025/m5025home.htm;
Internet; accessed 10 December 2006; Erwin Fuguett, “Northrop F-5 con La Fuerza
Aérea Venezolana,” FAV Club [information site on-line]; available from http://www.fav-club.com/articulos/f5vzla/f5vzlahome.htm;
Internet; accessed 29 January 2007.
31 Roberto Godoy, “Venezuela se arma e põe Brasil em alerta,” Defesa@net,
10 July 2006 [news site on-line]; available from http://www.defesanet.com.br/america_latina/venezuela_balance_1.htm;
Internet; accessed 13 October 2006.
32 Russia’s willingness to export air refueling aircraft is exemplified
by China’s order in 2005 for 8 IL-78M tankers. See World Defence Almanac,
333. India is also interested in acquiring 6 IL-78 refueling aircraft from
Russia. See “India to sign pact with Russia to buy additional Sukhoi fighter
jets,” Kuwait News Agency, 8 February 2007 [news agency on-line];
available from http://www.kuna.net.kw/home/Story.aspx?Language=en&DSNO=950250;
Internet; accessed 8 February 2007.
33 Jack Sweeney, “Venezuela buys Russian aircraft, tanks to boost
power,” United Press International, October 15, 2008, accessed May 18, 2014, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2008/10/15/Venezuela-buys-Russian-aircraft-tanks-to-boost-power/UPI-11881224089163/#;
Martin Sieff, “Il-76 transports give Chavez power across Latin America,” United
Press International, January 9, 2009, accessed May 18, 2014, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2009/01/09/Il-76-transports-give-Chavez-power-across-Latin-America/UPI-90271231518460/.
34 Vasiliy Kashin, “Il-76 returns to Russia,” The Voice of Russia,
July 10, 2012, accessed May 18, 2014, http://voiceofrussia.com/2012_07_10/IL-76-returns-to-Russia/.
35 “The Il-476 is a modernized version of the Il-76 Candid transport
plane and features a new wing, a fully digital flight control system, a new
cockpit with advanced digital displays and PS-90A-76 turbofans with improved
fuel efficiency, according to state-run aerospace holding United Aircraft
Corporation.” “Russia to Get First 3 New Il-476 Cargo Planes in 2014,” RIA
Novosti, March 19, 2013, accessed May 18, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/business/20130319/180118238/Russia-to-Get-First-3-New-Il-476-Cargo-Planes-in-2014.html.
36 Kashin; “Aviastar to Build ‘Dozens’ of Il-476 Transports by 2020,”
RIA Novosti, January 20, 2012, accessed May 18, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/business/20120120/170859103.html.
37 “Russian Air Force to Get 48 Il-476 Transports,” RIA Novosti,
February 5, 2013, accessed May 18, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130205/179242929.html.
38 “Russian Military Plans to Buy New Aerial Tankers – Source,” RIA
Novosti, February 20, 2013, accessed May 18, 2014, http://en.ria.ru/business/20130220/179587284/Russian-Military-Plans-to-Buy-New-Aerial-Tankers--Source.html.
39 “Boeing 707,” AFC Aviation Friends Cologne/Bonn, last modified April
16, 2014, accessed May 17, 2014, http://www.aviation-friends-cologne.de/listings/boeing-707-listing.html;
Chaco, post to “Aviones de transporte militar,” Foro RKKA, accessed May 17,
2014, http://foro.rkka.es/index.php?topic=2432.20;wap2. In reference to the air transport assets of
the Venezuelan air force, Chaco wrote: “. . . el otro avión de transporte tipo
cisterna, que queda operativo por el mismo problema de repuesto en funciones es
el Boeing 707-384C numero (sic) 6944 ya que el 8747 fue desincorporado.” See
Chaco, “Aviones de transporte militar.”
40 Aviación Militar Bolivariana, accessed May
19, 2014, http://www.aviacion.mil.ve/.
41 “China entrega a Venezuela primeros
aviones Y-8,” La Patilla, November 15, 2012, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.lapatilla.com/site/2012/11/15/china-entrega-a-venezuela-primeros-aviones-y-8/.
42 lisandrorose [Lisandro Swalbagen],
“Ilyushin Il-476, un avión con gran potencial de exportación,” Taringa!,
accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.taringa.net/posts/noticias/15684691/Ilyushin-Il-476-un-avion-con-gran-potencial-de-exportacion.html.
43 Siva Govindasamy, “Venezuela close to confirming deal for Chinese
K-8 trainers,” Flightglobal, September 27, 2008, accessed May 19, 2014, http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/venezuela-close-to-confirming-deal-for-chinese-k-8-trainers-316546/.
44 “China accepts Su-30MK2 fighters;” World Defence Almanac,
333.
45 The Kh-31A Mod 2 version has a 110 kg high explosive (HE)
penetration warhead and a maximum range of 100 km. The anti-radiation Kh-31P
was designed to attack the U.S. Navy’s AN/SPY-1 Aegis radar system of the Ticonderoga
class guided-missile cruisers and Arleigh Burke class guided-missile
destroyers, airborne early warning and control aircraft such as the E-3 AWACS
or airborne battlefield surveillance radar platforms like the E-8 Joint STARS.
The Kh-31P Mod 2 missile has an 87 kg HE blast/fragmentation warhead and a
maximum range of 200 km. Both the Kh-31A and Kh-31P have a maximum cruising
speed of Mach 3 at an altitude of 15,000 meters or of Mach 2.5 flying at 200
meters over the surface. See Jintao; “China accepts Su-30MK2 fighters;” Hewson,
214-16; World Defence Almanac, 333.
46 The BrahMos has a reported range of 290 km and a speed of Mach 2.8
flying at an altitude of about 15,000 meters. During the final phase of its
trajectory, the missile would fly at heights of 5-15 meters. When programmed to
follow a sea-skimming flight profile, the weapon’s range is of 120 km. The
air-launched version of the missile would carry a 200-250 kg warhead, an
active/passive radar seeker, and an inertial navigation system for naval strike
missions. Another version of the BrahMos is fitted with a combined inertial and
satellite navigation system to attack land targets. See “India, Russia to make
BrahMos missiles,” Times of India, 21 July 2006 [newspaper on-line];
available from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-1789050,prtpage-1.cms;
Internet; available 21 July 2006; “India, Russia to develop aircraft version of
BrahMos missile,” rediff.com, 16 December 2005 [news site on-line];
available from http://www.rediff.com//news/2005/dec/16brahmos.htm;
Internet; accessed 2 September 2006; Rahul Bedi, “BrahMos set for Su-30MKI
fit,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 43, no. 36 (6 September 2006): 17; Robert
Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, no. 43 (Coulsdon, Surrey:
Jane’s Information Group, 2004), 123; Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane’s Strategic
Weapon Systems, 41st ed. (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information
Group, 2004), 7, 184-85.
47 Bedi, 17.
48 The air-to-surface Yakhont features a cruise speed of Mach 2.6 and
a maximum range of 500 km at a height of approximately 15,000 meters. When
flying at only 5 to 10 meters above the sea surface the Yakhont can cover 200
km at Mach 2. The missile has an active /passive radar seeker and can attack
single ships or targeted vessels in a convoy, it may have satellite guidance
based on GLONASS (the Russian version of the GPS) combined with its inertial
navigation system, and the weapon can maneuver when close to the target to
confuse the enemy ship’s defenses. The
air-launched Yakhont has a 200 kg HE warhead estimated to be of a semi-armor
piercing design. See Hewson, 123; Lennox, 184-85. It should be added that
according to the Russian Defense Ministry, the 24 navigation satellites
completing the GLONASS system “will be fully deployed by 2010.” See “Glonass to
be deployed in full by 2010 – Defense Ministry,” RIA Novosti, 30 August
2006 [news agency on-line]; available from http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060830/53334839.html;
Internet; accessed 31 August 2006; “Russia to Deploy 24-satellite Navigation
System by 2010,” MosNews.com, 30 August 2006 [newspaper on-line];
available from http://www.mosnews.com/news/2006/08/30/glonass.shtml;
Internet; accessed 31 August 2006.
49 The Moskit has an active/passive terminal radar seeker with
electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM), and a 320 kg HE warhead believed to
contain a blast/fragmentation charge with a semi-armor piercing fuse designed
to detonate after the missile would have penetrated well into the hull of the
targeted ship. The weapon has a rocket/ramjet propulsion system that gives it a
speed of Mach 3 cruising at an altitude of 10,000 meters, in which case it has
a range of 250 km. When flying above the sea surface, the Kh-41 has a sustained
speed of Mach 2.1 with a range of 150 km. The Moskit can attack single vessels
as well as selected ships within a convoy. The weapon is considerably heavier
than the missiles previously mentioned, with a launch weight of 4,500 kg when
compared, for instance, to the launch weight of 2,550 kg of the Yakhont
missile. Only one Kh-41 would be carried at a time under the fuselage of a
Su-30MK2. See Hewson, 221-22, 123.
50 Ibid., 221-22.
51 Ibid., 198-99.
52 The improved version of the AS-20 has a maximum range of between
250-300 km flying at a constant speed of Mach 0.9. The improved AS-20 has an
integrated inertial and a GLONASS-based satellite navigation system. This
feature gives the missile the ability to strike targets on land. The basic
Kh-35 has an active radar terminal seeker with ECCM, a 145 kg HE semi-armor
piercing/ fragmentation warhead, the ability to target ships sailing
individually or as part of a convoy, and a sea-skimming flight altitude of 2-5
meters above the water during the missile’s final run to the target. Hewson,
219-20; Martin Streetly, ed., Jane’s Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems
2004-2005, 16th ed. (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group,
2004), 227; Lennox, 181-83. It has been reported also that “an improved
version” of the missile can fly down to only one meter above the sea surface
during the last leg of the weapon’s trajectory. This might be a feature of the
improved AS-20. There is in addition a newer version of the AS-20, designated
Kh-37, with an IIR (imaging infra-red) seeker. See Lennox, 182, 181.
53 Ibid., 183.
54 Streetly, 227.
55 The Kh-59ME has a range of 200 km, with a reported sustained speed
of Mach 1.5 flying at a height ranging from 50 meters to 1,100 meters probably
above the ground. In addition, the missile might be able to cruise down to at
least 7 meters over the sea surface during its final approach to the target.
Armed with a 320 kg HE semi-armor piercing charge, the Kh-59ME has an inertial
navigation system capable of receiving flight updates through a two-way
datalink, which enables the weapons control officer in the Su-30MK through the
missile’s TV command to line of sight (CLOS) guidance system to select an
aim-point on the target. The missile’s circular error of probability (CEP) is
said to be between 2-3 meters. See Lennox, 199-200; Gordon, Flankers,
50. The Kh.59ME could also be offered with an IIR seeker, which may give the
missile all weather, day and night terminal homing capability. See Lennox, 199;
Andreas Parsch, “Maverick,” Encyclopedia Astronautica [information site
on-line]; available from http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/maverick.htm;
Internet; accessed 3 September 2006.
56 Lennox, 200.
57 The Kh-59MK has a range of 285 km, and it can be launched from
heights of 11,000 meters down to 200 meters, flying a cruising trajectory at an
altitude of 10-15 meters above the water through an inertial/satellite
navigation system updated via datalink.
During its final run to the target, the Kh-59MK, fitted also with a 320
kg warhead, can descend to 4-7 meters above the water guided by an active radar
based on the radar guidance system of the AS-20. See Lennox, 199-200; World
Defence Almanac, 333. It is possible that all the satellite navigation
systems of the cruise missiles described so far in this article possess a dual
satellite guidance system designed “to use signals from either the US
Navstar/GPS or the Russian Uragan/GLONASS systems.” See Miroslav Gyürösi,
“Bazalt redesigns its MPK ‘smart’ bomb kit,” Jane’s Missiles & Rockets
10, no. 9 (September 2006): 16.
58 In addition to the weapons mentioned, the fighter can be armed with
Kh-29T and Kh-29TE TV-guided air-to-surface missiles (ASM), and the Kh-29L and
Kh-29ML laser-guided ASM. All these
versions of the Kh-29 (AS-14 “Kedge”) have “a 317 kg HE penetration warhead”
designed to attack naval targets, reinforced concrete shelters for aircraft,
infrastructure such as all-weather landing strips made of concrete and bridges,
and industrial installations. The Kh-29T and Kh-29L missiles have a range of 12
km, and the Kh-29T can be fired from a height of 5,000 meters. The Kh-29TE has
greater range with 30 km, and the Su-30MK can launch it from as high as 10,000
meters or from 200 meters above the surface. See Gordon, Flankers, 50;
Jackson, 442-43; Hewson, 209-10. Precision bombs such as the TV-guided KAB-500Kr
and KAB-1500Kr, the IIR-guided KAB-500R, and the TV-guided air-fuel
KAB-500Kr-OD bomb may also be offered for Venezuela’s Sukhoi fighters. See
Jackson, 442-43; Gordon, Flankers, 50; Hewson, 426-27; Víctor F. Amaya
G., “El Flanker Visita Venezuela,” FAV Club, July 2006 [information site
on-line]; available from http://www.fav-club.com/articulos/flakervzla/flankervzla.htm;
Internet; accessed 30 August 2006.
59 Salles,
Bendoraytes, and de Oliveira Júnior.
60 Lugo M.;
Fuguett, “Caribes y Gavilanes.”
61 Lugo M.
62 Streetly, 223.
63 Hewson, 393, 398.
64 Ibid., 42.
65 Stephen Trimble, “AIM-120D free flight tests now scheduled for
2007,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 43, no. 34 (23 August 2006): 10.
66 Letunovsky, 11-12.
67 Ibid., 12.
68 Ibid., 11; Trimble, 10.
69 Hewson, 73.
70 Letunovsky, 12; Hewson, 73.
71 José Higuera, “Russia poised to win Venezuelan contract,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly 43, no. 24 (14 June 2006): 16; Anthony J. Watts, ed., Jane’s
Underwater Warfare Systems 2002-2003, 14th ed. (Coulsdon,
Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2002), 40.
72 Eric Wertheim, comp., The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets
of the World 2005-2006. Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2005), 613.
73 Higuera, “Russia poised to win Venezuelan contract,” 16.
74 Wertheim, 613; Higuera, “Russia poised to win Venezuelan contract,”
16.
75 Wertheim, 613.
76 Watts, 40.
77 Ibid., 41; Wertheim, 613.
78 Watts, 41.
79 Higuera, “Russia poised to win Venezuelan contract,” 16; Wertheim,
613; Lennox, 186-88; Watts, 40.
80 Ibid.
81 Wertheim, 613, 599.
82 Watts, 40.
83 Streetly, 227.
84 Wertheim, 613.
85 Ibid., 599; E.R. Hooton, ed., Jane’s Naval Weapon Systems,
40th ed. (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2004),
482.
86 Higuera, “Russia poised to win Venezuelan contract,” 16.
87 Wertheim, 1062, 613; Higuera, “Russia poised to win Venezuelan
contract,” 16.
88 Janssen Lok, 43.
89 Salles, Bendoraytes, and de Oliveira Júnior. Hugo Chávez declared
in June that after first buying the Su-30 fighters, “we are going to leave open
the possibility of a future acquisition” of Su-35 fighter aircraft. See Toothaker.
90 Adrian J. English, Armed Forces of Latin America. Their
Histories, Development, Present Strength and Military Potential (London:
Jane’s Publishing Company, 1985), 461.
91 Lugo M.; Fuguett.
92 English, 463.
93 Gordon, Flankers, 51, 50; Gordon and Davison, 49; Jackson,
445.
94 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), 346-49. The recently declassified report by the
Royal Navy’s Board of Inquiry on the sinking of the destroyer Sheffield
described the Argentinean missile strike against the vessel with naval Super
Etendard fighter-bombers as a “determined and very professional SUPER E/EXOCET.
. .attack.” See Doug Richardson, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets 11, no. 1
(January 2007): 12.
95 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. South America,
February-July 2001 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, 2001), 665.
96 Fuguett; Lugo M.
97 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 2005-2006 (Abingdon, England: Routledge, 2005), 353, 69.
98 Víctor F.
Amaya G., “Base Aérea ‘El Libertador.’ Columna
Vertebral de la Fuerza Aérea Venezolana,” FAV Club [information site
on-line]; available from http://www.fav-club.com/articulos/bael.htm; Internet; accessed 30 August 2006; World Defence Almanac,
86; Lugo M.; Military Balance 2005-2006, 353; Sentinel, 665.
99 Víctor F. Amaya G., “Decoración Aniversaria para los Mirages del
Grupo Aéreo de Caza Nº 11,” FAV Club [information site on-line];
available from http://www.fav-club.com/articulos/colasviper.htm; Internet; accessed 30 August 2006.
100 René J. Francillon with Carol A. McKenzie, The Naval Institute
Guide to World Military Aviation 1997-1998 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1997), 373-74; Delso E. López L., “FAV Club Visita: La Base Aérea
Teniente Vicente Landaeta Gil en su 40 aniversario,” FAV Club
[information site on-line]; available from http://www.fav-club.com/articulos/balanda40anios.html; Internet; accessed 30 August 2006; World Defence Almanac,
86; Military Balance 2005-2006, 353; Sentinel, 665-66.
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102 Francillon, 373; Sentinel, 666.
103 English, 441.
104 Sentinel, 643.
105 Dmitry Bobkov, “Just business on Latin American arms market,” RIA
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106 “Russia to Deliver 30,000 Kalashnikovs.”
107 Bhadrakumar.
